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1 Introduction
. . . growth was not a passive, trickle-down strategy for helping
the poor. It was an active, pull-up strategy instead. It required
a government that would energetically take steps to accelerate
growth, through a variety of policies including building infrastruc-
ture such as roads and ports and attracting foreign funds."
Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (2004)
During the last three decades, developing countries have made enormous
strides in opening up their protected domestic markets to international trade
and foreign investment. Yet most countries have not simply opened up their
markets. They have also instituted a range of policies to encourage exports,
attract foreign direct investment (FDI), promote innovation, and favor some
industries over others. This leads to the following question: is openness
to trade and FDI alone su¢ cient to achieve high growth rates in develop-
ing countries? If harnessing the gains from globalization requires additional
policies, can we identify them? While some types of complementary policies,
such as building roads and ports, are not controversial, others are. Bhag-
watis suggestion to "attract foreign funds" implies tilting incentives in favor
of foreign investors, which means abandoning policy neutrality. Our goal in
this chapter is to explore the popular but controversial idea that developing
countries benet from abandoning policy neutrality vis-a-vis trade, FDI and
resource allocation across industries.
Policy neutrality does not necessarily mean free trade, or a neutral stance
regarding taxation of multinational corporations, or even a common tax
structure for all industries. Both optimal tax theory and practical scal
considerations imply that countries (especially poor ones) will often want to
rely on tari¤s as a source of revenue or set di¤erent tax rates across indus-
tries. Are developing countries justied in imposing tari¤s, subsidies, and tax
breaks that imply distortions beyond the ones associated with optimal taxes
or revenue constraints? We refer to this set of government interventions as
"industrial policy".
The presence of externalities is the main theoretical justication for de-
viating from policy neutrality. Learning externalities from exports could
justify export subsidies; knowledge spillovers from foreign companies could
justify tax breaks for FDI; production externalities in "advanced" sectors
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could justify infant-industry protection or other measures to expand those
industries. We begin this review with a series of simple models to highlight
the role of Marshallian and inter-industry externalities, industry-level rents,
sector-specic coordination failures and information spillovers as a rationale
for industrial policy ("IP").
The main message that emerges from this review is that the theoretical
justication for infant-industry protection requires at a minimum either that
the country have a latent comparative advantage in the protected industry
or that the international price for this industry is higher than warranted by
the true opportunity cost of this good in the rest of the world. Moreover, for
protection to deliver large gains, the protected industry must exhibit large
Marshallian externalities. In contrast to the temporary trade barriers as-
sociated with infant-industry protection, permanent protection of a sector
may be warranted if it generates positive externalities to other sectors. In
all these models, however, protection is never the rst-best policy. Even
when protection could improve welfare, a production subsidy would be more
e¢ cient since it avoids the temporary consumption losses associated with
protection. In addition, protection may not work if the market failure is due
to sector-specic coordination problems, since tari¤-induced growth does not
necessarily help to solve coordination failures. Finally, just as R&D subsi-
dies are appropriate responses to innovation spillovers, policies to promote
entry into new industries are appropriate to deal with information spillovers
associated with the discovery of new protable activities.
While a number of market failures could justify government intervention
in theory, one key question is whether IP has worked in practice. The theoret-
ical discussion is followed by a review of the empirical literature on industrial
policy in Section 3. One challenge that we face in evaluating the empirical
literature is the large gap between the theoretical justication for IP and the
quantitative work that has been done to evaluate its "success". Even if we
could show that protected sectors grow faster, this is not su¢ cient evidence
to claim that IP is justied from a welfare standpoint.
Despite this shortcoming, we proceed in Section 3 to evaluate three di¤er-
ent approaches to measuring the e¤ectiveness of infant-industry protection.
The rst approach focuses on particular industries that have received protec-
tion, such as the steel rail industry in the US and semiconductors in Japan.
The few existing studies of this nature suggest that the conditions necessary
to generate positive net welfare gains from infant industry protection are
di¢ cult to satisfy in developing countries.
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A second empirical strategy exploits the variation in productivity growth
and di¤erent measures of support (including protection and production sub-
sidies) across industries to see whether supported industries exhibit faster
growth. The challenge here is that tari¤s and quotas are frequently imposed
for reasons other than the pursuit of industrial policy. If we cannot identify
the motive for protection, then it is di¢ cult to evaluate either the success
or failure of IP via trade policy instruments. Generating scal revenue, im-
proving terms of trade, and political considerations (rent-seeking) are likely
to be just as important as infant-industry considerations in explaining the
pattern of trade policy and other measures of support.
Finally, a third approach studies particular countries (e.g., South Ko-
rea and Taiwan) and cross-country variation in trade policy and economic
growth. While the literature on trade and growth linkages faces many chal-
lenging problems, in Section 4 we suggest two general lessons that may be
drawn from the voluminous evidence. First, there was no signicant relation-
ship in the second half of the twentieth century between average protection
levels and growth. Second, there is a positive association between trade vol-
umes and growth. We interpret the lack of a signicant association between
average tari¤s and growth, combined with the strong relationship between
trade shares and growth, to suggest that any successful IP strategy must
ultimately increase the share of international trade in GDP. The fact that
so many countries have been unsuccessful in o¤setting the anti-trade bias of
their interventions may explain why so many have failed to succeed at IP.
We also review a new set of studies that emphasize the complementarity
between trade and FDI reforms and other government policies. These studies
suggest that trade liberalization will not generate faster growth unless accom-
panied by changes in other parts of the economy, such as reducing barriers
to new rm entry, encouraging more exible labor markets, and improving
infrastructure. These new studies are consistent with one of the most im-
portant new theoretical developments in international trade: the emphasis
on heterogeneous rms. The new heterogeneous trade models suggest a new
mechanism through which trade a¤ects productivity growth: greater com-
petition forces less productive rms to exit and increases the market share
of more productive rms. In this framework, gains from trade cannot be
realized when there are barriers to rm exit and expansion, which suggests
a need to take into account complementary policies on entry and exit. We
nish Section IV with an analysis of whether learning-by-exporting seems
to be quantitatively important, and a discussion of the empirical evidence
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regarding other mechanisms through which trade policy might a¤ect growth.
Aside from intervening in trade, many developing countries deviate from
policy neutrality by introducing tax breaks and other policies to attract for-
eign direct investment (FDI). While economists are generally skeptical re-
garding the benets of intervening in trade, they are much more likely to
have interventionist priors when it comes to FDI. Is this pro-interventionist
stance with respect to FDI justied? In Section 5, we review the micro
studies which have identied a number of important e¤ects of inward foreign
investment ows. While most of the empirical literature focuses on pro-
ductivity spillovers, there is also a growing literature that examines export
promotion through foreign investment, input linkages, and labor market ef-
fects. We argue that FDI is associated with technology transfer and positive
labor market outcomes in developing countries, but that the empirical liter-
ature on FDI does not yield su¢ cient evidence in favor of industrial policy
to justify subsidies to foreign investment.
At the end of this survey, we provide some broad suggestion for industrial,
trade and foreign-investment policy in developing countries. To preview our
conclusions, we nd no support for "hard" interventions that distort prices
to deal with Marshallian externalities, learning-by-exporting, and knowledge
spillovers from FDI. Nevertheless, we still envision an important role for
what we refer to as "soft" industrial policy. The goal is to develop a process
whereby government, industry and cluster-level private organizations can
collaborate on interventions to increase productivity. We suggest programs
and grants to help particular clusters by improving the formation of skilled
workers, regulation and infrastructure.
2 The Theoretical Justication for Industrial
Policy
The textbook model of IP is based on the idea that some sectors or in-
dustries exhibit Marshallian externalities, which are local externalities that
increase with the size of the industry. These externalities can arise through
localized industry-level knowledge spillovers, input-output linkages together
with transportation costs to ensure that the externalities remain local, and
labor pooling (see Marshall, 1920, and Krugman, 1991). Marshallian exter-
nalities give rise to geographic agglomeration of industries (e.g., software in
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Silicon Valley), which have been emphasized in the literature on economic
geography.
The simplest model of IP entails a small-open economy with two sectors,
1 and 2. Sector 1 has constant returns to scale while Sector 2 has Marshallian
externalities. The key result is that under some conditions there are mul-
tiple equilibria, with the equilibrium with complete specialization in Sector
2 being superior to the one with complete specialization in Sector 1.1 One
could say that the economy has a "latent" comparative advantage in Sector
2 but that a coordination failure prevents it from exploiting this advantage.2
Since the realization of Marshallian externalities is likely to take some time,
it is customary to talk about countries having a "dynamic" comparative ad-
vantage (Wade 1990, Amsden 1989) in sectors other than the ones in which
they are currently specialized, and to think of industrial policy as the way to
undertake the necessary transformation to capitalize on that dynamic advan-
tage. We think of this as the main theoretical justication for infant-industry
protection.
The following subsection presents a simple static model that formally
captures this idea for an economy facing exogenous international prices. We
then move on to endogeneize these prices based on production costs in the rest
of the world, and then show how the results extend to a dynamic framework.
If the South does not have a latent comparative advantage in the advanced
sectors likely to have Marshallian externalities, is there still a case to be
made for an IP that would promote a structural transformation towards
those sectors? In Subsection 2.2 we show that there are indeed conditions
under which this is the case. In particular, IP makes sense in two scenarios:
rst, when there are rents associated with the advanced sector, so that its
international price is high relative to its cost; and second, when there are
inter-industry externalities, so that a large advanced sector increases the
economys productivity across the board.
Marshallian externalities arise as an automatic consequence of the scale
of the sector: a sector necessarily experiences an increase in productivity as
1Multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria can also arise in a closed economy, although the
behavior of prices makes this less likely. This is because as one sector is expanding, the
relative price moves against this sector, and this may rule out multiplicity. See Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
2There are other rationales that have been discussed for industrial policy, including
nancial market imperfections. We ignore these arguments in this chapter (see Baldwin
1969 for an early criticism, and Pack and Saggi, 2006, for a recent survey).
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it becomes larger. As argued by Baldwin (1969), however, the expansion of a
sector does not always bring about positive agglomeration externalities. Such
agglomeration e¤ects may instead depend on the way in which production
is carried out. In other words, externalities may not be intrinsic to sectors,
but to the way in which they are organized (Rodríguez-Clare, 2007). In this
case, a sectorial reallocation of resources is not enough; import substitution,
for example, may allow an economy to expand its manufacturing sector,
but production may take place in unsophisticated ways and no "clustering"
benets may materialize. In Subsection 2.3 we present a model where, instead
of Marshallian externalities, sectors present opportunities for collective action
that increases their productivity by a certain amount (which may be di¤erent
across sectors). If there are no rents (i.e., if international prices perfectly
reect production costs in the North), then the best policy is simply to exploit
the opportunities for collective action in the sectors where the economy is
specialized. Under more general conditions, we show that sectors that would
merit special consideration for IP would be ones that have large opportunities
for productivity-enhancing collective action, or that have high world demand
relative to the combined size of countries that have achieved such collective
action.
In Subsection 2.4 we turn to IP aimed at "diversication." This is some-
thing that is often stated as a goal by many countries. We present a simple
model where diversication is linked to productivity and argue that if there
is a market failure reducing the level of diversication below the optimal one
(as in Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003), then a policy of encouraging discovery
and diversication would indeed be welfare enhancing.
2.1 Multiple Equilibria and Latent Comparative Ad-
vantage
We rst present a static model with exogenous prices, and then discuss the
implications of the model when prices are determined by production costs in
the rest of the world.
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2.1.1 Exogenous international prices
There is a small economy, which we call "South," two goods and one factor of
production, labor, in xed supply, L.3 Good 1 is produced with constant re-
turns to scale (CRS) and no aggregate externalities: a unit of labor produces
1 units of good 1. Good 2 is produced with constant returns to scale at the
rm level, but there are aggregate externalities, so that labor productivity
is:
2

1 + Min(L;L2)

with  > 0 and   1 + L > 1. The term 1 + Min(L;L2) captures
Marshallian externalities that are increasing with industry-wide employment,
L2, but that are exhausted once the labor force in a sector reaches the level
L. The term  can be seen as the maximum benets of clustering in sector
2.4 We assume that the total labor supply in South is higher than L, so that
if there is complete specialization in good 2 then productivity is 2.
Let pi be the international price of good i and let p
  p2=p1. Let us derive
a condition under which there are multiple equilibria, with one equilibrium
characterized by complete specialization in good 1 and the other by complete
specialization in good 2. We rst check that specialization in good 1 is an
equilibrium. Letting w denote the wage in South, then w = p11 if South
is specialized in good 1. The unit cost of producing good 2 in South given
that all labor is devoted to production of good 1 (and hence no benets of
clustering are realized) is w=2. Hence complete specialization in good 1 is
an equilibrium if and only if 1=2  p. Similarly, complete specialization
in good 2 implies p2 = w=2, and hence this is an equilibrium if and only
if 1=2  p. Thus, there is multiple equilibria if and only if the following
3This subsection follows Rodríguez-Clare (2007). Models of multiple equilibria in a
small open economy include Okuno-Fujiwara, 1988, Rodríguez-Clare, 1996, Rodrik, 1996,
Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996.
4In the traditional model, L is innite, so labor productivity is simply 2(1 + L2).
The alternative assumption that these aggregate externalities are bounded is not only
more realistic, but also leads to a simpler analysis. Moreover, this assumption allows us to
focus on the issue of latent comparative advantage, as opposed to advantages arising from
di¤erences in size or scale. For an analysis where scale (but not infant-industry protection)
takes center stage, see Ethier (1982), which formalizes the discussion relating to Frank
Grahams argument for protection (Graham, 1923). Scale e¤ects could be captured in the
model presented here by assuming that L is large; in this case small countries could not
exhaust the Marshallian externalities even if they specialized completely in industry 2.
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condition holds,
p  1=2  p (1)
Without loss of generality, in the following discussion we restrict attention
to the case in which this condition holds with strict inequalities. If there are
multiple equilibria, which equilibrium is better? In the equilibrium with
complete specialization in good 1 the wage is w = p11, whereas in the
other equilibrium we have w = p22. If condition (1) is satised with strict
inequalities then p2 > 1, so the equilibrium with complete specialization
in good 2 is superior.5
We will say that South has a latent comparative advantage in good i if
the opportunity cost of this good given the realization of all Marshallian
externalities is lower than the international price.6 For good 1 this entails
2=1  1=p, whereas for good 2 this is 1=2  p. Thus, condition (1)
with strict inequalities implies that South has a latent comparative advan-
tage in good 2. The equilibrium with specialization in good 1 is possible
because in this case Marshallian externalities are not realized, and hence the
latent comparative advantage of South in good 2 is not what determines the
pattern of specialization. Thus, the previous results (i.e., existence of multi-
ple equilibria and the fact that generally the equilibrium with specialization
in good 2 is superior to the one with specialization in good 1) can be rein-
terpreted as saying that a country may be specialized in a sector where it
doesnt have a latent comparative advantage, and that in this case a policy
that induces the economy to switch to the equilibrium with specialization
in the good where there is a latent comparative advantage could be welfare
enhancing (see discussion below).
Figure 1 illustrates the previous results. The curve labeled PPF repre-
sents the Production Possibilities Frontier for South, which is convex when
L2 < L (or Q2 < 2L) and becomes linear when L2  L (or Q2  2L).
The curve labeled PPFNC is the hypothetical Production Possibilities Fron-
tier when there are no ME (i.e.,  = 0), given simply by a line with slope
5The result of multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria can be converted into one of devel-
opment traps by introducing proper dynamics in the model (see Krugman, 1991 and
Matsuyama, 1991). Under some conditions, the economy may be specialized in the good
in which it doesnt have latent comparative advantage, and there may be no equilibrium
taking it to specialization in the other good. Government intervention in this case would
require more than simple coordination to select the good equilibrium.
6If Marshallian externalities take time to be realized, then one could talk about a
dynamic comparative advantage. See Redding (1999).
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Figure 1: Marshallian Externalities and Multiple Equilibria
1=2, as in the standard Ricardian model. Note that the slope of the PPF
is the same as the slope of PPFNC at the corner where there is complete spe-
cialization in good 1. Thus, if the international relative price of good 2 (i.e.,
p2=p

1) is lower than 1=2 there is an equilibrium with complete specializa-
tion in good 1, whereas if p2=p

1 is higher than the slope of the PPF along its
linear segment - namely, 1=2 - then there is an equilibrium with complete
specialization in good 2. Clearly, then, if (1) is satised, there are multiple
equilibria, with the equilibrium with specialization in good 2 delivering a
superior consumption possibilities frontier for South.
The standard case for infant industry protection or IP can now be stated
simply by saying that if the South is specialized in good 1, then a high
enough tari¤ would lead this economy to satisfy its own consumption of
good 2. This would allow the South to realize the benets of the Marshallian
externalities associated with this sector, and thereby shift the equilibrium
towards complete specialization in good 2.7 At that point the tari¤ would
no longer be needed, and the economy could maintain free trade.
Sauré (2007) presents an interesting and novel argument for why protec-
tion may fail to generate the results predicted by this model. He assumes
7We assume here that the South is su¢ ciently large that under autarky it would have
L2  L.
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that goods 1 and 2 are tradable inputs into the production of a nal non-
tradable good via a "modern technology." The key assumption is that the
nal good can also be produced directly from labor with a "traditional tech-
nology" which exhibits CRS (no Marshallian economies). Under some con-
ditions protection makes the modern technology unprotable because of the
increase in the price of input 2. Thus, rather than increasing production
of the good with Marshallian externalities, protection leads to the contrac-
tion of the whole modern sector and a reallocation of resources towards the
traditional sector.
2.1.2 International prices determined in North
The previous discussion takes international prices as exogenous. But prices
are (at least in part) determined by productivity levels in the rest of the world.
One would imagine that rich countries are already enjoying the lower costs
associated with clustering in sector 2, so these lower costs would be reected
in p. Thus, for a small country to have a latent comparative advantage in
sector 2, it must have some deep parameters that confer it such an advantage.
To see this, imagine now that there are two countries, North and South,
which may di¤er in the productivity parameters, 1 and 2, so that there are
exogenous international productivity di¤erences (independent of Marshallian
externalities) in the production of both goods 1 and 2. Imagine further that
South is small, so that prices are determined in North as if it was a closed
economy. Choosing labor in North as the numeraire, international prices
are simply given by the Norths unit labor requirements. Assuming that in
equilibrium L2N  L then p1 = 1=1N and p2 = 1=2N , so p = 1N=2N .
Note that the benets of clustering are reected in a lower international
relative price of good 2. This will be important in the analysis that follows.
Imagine rst that there are no Ricardian productivity di¤erences, ji = 1
for all j = S;N and i = 1; 2. Using (1) it is easy to conrm that there are
multiple equilibria in South (since p = 1= then condition (1) is 1=  1 
1), but since the second part of (1) is satised with equality, then the wage is
the same in both equilibria. Thus, although there are multiple equilibria, the
wage is not higher in the equilibrium with specialization in good 2. This is
because even though the economy benets from clustering in this equilibrium,
this is exactly compensated by the lower price of this good, which in turn
arises from the higher productivity in North derived from clustering.
The equilibrium with specialization in good 2 may be superior to the
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one with specialization in good 1 if we allow for exogenous productivity
di¤erences. In particular, the equilibrium with specialization in good 2 will
be superior if the South has a latent comparative advantage in the good
subject to clustering. To see this, drop the assumption that ji = 1 for all
j; i, and assume instead that
2S=1S > 2N=1N (CA)
The condition for multiple equilibria (i.e., condition (1)) is now (using p =
1N=2N)
1N=2N  1S=2S  1N=2N (2)
The second inequality is satised given (CA), so there is always an equilib-
rium with specialization in good 2. The rst inequality (needed for there to
be an equilibrium with specialization in good 1) is satised if and only if
2S=1S
2N=1N
  (3)
That is, the Souths comparative advantage in sector 2 must be weaker than
the benets of clustering.
The analysis here is exactly as above, with condition (2) replacing condi-
tion (1). Condition (CA) is necessary for South to have a latent comparative
advantage in good 2, and this is necessary for the wage with specialization
in good 2 to be higher and for IP to make sense for South.
An important point to note is that for the gains from IP to be large we
need South to have a strong latent comparative advantage in good 2. But
then condition (3) implies that Marshallian externalities must also be high
for there to be multiple equilibria. We can conclude that IP generates large
gains only if the sector that would be promoted exhibits both a strong latent
comparative advantage and large externalities.
One can enrich the model to generate some additional implications. For
example, if sector 2 is intensive in physical and human capital relative to
sector 1, then if South is specialized in 1 this goes together with low levels of
both types of capital and a lower level of TFP than if it were specialized in
sector 2 (Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996, Rodríguez-Clare, 1996). A policy
to shift resources towards sector 2 would then generate endogenous accumu-
lations of capital, as observed in East Asian countries. In other words, some
LDCs may have low capital stocks as well as low TFP as a consequence of
not exploiting their latent comparative advantage.8
8One problem with this idea as a way to think about income di¤erences across countries
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2.1.3 Dynamic externalities
Here we extend the model to allow for dynamic Marshallian externalities,
as in Bardhan (1970), Krugman (1987), Lucas (1988), Redding (1999) and
Melitz (2005). To do so, we assume that productivity in sector 1 in country
i is 1i, just as above, whereas productivity in sector 2 in country i at time
t is now Ait2i

1 + Min(L;L2it)

. Letting aSt  max fASt=ANt; 1g and
aNt  max fANt=ASt; 1g, we assume that Ait grows thanks to both learning
by doing (which happens if country i has a cluster in sector 2, i.e. L2it > 0)
and international spillovers (which happens if ait < 1). Formally, we assume
that
_Ait = (g=L)min(L;L2it)Ait + "(1  ait)Ait
where " > g > 0. Productivity increases caused by dynamic externalities in
one country eventually di¤use to the other country even if there is no cluster
there. Thus, in this model clusters are important to generate knowledge but
are not critical to benet from knowledge spillovers.
Note that if the North has a cluster but the South does not, then _ASt =
"(1   aSt)ASt. There are "benets of backwardness," in the sense that a
lower relative productivity in South (i.e., lower aSt) leads to a faster rate
of productivity growth. This implies that given " > g there is a steady
state productivity gap ASt=ANt = a^ given implicitly by g = "(1   a^): if
aSt < a^ (aSt > a^) then aSt increases (decreases) towards a^. For future
reference, note that the productivity of North relative to South in this steady
state is (2N=2S)=a^: the rst term captures pure Ricardian productivity
di¤erences, whereas the second and third terms capture the impact of static
and dynamic benets of clustering, respectively. Starting from such a steady
state, if South acquires a cluster in sector 2, so that now L2St  L, then
there will be full convergence as aSt increases from a^ towards 1.
As before, assume that prices are wholly determined in North. Then
p1 = 1=1N and p

2t = 1=A2Nt2N , and assume that condition (CA) holds.
Focusing on the South, complete specialization in 1 is a steady state equilib-
rium if
2S=1S
2N=1N
 =a^ (4)
On the other hand, complete specialization in good 2 is necessarily a steady
state equilibrium (given condition (CA)). Thus, there are multiple steady
is that it would imply that poor countries have a lower physical capital share, which is not
consistent with the data (see Gollin, 2002).
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states if and only if condition (4) is satised. It can be readily veried that
the steady state with specialization in good 2 entails a higher wage for South
than the steady state with specialization in good 1. This is because condition
(CA) implies that South has a latent or "dynamic" comparative advantage
in good 2.9
Imagine that this condition is satised and that the system is in steady
state with South completely specialized in good 1. Is there an equilibrium in
which South moves to the steady state with specialization in good 2? If South
becomes specialized in good 2 then it realizes the static externalities, but it
will take some time for it to catch up to the North in terms of productivity
(i.e., aSt < 1 for some time). During this period, specialization in good 2 is
an equilibrium if
2S=1S
2N=1N
 1=aSt
This implies that if
1=a^  2S=1S
2N=1N
 =a^
then there are multiple steady states, and also an equilibrium in which sim-
ply South switches from specialization in good 1 to specialization in good
2 and eventually reaches the steady state with complete specialization in
good 2. The government could achieve this switch with trade protection for
an innitesimally short time, and the gains would necessarily outweigh any
associated costs (see below).
On the other hand, if
2S=1S
2N=1N
< 1=a^
then this is no longer the case. There would need to be temporary protection
until aSt increases from a^ to a level a0 dened implicitly by
2S=1S
2N=1N
= 1=a0
After that, complete specialization in good 2 would be an equilibrium for
South. Eventually the system would reach the steady state with aSt = 1.
9Formally, we would say that a country has a latent or dynamic comparative advantage
in a good if its opportunity cost given the realization of all static and dynamic Marshallian
externalities is lower than the international price.
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2.1.4 Discussion
The simple model presented here captures the notion that temporary pro-
tection may induce an economy in a bad equilibrium to switch towards the
equilibrium where specialization is according to its latent or dynamic com-
parative advantage. Of course, this is nothing more than the classic case for
infant-industry protection, where policy is supposed to turn a latent com-
parative advantage into an e¤ective one.10 Such a policy would be welfare
enhancing provided it passes both the Mill and Bastable tests: the Mill test
is that the protected sector can eventually survive international competition
without protection, whereas the Bastable test is more stringent in requir-
ing also that the discounted future benets compensate the present costs of
protection (see Kemp, 1960, and Corden, 1997). In the model above, infant-
industry protection passes the Mill test if and only if the South has a latent
comparative advantage in the protected sector. The Bastable test requires
that the discounted gains from IP compensate the temporary consumption
loses associated with protection during the period in which the economy is
generating the (dynamic) productivity gains associated with clustering. This
is the period when aSt is increasing from a^ to a0. Bardhan (1971), Redding
(1999) and Melitz (2005) - among others - explore the conditions on the
learning process under which the benets of protection justify these initial
losses. Bardhan (1970) and Melitz (2005) explore the optimal way in which
protection should be granted.
Of course, protection is only a second-best policy to deal with the presence
of Marshallian externalities. A production subsidy would be more e¢ cient,
as it would avoid the temporary consumption losses mentioned above. The
whole discussion of infant-industry protection is based on the presumption
that a production subsidy is simply not feasible, either for scal, political
or practical considerations (see Section 3). If this were not the case, then
the analysis would be quite simple: provide a (Pigovian) subsidy such that
the marginal subsidy is equal to the marginal externality. Naturally, if the
source of the externality is not production but some more specic activity
10John Stuart Mill (1848, reference 1909) is generally credited for being the rst to
express this idea in a clear and simple way, although it was Friedrich List (1885) who vig-
orously argued for the adoption of infant-industry protection of manufacturing in European
countries. See Corden (1997) for a discussion of the di¤erent arguments for and against
infant-industry protection, and Irwin (1996) for an excellent treatment of its intellectual
history.
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(e.g., R&D) then the subsidy should be directed there.
The condition that the South have a non-exploited latent comparative ad-
vantage to justify protection is special to the simple Ricardian model we pre-
sented, where the production possibilities frontier (PPF) is linear and there
is a tendency for complete specialization. If the PPF is strictly concave and
international prices are such that under free trade the economy is diversied,
then the presence of Marshallian externalities in the import competing sector
implies that a small tari¤ would necessarily be welfare increasing. But this
kind of "marginal intervention" is not what people commonly associate with
infant-industry protection.
Another possibility that arises with a strictly concave PPF is multiple
equilibria where the bad equilibrium has a low (but positive) production
level, whereas the good equilibrium has a higher production level but not
enough for any of this production to be exported. Even if the economy
does not have a latent comparative advantage, temporary protection may
be welfare enhancing in this case as long as the Mill and Bastable tests are
satised.
Although it is a special result to the simple Ricardian model presented
here, the result that a latent comparative advantage is necessary for infant-
industry protection seems useful to guide policy discussions in practice. First,
in all cases in which infant-industry protection has supposedly been success-
ful, the infant sector eventually generates signicant exports. It is simply
hard to imagine otherwise. Second, if there are resource constraints that
prevent the sector from becoming large, then it is likely that the benets of
IP would be small and perhaps the associated costs and risk would not be
justied. For this reason, in the rest of this section we restrict attention to
the Ricardian model (linear PPF).
2.2 Industrial Policy without Latent Comparative Ad-
vantage
Can it be advisable for South to run a policy to promote specialization in a
good with Marshallian externalities (i.e., good 2 in the model above) in spite
of not having latent comparative advantage in that sector? For this analysis
and the rest of this section we again restrict attention to the simpler static
analysis.
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2.2.1 Sector-level rents
Imagine that prices are determined not in a single economy, but in a collec-
tion of economies. In particular, assume that North is partitioned into two
regions, N1 and N2, with labor quantities L1N and L
2
N . Everything else is as
above. Without loss of generality, assume that region N2 is the one that will
produce good 2. If L2N is su¢ ciently large relative to the worlds demand
for good 2 then it will not be completely specialized in that good, in which
case prices will be determined by technology levels (inclusive of clustering
e¤ects), so that p = 1N=2N , just as in the previous case. But if L2N is
small relative to the world demand for good 2, then in equilibrium one can
have
1N=2N > p
 > 1N=2N (5)
In contrast to what we have with an integrated North, here p can be strictly
higher than 1N=2N . The di¤erence can be interpreted as the "rents"
associated with good 2. To capture this, let
R  p

1N=2N
Condition (5) can now be stated as
 > R > 1 (6)
Consider again a "small" South, which takes international prices as given.
The condition for multiple equilibria is again given by (1), with p satisfying
(5). This can be written as
R=  1S=2S
1N=2N
 R (7)
We are interested in the case where South does not have a latent comparative
advantage in good 2, or
1S=2S > 1N=2N (8)
In this case, the LHS inequality in (7) is always satised (given (6)), while
the RHS inequality, which is necessary for specialization in good 2 to be an
equilibrium, is satised if R > CA, where CA  1S=2S
1N=2N
is a measure of
comparative advantage in South in good 1. In other words, there is multiple
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equilibria in South if its comparative advantage in good 1 is smaller than the
rents associated with international prices. Moreover, just as in the previous
cases, the equilibrium with specialization in the good with Marshallian exter-
nalities sustains a higher wage.11 This result is reminiscent of the literature
on strategic trade policy, where increasing returns and imperfect competition
leads to the existence of rents which governments try to capture via trade
policy.
An alternative way to get a similar result is by assuming the existence
of a wage premium in sector 1.12 To see this, assume again that North is
a single integrated region, but with a wage premium in sector 2, so that
w2 = Rw1. Then it is easy to verify that p = R1N=2N , which is the same
as above.13,14
2.2.2 Inter-industry externalities
We have so far focussed on intra-industry externalities. Consider instead
aggregate externalities, so that all sectors in the country benet from the ex-
ternalities realized in a sector (see Succar, 1987, Young, 1991, and Greenwald
and Stiglitz, 2006).15 Assume that now productivity in good i in country j
11Another way to think about rents is if South were no longer a small economy. Consider
Figure 1 again and imagine that there are no productivity di¤erentials between South and
North. Imagine further that these two regions have equal size, and that demand for good
2 is su¢ ciently high that the equilibrium entails one country fully specialized in good 2
and the other fully specialized in good 1. Then, if condition (1) is satised, the country
that specializes in good 2 is better o¤ than the country that specializes in good 1.
12Yet another way to have rents would be through the existence of pure prots, as in the
literature on "strategic trade policy" (Brander and Spencer, 1983, Eaton and Grossman,
1989).
13We have assumed here that there is no wage premium in South. If there were a
wage premium in South of equal magnitude as in North, then in the absence of a latent
comparative advantage in good 2, there would not be multiple equilibria, but it could be
advisable for South to implement a policy to specialize in sector 2. This would no longer
be a case of Marshallian externalities and infant-industry protection, but rather a standard
application of the theory of domestic distortions and trade policy.
14One di¤erence with the case analyzed above, where rents arise from lack of FPE, is
that with wage premia we no longer have the restriction that R < . The reason is that
now the opportunity cost of good 2 given that region is specialized in good 1 is R1N=2N ,
and we need this to be higher than p, which is possible even if 1N=2N < p. Note that
in this case then there is no equilibrium with specialization in good 1 in South.
15Perhaps the most important type of inter-industry externalities are generated by in-
dustries that supply specialized inputs that are used intensively by rms in many other
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is
ij

1 + iMin(L;L2j)

with 1 < 2, so that intra-industry externalities are stronger than inter-
industry externalities. Let i  1+i L and note that 1 < 2. We return to
the case of FPE in North with no rents, so that pi = 1=iiN , and assume that
South has a latent comparative advantage in good 1. It is readily veried in
this case the only equilibrium in South entails specialization in good 1.16 But
specialization in good 2 implies w = 22Sp2 = 2S=2N , while specialization
in good 1 implies w = 1Sp1 = 1S=11N . The rst is higher than the second
if and only if
1=1 <
2S=1S
2N=1N
If this is satised, then forcing the economy towards specialization in good
2, even if this is not an equilibrium, is better than staying in the equilibrium
with specialization in good 1. In this case, the losses from going against
comparative advantage by specializing in sector 2 are dominated by the gains
associated with the economywide externalities generated. This may be one
way of interpreting the argument in the late 1980s in favor of protecting the
semiconductor industry in the United States (see Borrus, Tyson and Zysman,
1986).
2.3 Industrial Policy as Sector-Specic Collective Ac-
tion
We have so far focused on Marshallian and inter-industry externalities as
reasons for IP. A more general conceptual framework for thinking about IP
is the existence of coordination failures at the industry or sector level. Of
course, coordination failures arise in the presence of Marshallian externali-
ties. The di¤erence is that the distortions associated with these externalities
(at least as modeled above) disappear when the sector gets su¢ ciently large,
sectors. According to Wade (1990), this kind of reasoning was quite important in Taiwan,
where the government promoted several sectors that were deemed to provide critical inputs
for many other industries. See Noland and Pack (2003) disagree with this view.
16The condition for specialization in good 1 to be an equilibrium is 2S=1S2N=1N <
2
1
,
which is clearly satised given 2S=1S2N=1N < 1 together with 1 <
2
1
. On the other hand,
specialization in good 2 implies that w=22S = p2. This is an equilibrium if w=11S > p

1,
or 2S1S >
2N
1N
, which cannot be satised if South has CA in good 1.
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whereas this is not the case with other types of coordination failures. For
example, in Rodríguez-Clare (2007) externalities arise only when "modern"
technologies are used in a sector. Thus, even sectors that are seen as "ad-
vanced" in developed countries can behave as backward sectors when they
operate in LDCs, and hence fail to generate any externalities. This captures
the idea that what matters for productivity is not "what you produce, but
how" (Porter, 1998, De Ferranti et. al., 2001). In these circumstances, a
sector can expand and still fail to experience an increase in productivity.17
Protection or export subsidies would fail, and other policies would be called
for.18
The existence of coordination failures implies that collective action at the
sector level may lead to productivity gains. A concrete example of collec-
tive action is the eradication of food and mouth disease in Uruguays cattle
industry, which generated enormous benets by allowing the industry to ex-
port beef to the United States (see Hausmann, Rodríguez-Clare and Rodrik,
2005). Simply providing a production or export subsidy to the cattle indus-
try would not have solved the problem. A specic policy to deal with the
coordination failure associated with strong externalities was necessary. An-
other example is the case of ower exports from Ecuador (Hernández et. al.
2007). Several attempts to export owers in the 1960s and 70s failed in part
because of the lack of reliable air transport to the main destinations. A key
di¤erence in the 1980s was an e¤ort by the association of ower exporters,
EXPOFLORES, to convince the government and the national airline to set
up the required number of cargo ights for this activity. Thanks in part to
this e¤ort, the value of ower exports boomed from less than half a million
dollars in 1984 to more than $400 million in 2006.19
17This may explain the existence of cases of geographic concentration of sectors that
failed to experience signicant agglomeration economies(e.g., concentrations of footwear
and textile producers). Perhaps these are cases of clusters that failed to achieve Marshal-
lian externalities (see Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999).
18An appropriate policy could be to subsidize production but only to the extent that it
is done using modern technologies.
19Another example, also from Ecuador, concerns the development of new exports of
broccoli and mangoes, where nding the best seeds and meeting international phytosani-
tary standards presented producers with signicant coordination problems. As stated by
Hernández et. al. (2007), collective action fostered and implemented by several private,
public and mixed agencies was important in dealing with such problems and in facilitating
the development of these new sectors. Similar cases are documented for Chile in Agosín
and Bravo-Ortega (2007) and for several countries in Chandra and Kolavalli (2006).
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2.3.1 A simple model
We now want to explore a model where policy can induce higher productivity
in a sector through some kind of industry-level collective action, and where
prices are determined in a collection of economies (not only in "the North"),
so that there may be rents. The goal is not to model the specics of collective
action, but rather to examine the conditions under which this may increase
a countrys income level.
There are N countries, indexed by j. Labor is the only factor of pro-
duction, and is available in total quantity Lj in country j. There are M
industries indexed by m. There are opportunities for collective action in
each industry. Collective action increases productivity in industry m by the
factor xm; otherwise, productivity is one in all industries in all countries. We
refer to xm as the level of complexity in industry m, since it seems reason-
able to expect that more complex industries will benet more from collective
action. A country that has achieved high productivity in industry m thanks
to collective action will be said to have HP (for high productivity) in that
industry. Let kjm be the indicator function for whether country j has HP in
industry m , and assume
P
Lj = 1 so that Lj is also the share of worldwide
labor living in country j. Then sm 
P
j kjmLj is the share of labor in coun-
tries with HP in industry m. Also, country j0s productivity in industry m
can be written as x^jm  (1  kjm) + kjmxm. Preferences are Cobb-Douglas,
with a share vm devoted to industry m, and
P
vm = 1. Thus, we can think
of vm equivalently as the "size" of industry m, or the extent of the worlds
demand for its output.
The model described thus far is a Ricardian model with N countries and
M industries, where productivity can be either low or high in each industry.
The equilibrium is easy to describe: it consists of a set of wages, wj, prices,
pm, and an allocation, Ljm, for j = 1; :::; N and m = 1; :::;M such that for
all j and m the following conditions hold: wj  x^jmpm and if Ljm > 0 then
wj = x^jmpm (zero prots), and pm
P
j x^jmLjm = vm
P
j wjLj (i.e., the value
of sales of m equals total expenditures on m) for all m.
It is useful to describe an equilibrium without rents. Choosing labor as
the numeraire, this entails wj = 1 for all j and pm = 1 if sm = 0 and
pm = 1=xm if sm > 0; it requires that for each industry either no country
has HP or there are enough countries (adjusting for their size) with HP that
the large supply drives the price to its marginal cost with unitary wages.20
20Formally, if sm > vm for all m then there is an equilibrium with wj = w for all j. To
20
Note that in this case a country that does not achieve HP in any industry
would still enjoy the same wage as other countries. We can think of this as
a case in which Factor Price Equalization (FPE) holds.
Rents arise when sm is small relative to vm. For example, imagine an
equilibrium where sm = 0 for all m 6= 1, and only country 1 has HP in
industry 1. Then wj = 1 for j = 2; :::; N while w1 > 1 if and only if v1 > s1:
there are rents in industry 1 (i.e., the price of industry 1 is higher than the
marginal cost at unitary wages, p1 > 1=x1).21
Industries di¤er with respect to three variables: complexity (measured by
xm), size (measured by vm), and the share of people in the world that live
in countries that have HP (measured by sm). We will refer to the later as
"prevalence," since it measures the extent to which HP is widespread across
the world in an industry. The previous result suggests that industries will
have rents if they are large relative to their prevalence. Apart from this
result, one can learn more from this model only by considering special cases.
Instead of doing this, we introduce some additional assumptions to "smooth
out" the kinks in the Ricardian model and obtain more general results.
Assume that each industry is composed of a continuum of goods with
varying productivity levels. Preferences remain Cobb-Douglas, but now with
equal shares across all goods. Thus, assuming that industrym has a measure
vm of goods, then (as above) expenditures on industrym are vm with
P
vm =
1. (Note that it is natural to think of vm as the "size" of industry m because
it measures both the share of total expenditures devoted to this industry
and the measure of goods belonging to that industry.) More importantly,
we assume that productivity di¤ers across goods within an industry as in
Eaton and Kortum (2002). Specically, productivity for any particular good
in sector m in country j is x^jmz, where x^jm is as above and z is an additional
productivity that is independently drawn from the Fréchet distribution with
see this, simply assume that wj = 1 all j, and pm = 1=xm, and Ljm > 0 only if kjm = 1.
We only need to check that (1=xm)
P
j xmLjm = vm with
P
j Ljm = vm holds for all m.
One can choose Ljm in such a way that this holds as long as sm  vm all m.
21The equilibrium could have goods in industry 1 produced by both country 1 and
other countries, in which case it is obvious that w1 > 1. Otherwise, if country 1 is
the only country with positive production in industry 1, then the equilibrium condition
p1L1x1 = v1 (1  L1 + w1L1) together with p1x1 = w1 and s1 = L1 imply that w1 =
v1(1  s1)=s1(1  v1), hence v1 > s1 implies w1 > 1. If s1 = L1 > v1 then w1 > 1 cannot
be sustained, because country 1 cannot specialize completely in the good in which it has
a superior productivity.
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parameters Tj and , i.e. Prj(z  Z) = exp[ Tjz ].22 This distribution
has sound microeconomic foundations (see Eaton and Kortum, 2001), but
understanding those foundations or its several convenient properties is not
important for our purposes here; it is su¢ cient to know that a higher Tj
implies better productivity draws for country j (on average).
Since each good is innitesimally small and there are no transportation
costs, then each good will be supplied to the whole world by the country
with the lowest cost. If we consider a particular good in industry m with
productivity draws (z1m; z2m; :::; zNm) in countries (1; 2; :::; N) then this good
will be supplied by country j = argminl fwl=x^lmzlmg. Eaton and Kortum
(2002) show that a country with wage wj and productivity parameter x^jm
will capture a share
Djm =
(wj=x^jm)
  TjP
l (wl=x^lm)
  Tl
(9)
of total sales in industry m. A country with a lower Tj, a higher wj, or a
lower x^jm will capture a smaller market share in industrym. Contrary to the
standard Ricardian model, however, a country will have positive production
in all industries because it will always have a few goods within any industry
where its productivity draws are very high. Letting Y =
P
wjLj denote
worldwide income, then the trade balance conditions are
P
mDjmvmY =
wjLj (value of sales equal value of purchases for country j). These conditions
determine the equilibrium wages w1; :::; wN .
How is the wage in a country a¤ected by acquiring HP in an industry? If
a country had a choice, where should it concentrate its e¤orts to achieve col-
lective action?23 These are key questions for IP. Note that we have assumed
that there are no deep sources of comparative advantage, so this would not be
an issue in this choice. Then it seems reasonable that countries would want
to focus their e¤orts in industries that have higher complexity, are larger (or
have higher demand), and have a lower prevalence: higher complexity means
that there is more to gain from collective action, while larger demand com-
bined with low prevalence implies higher rents. Under some conditions, one
22To simplify the discussion, we assume that Tj = Lj for all j. Otherwise, countries
with a higher ratio Tj=Lj would tend to have higher wages for reasons that dont relate
to IP (although see next subsection).
23If the costs of collective action di¤er across industries, then this clearly would have to
be taken into account in this choice. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the cost of
achieving collective action is included in the xm.
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can in fact prove this result. In particular, assume that countries 1 and 2 are
identical except that they have HP in industries 1 and 2, respectively, with
no HP in the rest of industries (i.e., country 1 has HP only in industry 1 and
country 2 has HP only in industry 2). Then one can show that if x^j1 = x^j2
for all j = 3; :::; N then the wage in country 1 is higher than in country 2 if
x1 > x2 or if v1 > v2. Also, assuming that x1 = x2 and v1 = v2, then w1 > w2
if s1 < s2 (see Appendix).24
We have assumed thus far that there are no di¤erences in industry-level
productivity across countries. If this were not the case, then it is clear that
a country may want to go against its latent comparative advantage and
specialize in goods with combinations of high complexity, high demand and
low prevalence. Thus, this model may be suitable to think about IP, although
it is important to note that trade protection is not an e¤ective policy in this
framework.
2.3.2 Relation of the model to some recent contributions
We now show how to place some recent arguments for IP in the context
of this simple analytical framework. Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006)
argue that the varied economic performance of di¤erent countries is partly
explained by the goods that they produce. Other things equal (including
physical and human capital stocks), countries that specialize in what they
call "rich country goods" are richer. Their explanation is that such goods
provide more opportunities for learning by doing (similar to Young, 1991)
and for technological and institutional upgrading that ultimately benets the
whole economy.
The model presented here can capture this notion in a slightly di¤erent
way. In this model we may talk about "rich country industries" as ones
that are more complex, have higher worldwide demand, or exhibit lower
prevalence. Countries that achieve HP in these industries would be able to
sustain higher income levels, and getting there would entail higher growth
rates.
24One could imagine a situation in which countries understand this model and implement
IP to maximize their income. If collective action had no cost, then obviously all countries
would simply achieve HP in all industries. But imagine that collective action is costly. In
the resulting equilibrium sectors with higher complexity and/or larger demand would be
matched by high prevalence in such a way that the return to collective action would be
the same in all sectors.
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Hausmann and Klinger (2006) argue that goods are connected, so that
productivity in one good would be higher if the country has already achieved
HP in a related good. This has similar implications as inter-industry exter-
nalities (think of "industries" as "goods"). For example, coming back to the
role of specialized inputs, if such inputs exist for one good, this would also
help in the production of a similar or related good. Hausmann and Klinger
show that some goods are connected to many other goods, while other goods
are relatively isolated. They think of the space of goods as a forest, with
each good being represented by a tree, and talk about how this forest is
more dense in some areas. Hausmann and Klinger (2006) and Hausmann
and Rodrik (2006) suggest that if a country could choose, it would want to
locate in the denser parts of the forest.
The idea that there are regions in the forest that are more dense is cap-
tured in the model above by having industries di¤er in their size or worldwide
demand. The suggestion that countries in dense part of the forests are better
o¤ corresponds to the result above that countries are better o¤ if they man-
age to achieve HP in an industry with a high measure of goods, vm, since
this corresponds to high demand. But the model reveals a weakness of this
notion: industries with high demand would not be attractive if they also
have high prevalence. Returning to the forest metaphor, being in a dense
part of the forest would not be better if this is also more crowded. For ex-
ample, although the electronics industry may be a "highly connected area"
of the forest, there may also be many countries (and large ones, e.g. China)
participating in this area. In principle, it could be better for a country to
remain in an isolated but relatively uncongested part of the forest.
The measure of the "income level" of an industry developed by Haus-
mann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) takes this into account: an industry with
high prevalence would exhibit low prices and would thus be classied as one
with a lower income level. Thus, in principle, this measure may be seen
as a reasonable way to guide countries in choosing industries that are ideal
for productivity-enhancing collective action. Unfortunately, however, this
may be a noisy measure of the relevant notion needed for IP because it may
be capturing capital (physical, human, or knowledge capital) intensity, which
leads countries with good conditions for capital accumulation to produce and
export these goods. In other words, if there is an exogenous variation in con-
ditions for capital accumulation across countries, and if goods di¤er in their
capital intensity, then rich countries will tend to produce and export capi-
tal intensive goods, and this will have nothing to do with industry-specic
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collective action and IP. The same association between rich countries and
certain sectors may arise because of an exogenous variation in the quality
of institutions. For example, if rich countries have institutions that are con-
ducive to capital market development, then they would tend to specialize in
goods that rely heavily on outside capital (Manova, 2006). If one could some-
how adjust Hausmann, Hwang and Rodriks measure to isolate the income
correlation of goods that is not explained by capital intensity or exogenous
variation in institutions, then this could be a useful measure for IP. In par-
ticular, countries could consider inducing collective action in sectors with a
high "adjusted income level."
2.4 Self-discovery and diversication
The notion of IP that we have emphasized so far is that there are "special
industries," and that countries should aim to reallocate resources to those
industries. An alternative idea that we now explore is to think of a policy to
increase diversication. This has been a particular concern in countries that
specialize in natural-resource intensive industries (see De Ferranti, 2001, and
CAF, 2007, for recent treatments focusing on Latin America). Diversication
could be desirable as a way to reduce volatility, or as a way to increase
productivity. Here we focus on the later.
To think about the connection between diversication and productivity,
consider the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of trade. As explained above,
Eaton and Kortum model productivities as being drawn from a distribution
that is common across countries except for a technology parameter T . This
technology parameter determines the location of the productivity distribu-
tion: countries with a higher T have "better" distributions in the sense that,
on average, productivity draws will be higher (formally, this entails rst-
order stochastic dominance). Apart from T , countries also di¤er in size, L.
Assuming away trading costs for simplicity, wages are determined by the ra-
tio of technology to size, T=L. A high T=L means that the country would
have many sectors in which it has absolute advantage relative to its size,
leading to a high equilibrium wage. Moreover, given L, a higher T implies
the production (and export) of more goods, or more diversication.
Of course, higher productivity and higher wages may not go together with
diversication. For example, high productivity in a sector that is not "di-
versied" or "di¤erentiated" would draw resources away from the diversied
sector and reduce overall diversication even as it increases overall produc-
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tivity and wages. It is also important to recall that the data reveals that
after a certain level of development, higher income goes together with less,
not more diversication (see Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003).
An interesting way to think about diversication is via what Hausmann
and Rodrik (2003) call "self-discovery." They argue that countries dont re-
ally know their cost structure, and hence they dont know the goods in which
they have comparative advantage. This must be discovered through costly
experimentation, which is plagued by information spillovers that render its
private benets low relative to its social benets. The following model shows
a simple way to capture the connection between diversication and produc-
tivity, and then between self-discovery and diversication.
Consider an economy with labor as the only factor of production and two
sectors: agriculture and manufactures. Agriculture is a homogenous good,
produced with decreasing marginal returns to labor, with QA = F (LA).
There are a continuum of manufacturing goods indexed with j 2 [0; 1] that
are produced from an input H = "L (" converts raw labor units L into
e¢ ciency units H) with productivities as in Eaton and Kortum (2002): one
unit of H produces z units of manufactures, with z for each good j 2 [0; 1]
drawn from the Fréchet distribution with parameters T and , as above.
Assuming no transportation costs for either agriculture or manufacturing,
and letting agriculture serve as numeraire, then the wage is w = F 0(LA).
The cost of producing a manufacturing good with productivity draw z is
w="z, and, analogous to the expression in (9), the share of manufactures
that will be exported by a country with wage w, labor e¢ ciency ", and
technology parameter T , is
(w=") TP
(wl="l) Tl
Consider now two countries that di¤er only in , " or T . The country with
higher  will exhibit a higher wage, but will also devote more resources to
agriculture and less to manufacturing, with a smaller share of manufacturing
goods exported and a lower level of diversication (i.e., the number of goods
exported is lower). This is a case of "good concentration." On the other hand,
a country with a lower " or a lower T would also have a higher share of labor
in agriculture, with higher concentration, but in this case the equilibrium
wage would be lower. This is a case of "bad concentration."
Now let us think about the determinants of T . In a dynamic setting, T
can be seen as the stock of ideas (see Eaton and Kortum, 2001). Imagine
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that there is a worldwide stock of ideas, T , that grows at rate n. Discov-
ery can be seen as the process by which a country adopts these worldwide
ideas to the national environment. This is not exactly as in Hausmann and
Rodrik (2003), where productivity is determined ex-ante, and experimenta-
tion simply reveals what that productivity is. But the basic implications are
the same. If x is the rate of discovery, then _T = xT , and in steady state
T=T  = x=n. Thus, a higher rate of discovery leads to diversication and a
higher equilibrium wage.25
The rate of discovery depends on its cost and associated private returns.
If there are knowledge spillovers, as in Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), so that
once an entrepreneur adopts a foreign idea then it di¤uses rapidly to others
in the economy, then the market by itself would lead to a suboptimal level
of discovery and a level of diversication that would be too low. Polices to
encourage discovery would lead to more diversication and higher welfare.
2.5 National and Global Gains from IP
The gains from IP for a country could come at the expense of other countries,
or they could lead to global e¢ ciency gains. We now explore the nature of
the gains from IP for the di¤erent models discussed above.
Consider rst the case in which the existence of Marshallian externalities
leads to multiple equilibria. Above we considered a small country, but to
explore whether gains are national or international we have to allow for the
possibility that a countrys IP hurts other countries. Consider a model with
two countries (A and B) and two goods (1 and 2). As above, good 2 exhibits
Marshallian externalities. In this context, IP entails a shift from an equilib-
rium in which countries are not specialized according to their comparative
advantage to one in which they are. Clearly such a shift increases worldwide
e¢ ciency. What happens to welfare in each of the two countries? First note
that the country that implements IP (country A) experiences an increase in
productivity in industry 2. If the terms of trade didnt change, country A
would be better o¤ (as in Subsection 2.1.2). But if A is not small, then the
25This is not consistent with what happens for rich countries, where higher productivity
goes together with falling diversication. One way to think about this is that at some point
a third sector emerges, a high-tech sector, which is a simple CRS sector where research
implies increasing productivity. When T and productivity in high-tech is su¢ ciently high,
the agriculture sector disappears, and increasing productivity in high tech leads now to
falling exports of manufactures and increasing concentration.
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relative price of good 2 will fall, and this will erode some of As productivity
gains. Even if A was so large that the terms of trade were now equal to its
domestic prices, however, it would still gain, so country A necessarily gains
from IP.26 This is a simple application of Helpman and Krugmans (1984)
proposition that a country necessarily gains from a move to an equilibrium
in which it allocates more resources to a sector with positive externalities.
For the other country (country B) welfare can decrease. To see this, note
that for this country the e¤ect of IP is exactly the same as the e¤ect of an
increase in productivity in industry 2 in country A. This could be either
positive or negative for country B. For example, if the opportunity cost of
good 2 in country A is just barely lower than the opportunity cost of good 2
in country B when both countries fully exploit the Marshallian externalities,
then it is clear that country B loses from the IP implemented in country A.
Di¤erent results arise when IP is geared towards the appropriation of
rents or broad (inter-industry) externalities associated with certain goods, as
in the literature on strategic trade policy (see Brander, 1995). In this case,
the use of IP by di¤erent countries entails essentially a zero-sum game, or
worse, as it could lead to an allocation of resources in which countries are
not specialized according to comparative advantage.
Consider next the model where IP entails industry-specic collective ac-
tion. If collective action is costless, then the answer is very simple: IP
necessarily increases global welfare, although it may hurt another country by
worsening its terms of trade. Things become more interesting when collective
action entails costs. If countries bargain e¢ ciently among themselves regard-
ing trade barriers, then (by denition) only IP that increases global welfare
will be implemented. One could optimistically argue that global negotiations
that include trade and other policies actually take into account the ability
of countries to implement IP, and that the resulting agreements allow only
policies that increase global welfare. In this case, countries that can follow
IP that increases their own welfare but lowers global welfare would be paid
(perhaps though better trade access to other countries) not to do it, and
countries that can implement IP that lowers national welfare but increases
global welfare would be paid to do it. In fact, this is the way that trade
agreements work in Bagwell and Staigers (1998) model of GATT.
Bagwell and Staiger show that as long as countries choose their policies
26A key ingredient in generating this result is that country A0s opportunity cost of good
2 falls below that of country B, a result of A0s latent comparative advantage in good 2.
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while disregarding their e¤ects on international prices, then they will lead
to a globally e¢ cient outcome. If international agreements are not e¢ cient
in this sense, however, then countries would evaluate the impact of IP on
welfare while taking into account its e¤ect on international prices. Clearly,
this could lead to a decline in global welfare. For example, imagine that
countries have committed to free trade. If IP for some good X implies a
reduction in the supply of some other good Y then the price of this good
would increase. If IP just barely makes the Home country implementing it
better o¤, then for the world as a whole (which necessarily sees a decline
in TOT) this entails a loss. Note, however, that this is a general feature of
domestic policies implemented by countries that a¤ect international prices,
and not something particular to IP.
Finally, we turn to the model where IP aims at promoting diversication.
As in the cases discussed above, the problem for global welfare may arise from
the inuence of IP on international prices. Imagine that the cost of a policy
to encourage "self-discovery" just barely justies the associated benets. If
such benets include an improvement in a countrys terms of trade (which
would arise from the decline in the supply of the non-diversied good), then
the global e¢ ciency would decline. Again, global e¢ ciency would necessarily
increase from IP only if countries evaluate it while disregarding its impact
on international prices.
3 Empirical Evidence on Infant-Industry Pro-
tection and other forms of IP
Since the best known form of IP is infant-industry protection, we devote most
of this section to a critical review of the empirical literature on this type of
IP. As discussed in Section 2, the theoretical justication for infant-industry
protection relies on the existence of Marshallian externalities. There is
extensive evidence that these externalities exist and are signicant (Rosenthal
and Strange (2004)). When such externalities exist, temporary protection
may help the country switch towards a better equilibrium, and this may be
welfare improving if the short-run costs are not too high. Protection may
also be welfare enhancing if the protected industry generates positive (inter-
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industry) externalities to the rest of the economy.27
As we outlined in Section 2, such a policy would be welfare enhancing
only if it passes both the Mill and Bastable tests. Recall that the Mill
test requires that the protected sector can eventually survive international
competition without protection, whereas the Bastable test requires that the
discounted future benets compensate the present costs of protection. We
emphasize in our review that very few studies of IP have examined whether
industries pass either the Mill or the Bastable test. Consequently, even if we
could show that protected sectors grow faster, this is not su¢ cient evidence
to claim that IP is justied from a welfare standpoint.
Even if the conditions necessary for protection to increase welfare are
satised, protection is not the rst-best policy. The theory of targeting (see
Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963)) suggests that a governments objectives
can be met more e¢ ciently using instruments other than tari¤s, and that
when these instruments target the distortion at the source, the optimal tari¤
for a small economy is zero. Unless there are specic distortions or exter-
nalities associated with trade, the rst-best policy instrument to conduct
industrial policy is not likely to be tari¤s. In a recent review on the scal
implications of trade reform, Pelzman and Shoham (2006) point out that "in
the theoretical public nance literature it is well established that an optimal
policy for a small open economy is to reduce tari¤s to zero and raise consump-
tion taxes (see Dixit (1985) and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)), thus maintaining
production e¢ ciency" (p. 9).
In practice, however, there are several reasons why countries have con-
tinued to use tari¤s to promote domestic industry. The rst best policy
instruments are frequently not available in countries with limited abilities to
collect income, consumption, or production taxes. Anderson (1996) shows
that in a budget constrained economy, where it is di¢ cult to compensate tar-
i¤ cuts with increases in consumption or other taxes, tari¤ reductions lead
to a curtailment of government spending and a resulting under-provision of
public goods, which lowers welfare. Irwin (2007) compares the deadweight
losses per dollar of revenue raised by tari¤s with other forms of taxation in
the United States. He argues that although the deadweight losses (per dollar)
for tari¤s were high in the 19th century, "import duties were probably much
easier to collect and enforce... than other modes of taxation" (p. 19). Irwin
27It is important to note that this is not infant-industry protection, however, since the
protected industry is not presumed to become competitive at some future period.
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(2002) draws similar conclusions for Argentina and Canada at that time. For
the same reasons, it could be argued that in some developing countries trade
protection could be a reasonable policy tool to implement IP. An important
implication is that if scal considerations are the reason to use trade protec-
tion rather than production subsidies, then clearly tari¤s would be the right
policy and not quantitative restrictions.
In the rest of this section we review the empirical research on the ef-
fectiveness of infant-industry protection. We begin by discussing case stud-
ies where protection was clearly motivated by infant-industry considerations
and then move on to other approaches that exploit the cross-industry and
cross-country variation in trade barriers to see whether protection had the
consequences predicted by infant-industry models.
3.1 Single-Industry Studies
There are very few detailed evaluations of infant-industry protection. Some
important papers that explicitly take into account learning e¤ects include
Baldwin and Krugman (1986, 1988), Head (1994), Luzio and Greenstein
(1995), Hansen, Jensen, and Madsen (2003), and Irwin (2008). Baldwin and
Krugman (1986) study protection to the semi-conductor industry in Japan.
They use a simulation model to show that the Japanese semi-conductor in-
dustry in Japan could not have emerged as a global player without the pro-
tected domestic market. Protection was needed in order to achieve the kinds
of economies of scale and learning e¤ects that would allow the industry to
move down its marginal cost curve and be competitive on world markets.
However, Baldwin and Krugman (1986) also nd that the costs to Japanese
consumers outweighed the benets, leading to net welfare losses for both
Japan and the US. Thus, although the semi-conductor sector in Japan sat-
ised the Mill test, it did not satisfy the Bastable test.
Baldwin and Krugman (1988) estimate the impact on US and European
welfare of Airbuss entry into the imperfectly competitive aircraft model.
They show that subsidies to Airbus may have resulted in net welfare gains
for Europe, primarily due to the high degree of imperfect competition (and
monopoly rents) that characterized the industry. However, their simulation
also makes clear that these results depend heavily on the assumed parame-
ters, including the elasticity of demand. In any case, it is possible to evaluate
that sector in such a way that the European subsidy to Airbus passes both
the Mill and the Bastable test.
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Head (1994) studies the e¤ect of tari¤ protection on the emergence of the
steel rail industry in the United States. This case ts the infant-industry
protection view almost perfectly: the local industry was initially uncompet-
itive (1860s), but a few decades after the imposition of an import tari¤ the
United States was the world leader in this market and the duty was repealed.
Head concludes that "the domestic industry did grow upand the duty was
eventually removed. Hence, protection certainly did not cause stagnation
and gross ine¢ ciencies. Furthermore, the duty led to long-run reductions in
domestic prices. While the savings to railroad builders were too small and
came too late to yield a net gain to consumers, the overall e¤ect on welfare
appears to have been positive" (p. 163).
Hansen, Jensen and Madsen (2003) examine the e¤ect of production sub-
sidies in Denmark for the production of electricity from wind power. They
conclude that the subsidies elicited strong learning-by-doing in the industry,
which achieved a dominant position in the world market. Moreover, accord-
ing to their calculations, the direct and indirect (environmental) benets
outweighed the overall costs of the policy.
Irwin (2008) evaluates the e¤ects of protection in the tinplate industry in
the United States. The industry ourished after receiving tari¤ protection
in 1890. Whereas there were no US producers at all prior to the imposition
of the tari¤, after the imposition of the tari¤ (at rates exceeding 70 percent)
the industry became entirely self-su¢ cient. According to his counterfactual
simulations, the tari¤ accelerated the industrys development by about ten
years, which would have developed anyway due to falling costs of iron ore.
However, the costs to consumer surplus were so large that welfare declined
as a consequence of protection. Irwin concludes that a lower tari¤ of around
50 percent could have been justied by net welfare calculations, but that the
actual tari¤ imposed was too high.
All the previous studies are for cases of protection or subsidies in devel-
oped countries. One single-industry study of infant-industry protection in a
developing country is that of Luzio and Greenstein (1995), who study the
e¤ects of protection of the microcomputer industry in the 1980s in Brazil.
They show that although there was rapid productivity growth in the pro-
tected industry, it never caught up with the also rapidly growing technolog-
ical frontier. As a result, welfare declined by a signicant amount (around
20 per cent of domestic spending on microcomputers) and the policy was
abandoned in the early 1990s.
More studies like these analyzing the welfare implications of infant in-
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dustry protection would be very useful. Yet even this brief review makes
it clear that protection may lead to higher growth but result in net welfare
losses. For tinplate, steel rail, wind power, semi-conductors and aircraft,
protection allowed domestic producers to grow and eventually become world
class producers Yet for tinplate, semiconductors, microcomputers, and possi-
bly aircraft, protection led to net welfare losses. These case studies suggest
that getting interventions "right" in terms of welfare is very di¢ cult.
3.2 Cross-Industry Studies
The theoretical framework makes a number of predictions for cross-country
empirical studies. If the conditions necessary for infant-industry protection
to improve welfare are satised (see Section 2) are satised, then protected
sectors should experience faster productivity growth than non-protected sec-
tors. With time, protected sectors should increase their importance in the
economy, and eventually become exporters. Under these conditions, one
would expect to nd a positive correlation between trade protection and
productivity growth.
One of the rst studies to look for a correlation between trade protection
and productivity growth is Krueger and Tuncer (1982). Using cross-industry
data on protection and productivity growth for Turkey in the period 1963
- 1976, these authors conclude that the empirical evidence does not provide
support for the infant industry argument. However, Harrison (1994) uses
their data to show that more protected sectors did in fact exhibit higher pro-
ductivity growth. As pointed out by Harrison, "Krueger and Tuncer (1982)
applied no statistical tests to support their conclusion...If one runs simple
correlations..one obtains striking results: Krueger and Tuncers data show
a statistically signicant positive relationship between increased protection
and higher productivity growth. In contrast to their stated conclusions, it
is possible to show that, in Turkey, protected industries did in fact achieve
greater productivity gains during the sample period."
While Krueger and Tuncers results appear to show some support for
infant industry protection, most studies nd little support. Cross-industry
studies usually show that the removal of protection generates both intra-
rm and intra-industry productivity gains (possibly through market share
reallocations, just as in Melitz, 2003). This includes work by Pavcnik (2002),
Tybout and Westbrook (1995) for Mexico, Harrison (1994) for Cote dIvoire,
Nishimizu and Page (1982) for Yugoslavia, Kim (2000) for South Korea,
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Topalova (2004) for India, Muendler (2003) for Brazil, Beason and Weinstein
(1996) for Japan, and others.
Rodrik (2007) has criticized the use of cross-industry studies to test for the
success of IP on the grounds that if IP is designed to deal with market failures
that impede sector growth, then one should not be surprised to nd a negative
correlation between protection and growth. He assumes that gi = (1  i)A,
where gi is the growth rate of industry i, i is an index of market failures,
and A is a parameter that captures productivity growth that is common
across industries. In this framework, industries with stronger market failures
would exhibit slower productivity growth. If there are political or scal
costs associated with the promotion of an industry then in equilibrium one
would nd industries with a higher i exhibiting stronger promotion and lower
growth. Rodriks point is that lower growth could be perfectly consistent with
a successful IP, just as it is consistent with a politically motivated policy of
promoting sunset sectors. Rodriks argument may be correct for certain
types of IP, but not for IP associated with the infant industry argument (as
dened in Section 2), since this would generate a positive correlation between
protection and productivity growth. Even if Rodrik were correct in the short
run, we would expect that in the longer term successful examples of infant
industry protection would lead eventually lead to growth.
In any case, there is a more fundamental problem with existing tests of
infant industry protection. There is no evidence to suggest that intervention
for IP reasons in trade even exists. If intervention were motivated by IP
reasons, we would expect the pattern of protection to be skewed towards
activities where positive externalities or market failures are largest. Instead,
existing evidence suggests that protection is motivated by optimal tari¤ con-
siderations (Broda, Limao, and Weinstein, 2006), for revenue generation, or
to protect special interests (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999, Gawande, Krishna
and Olarreaga, 2005). Tari¤ protection is frequently granted to less suc-
cessful rms or declining industries. Beason and Weinstein (1996) study the
pattern of industrial targeting in Japan and specically ask whether the gov-
ernment targeted industries with increasing returns or emerging sectors such
as electrical machinery. They nd the opposite result: protection and other
forms of targeting such as capital subsidies were highest for declining indus-
tries and industries without increasing returns. Most tari¤ protection was
heavily concentrated in processed food and textiles, while most subsidized
loans and tax relief went into mining. Beason and Weinstein conclude that
"industrial policy considerations were dominated by the desire to aid declin-
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ing sectors or protect the interests of large unproductive industries". Lee
(1996) reaches similar conclusions for South Korea.
Harrison and Hanson (1999) nd that in Mexico in the 1980s the pattern
of trade protection was skewed towards food processing and garments, pre-
sumably for political economy reasons since these were sectors where Mexico
already had a comparative advantage. More recently, Mobarak and Pur-
basari (2006) use a database on rms granted import licenses for raw mate-
rials and commodities in Indonesia to show that politically connected rms
are more likely to be granted protection. However, rms that export are
signicantly less likely to be granted support. This suggests that rms most
likely to succeed on world markets in Indonesia were in fact penalized by
restricting their access to import licenses.
There are a number of other areas where additional research is needed.
To properly test the type of model presented in Section 2, we would expect
initial output and productivity gains from the imposition of tari¤s; later
removal of these tari¤s would generate no e¤ects. We are not aware of
any studies that test for these asymmetric e¤ects of imposing protection
and later removing tari¤s through trade reform. Nor do existing empirical
studies address the many other reasons why infant industry protection may
not work. Domestic demand in LDCs may lack the level of sophistication that
would induce rms to meet the quality standards necessary for penetrating
richer markets (Porter, 1990). Porter also argues that weak competition
in small protected markets may not provide the incentives that rms need
to upgrade their technologies and increase their e¢ ciency. Small markets
may also fail to reach a critical mass where Marshallian externalities are
fully exploited. Moreover, as mentioned above, industries that use simple
production methods may expand without the generation of any externalities,
even if those same industries do exhibit strong Marshallian externalities in
rich countries (Baldwin, 1969, Rodríguez-Clare, 2007). Firms may believe
that protection will fail to create a cluster, and so they may decide not
adopt the production methods that lead to externalities but are protable
only within a cluster. In other cases protection may actually favor the use
of backward technologies that do not contribute to the generation of higher
industry-level productivity (Sauré, 2007).
The realization of Marshallian externalities is a much more complex process
than what the model in Section 2 suggests. As argued by Rosenthal and
Strange (2005), "there are many di¤erent aspects of a location that may
matter to rms. A well-intentioned policy could easily fail because it failed
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to attend to one or two of these... it may not be possible to duplicate else-
where the circumstances that led to a successful agglomeration in another
place... This is not to say that government policy has never contributed to
the formation of clusters. It certainly has, but the formation of clusters has
been a side-e¤ect rather than the primary goal of the policy..." (p. 19). In
other words, the econometric evidence regarding Marshallian externalities
may in fact be telling us that agglomeration may be necessary but not suf-
cient for increased productivity. If a certain factor, policy or institution
is necessary for geographic concentration of an industry to lead to higher
productivity, then we may observe Marshallian externalities taking place in
advanced countries, but not in LDCs. To put it crudely, subsidizing the
software sector may not generate a Silicon Valley in a developing country.
3.3 Cross-Country Studies
There are a number of cross-country studies evaluating the success of IP.
These can be grouped into (1) testing for an association between protection
and country performance and (2) qualitative case study evidence. A number
of recent studies emphasize the importance of the pattern of protection in
understanding possible linkages between IP and economic growth. These
include ORourke (2000), Clemens and Williams (2001), Chang (2002), Irwin
(2002), Lehmann and ORourke (2008),
ORourke (2000) and Clemens and Williamson (2001) both nd a posi-
tive correlation between import tari¤s and economic growth across countries
during the late nineteenth century These two studies hypothesize that pro-
tection was associated with growth because it allowed countries to accelerate
the growth of what were then "emerging" sectors (industry) out of "declining
sectors" (agriculture). These emerging sectors were characterized by learn-
ing e¤ects and the kinds of Marshallian externalities modelled in Section
2. These new explanations for the observed positive relationship between
growth and protection at the turn of the twentieth century could also be used
to explain how rst Britain, and then the United States, were able to emerge
as economic leaders in conjunction with tari¤s that were very high in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Chang (2002) claimed that protection
was essential in the transformation of the United States into an industrialized
economy in the 19th century. Others (for one such view, see Sir Arthur
Lewis, 1955) have argued that Latin Americas relatively high growth rates
during the 1960s and early 1970s in a time of high e¤ective rates of protec-
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tion was also no coincidence.
Irwin (2002) casts doubt on the meaning and robustness of such correla-
tions, arguing that rather than a causal relationship from protection for IP
reasons to growth, the positive correlation comes from the fact that a few
fast growing countries (e.g. the United States, Canada, Argentina) imposed
high tari¤s as a means of raising scal revenues. Lehmann and ORourke
(2008) are able to address this criticism by purging their results of tari¤s
imposed for revenue purposes.
As pointed out by Lehmann and ORourke (2008), what you protect
matters. If the pattern of protection is skewed towards increasing returns
sectors where there are important externalities, then IP would be much more
likely to work than if protection is given to declining sectors or sectors with-
out externalities. In their book analyzing whether openness to trade is likely
to be associated with higher growth, Grossman and Helpman (1991) make
a similar point. Lehmann and ORourke examine the pattern of protection
and growth for a sample of developed countries during the period between
1875 and 1913. They nd that while agricultural tari¤s were negatively cor-
related with growth, industrial tari¤s were positively correlated with growth.
Lehmann and ORourke also separately examine the relationship between
growth and what they refer to as "revenue tari¤s"tari¤s imposed on goods
not produced at home and applied to raise revenue. They nd no relation-
ship between tari¤s imposed to raise revenue and economic growth. They do
not, however, estimate the impact of protection on productivity growth, nor
do they calculate the net welfare e¤ects of these policies.
Two other recent studies that emphasize that it is the pattern of protec-
tion which matters and not the average level of protection include Nunn and
Treer (2004) and Estevadeordal and Taylor (2008). Nunn and Treer (2004)
nd that countries which protect skill-intensive sectors grow more rapidly
than countries which protect unskilled-labor-intensive industries. Estevade-
ordal and Taylor disaggregate tari¤s into consumption, capital goods, and
intermediate goods tari¤s. For the 1970s through the current decade, Es-
tevadeordal and Taylor show that tari¤ protection a¤ects growth negatively
only if tari¤s are on capital or intermediate goods. There is no association
between tari¤s on consumption goods and long run growth. We continue and
expand this discussion to include a more general evaluation of the literature
on trade and growth in Section 4.
Another approach relies on qualitative case study evidence to contrast
the apparent success of East Asia countries relative to Latin America and
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elsewhere in the use of industrial policy. There is signicant debate over
whether the use of a range of industrial policy instruments, including infant-
industry protection, helped or hurt development in East Asia. A common
view is that East Asian countries used export subsidies whereas Latin Ameri-
can countries used import tari¤s, and that this explains part of the di¤erence
in performance in these two regions. In fact, East Asian countries used both
import tari¤s and export subsidies, and this created a setting in which the in-
centives were neutral regarding import substitution versus exports, although
manufacturing as a whole enjoyed some net promotion (World Bank, 1993).
Chinas policies over the last twenty ve years could similarly be described
as using both import tari¤s and export subsidies.
South Korea and Taiwan had tremendous rates of physical and human
capital accumulation over the 60s, 70s and 80s, and this went together with
rapidly changing comparative advantage towards capital intensive goods. Of
course, the standard explanation of this experience is that capital accumula-
tion caused by some exogenous factors led to a changing comparative advan-
tage. But an alternative interpretation, consistent with the model presented
in Section 2.1.2, is that such a structural transformation was not inevitable
because of multiple equilibria. In particular, without protection or promotion
of the capital intensive sectors, countries would have remained specialized in
the sectors where they enjoyed a static comparative advantage; since these
sectors were not capital intensive, then capital accumulation would not have
taken place. Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) have argued that IP was cru-
cial for some East Asian countries to capitalize on their latent comparative
advantage in advanced manufacturing.
It is clear that East Asian countries indeed pursued several policies to
encourage particular sectors, such as production subsidies, subsidized credit,
scal incentives, and trade protection. But what was the actual e¤ect of these
policies relative to what would have happened in their absence? Can IP be
credited with bringing about the successful industrialization experienced in
East Asia? One approach in the literature has been to check whether the
industries that received most support are the ones that have grown most
rapidly.28 As we discussed above, protection is typically motivated by politi-
cal or terms of trade reasons rather than prospects for higher growth through
IP. In the late twentieth century, in contrast to the last century when indus-
28Beason and Weinstein (1996) perform this exercise for Japan while Lee (1996) does it
for Korea. See Noland and Pack (2003) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
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trial countries protected emerging industries, it appears that trade barriers
are often designed to protect "sunset" industries rather than to encourage
"sunrise" industries (see Noland and Pack, 2003).
3.4 Export subsidies and other forms of IP
We have organized our discussion of the empirical evidence regarding the
e¤ectiveness of IP on infant-industry protection. But clearly there are many
other forms of IP: countries could subsidize exports across the board or in
particular industries, they could impose di¤erential taxes, as well as di¤eren-
tiated production, credit and R&D subsidies. Since a comprehensive review
of all forms of IP is not possible, in the rest of this section we focus our
discussion on export subsidies.
Consider again the case in which some sectors exhibit Marshallian ex-
ternalities. An overall export subsidy would simply preserve the allocation
associated with the current pattern of comparative advantage. If export
subsidies are targeted to the sectors that exhibit Marshallian externalities,
then they could also be e¤ective in switching the economy to the superior
equilibrium. Again, production subsidies are less distortionary than export
subsidies but they impose stronger scal demands. Thus, for governments
with great scal needs or where taxation is very distortionary at the margin,
export subsidies could be a reasonable option, although import tari¤s would
be superior from a scal perspective.
In any case, the argument for the superiority of export subsidies over
import tari¤s is threefold: (1) that by promoting exports, a country makes
sure that rms are subject to the "discipline of the international market,"
which forces rms to become more productive; (2) that by subsidizing only
exporting rms, a country e¤ectively limits the subsidy to rms with high
productivity; and (3) that domestic markets may be too small to allow the
protected industry to reap the full benets of Marshallian externalities. All
of these arguments are relevant but require some qualication. First, the
discipline of the international market applies both to rms that export and
to those that sell in domestic markets as long as there are no quantitative
restrictions. Second, there is in principle no reason to subsidize highly pro-
ductive rms over low productivity rms (see Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare,
2007), unless there are barriers that prevent resources from owing from the
latter to the former, in which case the rst-best policy would be to remove
those barriers. Finally, if the economy is small in relation to the industry
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size needed to fully exploit the Marshallian externalities, this is not going to
be xed by an export subsidy. A di¤erent and more reasonable argument
is that domestic demand is not su¢ ciently sophisticated, hence rms selling
to domestic consumers will not develop the necessary level of sophistication
needed for success in international markets. Export orientation for infant
industries would avoid this problem.29
One could redene the case for industrial policy as trying to change in-
centives to produce (or export) some goods and not others. What evidence is
there that what a country exports (or imports) matters? There are a number
of studies listed in Table 2 which suggest that the growth e¤ects of openness
hinge on the composition of trade. These include Dodaro (1991), Giles, Giles
and McCann (1992), Hansen (1994), Ghatak, Milner, and Utkulu (1997),
Pineres and Ferrantino (1997), Xu and Wang (1999), Choudhri and Hakura
(2000), Khalafalla and Webb (2001), and An and Iyigun (2004). With one
exception, all these studies nd that exports are more likely to lead to growth
if they are in non-traditional sectors such as manufacturing or skill-intensive
goods rather than primary products or raw materials; studies also nd that
greater export diversication is more likely to be associated with growth.
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005) develop a measure of the sophisti-
cation of a countrys exports based on the level of GDP per capita associated
with the export of di¤erent goods worldwide. Once they have attached a
level of GDP per capita to each detailed export category based on which
countries export the good, they can then derive the implied GDP level of a
countrys exports. Countries whose export baskets contain items typically
produced by higher income countries have a "high" level of export sophistica-
tion relative to what would be expected given their level of development. In
principle, one could construct a measure of the distance between the implied
income level of a countrys exports and the countrys actual level of GDP
per capita. In a related paper, Rodrik (2006) shows that Chinas exports in
1992 were associated with an income level more than six times higher than
Chinas per-capita GDP at that time. Rodrik suggests that the gap between
the implied level of income of Chinas exports and Chinas actual GDP per
29Although we have focused on trade policies, the use of local-content requirements
on foreign producers can also be justied by appealing to Marshallian externalities. In
fact, such requirements force multinationals to buy local inputs just as protection induces
domestic consumers (and rms) to buy from local producers. A major di¤erence, of course,
is that local-content requirements are quantitative restrictions rather than explicit tari¤s
or subsidies.
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capita is too large to have occurred naturally and is one outcome of Chinas
activist industrial policy.
These studies suggesting that what a country exports is more impor-
tant than how much the country exports for long run growth are suggestive
that IP has played an important role in country growth experiences, but are
not conclusive. No researchers have identied an association between the
existence of Marshallian externalities in particular sectors, industrial promo-
tion of those sectors, consequent changes in the commodity composition of
a countrys export basket, and growth. Consequently, we can only loosely
infer that rapid changes in the composition of a countrys exports towards
more sophisticated products could be indicative of IP.
4 Trade and Economic Development
Countries intervene in trade for many reasons, including the desire to shift
production towards sectors with positive externalities (industrial policy), to
raise revenue, to a¤ect terms of trade, and to satisfy special interests. We
reviewed in Section 3 some of the studies that explicitly evaluate the suc-
cess of IP. There is almost no research that has been able to isolate the
e¤ects of IP on welfare, taking into account all the other motives for pro-
tection. However, there is a large literature which estimates the reduced
reform relationship between openness to trade and economic growth. In
this section, we review nearly 200 prominent studies that use some kind of
reduced form approach. We identify the di¤erent measures of openness used
in this literature, the datasets, the identication strategies, and the results
Can we use this vast literature to cast light on the IP debate? In dening
openness to trade, we make a distinction between trade volumes, such as
exports or imports, and trade policy, such as tari¤ reductions or changes
in quotas. Most of the studies we review below nd a positive relationship
between trade volumes and growth. While there are far fewer studies that
evaluate the linkages between tari¤s and growth, they tend to get insignicant
or weak e¤ects. This should not be surprising given the mixed motives
for imposing tari¤ protection. We hypothesize that these di¤erent results
imply that industrial policy is more likely to be successful if it is "pro-trade".
Yet from a practical standpoint, it is di¢ cult to envision a successful set
of policies that are both pro-trade and protectionist; at a minimum, this
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would require policies that fully o¤set any anti-trade biases. The positive
correlation between trade shares and growth is consistent with our hypothesis
that IP implemented via export promotion and encouragement of FDI has
generally been more successful than protection to trade. Before we turn to
the literature on trade volumes, trade policies, and country outcomes, we
begin with some stylized facts.
4.1 Stylized Facts on Trade policies, 1980-2004
If we use a conventional measure of trade volumes such as export shares
in GDP, developing countries are now more integrated into the world econ-
omy than the industrial countries. Figure 2 shows that export shares for
developing countries overtook industrial countries in the early 1990s.
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Figure 2: Export Shares in Developing and High-Income Countries
Table 1 shows the evolution of country trade policies over the last twenty
ve years. Countries are ranked according to the net change in tari¤ levels
between 1985 and 2004. We have included both developing and developed
countries to provide an indication of how protection changes at di¤erent
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stages of development. The rst four columns indicate the ratio of tari¤
revenues to trade ows, taken from the World Bank. The next four columns
report the actual administrative tari¤s, averaged across import categories
between 1980 and 2004. The last three columns report changes in these
tari¤s between 1985 and 2004. The last column indicates the change in the
standard deviation of tari¤s over time; this measure is an indication of the
change in the dispersion of tari¤s.
It is evident from Table 1 that there has been a dramatic decline in tari¤
protection among developing countries. Average tari¤s in India declined from
98.8 percent in 1980 to 28.1 percent in 2004; in Bangladesh from 102.2 in
1985 to 16.4 percent; in Costa Rica from 55 percent to 5.7 percent; in China
from 49.5 percent in 1980 to 9.8 percent in 2004; in Turkey from 44 to 2.6
percent, and in Chile from 30 to 4.9 percent. Not all countries had such
enormous declines, however: in Algeria, average tari¤s only declined slightly,
from 21 to 18 percent.
There are several other features worth noting in Table 1. The last column
of Table 1 shows that there has been a dramatic decline in tari¤dispersion, as
indicated by the fall in the standard deviation of tari¤s. There is also a large
discrepancy between tari¤ revenues as a percentage of trade ows ("revenue
tari¤s") and actual statutory tari¤s. Revenue tari¤s are reported in the
rst 5 columns of Table 1, while statutory tari¤s are reported in columns 6
through 10. To illustrate the di¤erence, Table 1 shows that average tari¤s
in India in 1980 were 98.8 percent but tari¤ collections as a percentage of
trade were only 15.5 percent. In Paraguay, average tari¤s were 71 percent
in 1980, while tari¤ collections were 6 percent; in Costa Rica, tari¤s were 55
percent and collections were 5.3 percent; in Chile, average tari¤s in 1980 were
30 percent but tari¤ collections were 2.8 percent. The di¤erence between
these two measures reects in part the role of tari¤ exemptionstypically
state enterprises were exempt from paying tari¤s, as were many exporters
and foreign enterprises as well as selective imposition of duties by customs
o¢ cers and the negative impact of high tari¤s on imports.
We also highlight the historically high levels of protection in China. China
has arguably had the most spectacular success in integrating into the world
economy in the last two decades. Yet in 1990, it was still one of the most
protected economies in the world, with an average tari¤ rate of 40 percent.
According to Table 1, in 1990 China was tied for fth place in average levels
of tari¤ protection, behind Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Kenya. The
dispersion of tari¤ levels was also high, and the maximum tari¤ exceeded
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Figure 3: Exports as a share of GDP
200 percent. Figure 3, taken from Rodrik (2006) documents that much of
Chinas export surge occurred simultaneously with the imposition of high
tari¤s. Nevertheless, countries such as China and India because they had
such high tari¤s to begin with also exhibited the highest tari¤ reductions
between 1985 and 2004.
4.2 Cross-country Evidence on Trade Policies, Trade
Volumes, Productivity, and Growth
A standard approach in the cross-country literature is to regress an outcome
of interest for country i at time t (GDP growth, real GDP per worker, or
total factor productivity growth) on a preferred measure of openness and a
set of controls Z,
Yit = Constant+ OPENNESSit + Zit + i +  t + "it (10)
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Most controversies have arisen over the following three issues:
1. How to measure OPENNESS
2. How to account for the endogeneity between Y and OPENNESS.
3. Which variables to include in the set of controls Z.
(1)How to measure openness. There is a large debate over how to measure
openness. The ideal measures for understanding the linkages between trade
policies and outcomes are measures of policies themselves such as tari¤s
and quotas, but until recently, these measures were hardly ever used (see
Harrison (1996) for a discussion). How much of a problem is the lack of
information on statutory tari¤s (in contrast to revenue tari¤s) in practice?
If the di¤erence between actual tari¤s and revenues are due to exemptions
in the tari¤ schedule, then the tari¤ schedule is misleading, and it would
actually be better to use revenues as a share of import value. But if the
di¤erential between revenue tari¤s and statutory tari¤s highlighted in Table
1 reects the restrictive impact of high barriers on trade volumes, barriers, or
corrupt practices which impose rent-seeking costs not reected in revenues,
then using trade revenues to proxy for tari¤s is not ideal.
A more fundamental problem which has plagued the literature on the
relationship between trade policies and growth is the continued use of trade
volumes as a proxy for policy. Trade volumes are a¤ected by many di¤er-
ent factors, including policies, distance to neighbors and trading partners,
country size, exchange rate movements, terms of trade changes, and barriers
to entry. Consequently, simply using trade volumes to proxy for changes
in trade policies may be misleading. We evaluate the relationship between
these di¤erent openness measures in Table 3. We present correlations be-
tween actual tari¤s, trade taxes as a percentage of trade, two measures of
trade volumes, the nominal exchange rate, and the ratio of foreign investment
inows to GDP using annual data from 1980 through 2004. For trade shares,
we include both nominal and real trade shares, where real trade shares are
dened as the ratio of trade to GDP in constant prices from the Penn World
Tables (version 6.1). Table 4 repeats the same exercise, but restricts the
sample to developing countries. The correlations reported in Tables 3 and 4
highlight the following:
 Although Table 1 indicates a big di¤erence in magnitude between the
ratio of tari¤ revenues to trade and actual administrative tari¤s, the
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correlation coe¢ cient reported in Table 3 between the two measures is
actually quite high at .63 and statistically signicant.
 There is a signicant negative correlation between trade shares and
tari¤s. The correlation with nominal openness is -.25. The correlation
with real openness about the same, between -.2 and -.3, depending on
which measure of tari¤s is used.
 The negative correlation coe¢ cient between trade policies (tari¤s) and
outcomes (trade shares) does not depend on how tari¤s or trade shares
are measured.
 Tari¤ levels are highly (negatively) correlated with the ratio of foreign
investment inows to GDP, and trade volumes are highly (positively)
correlated with foreign investment inows. In fact, trade ows are
more highly correlated with foreign investment inows than they are
with tari¤s. These correlations suggest that measures of openness may
also be capturing the gains from foreign investment inows.
 The correlations are the same or stronger if we restrict the sample to
developing countries (see Table 4). Trade taxes as a share of trade ows
continue to be highly correlated with actual tari¤s. The correlation
coe¢ cient between trade shares and both tari¤ measures increases to
(negative) .36.
These stylized facts suggest that trade taxes as a share of trade are a
much better proxy for average tari¤s than trade shares. The correlation
coe¢ cient of statutory tari¤s with revenue tari¤s is signicantly higher than
the correlation of statutory tari¤s with trade shares (.70 versus -.35). Yet
researchers continue to rely on trade shares as a measure of trade policy,
despite the easily available (World Bank or IMF) tari¤ revenue measure.
The other broad conclusion we can draw from these data is that there is
a signicant positive relationship between less restrictive trade policies and
higher trade shares. Pritchett (1996) suggested that:
alternative objective measures of trade policy are completely
uncorrelated across countries. This result has serious implica-
tions for empirical research that attempts to assess the e¤ects of
liberalization on economic performance using comparisons across
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countries; it also highlights the di¢ culties of interpretation in
these types of empirical studies.
We would argue that this is not the case: statutory tari¤s are highly
correlated with revenue tari¤s, indicating that they are excellent measures
of trade policy There is also a signicant and negative correlation between
tari¤measures and outcome measures such as real or nominal trade shares in
GDP. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the (inverse) correlation between trade
shares and trade policies is not nearly large enough to allow proponents of
free trade to argue that high trade shares always reect a free trade stance.
Most studies listed in Table 2 use trade volumes as a measure of openness,
but trade volumes are outcomes of trade policies as well as a host of factors
including geography, shifts in terms of trade, exchange rate shocks, and
changes in transport and communication costs. Much of the criticism in
the important and widely cited Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) NBER Macro
Annual paper is directed at the inadequacy of typical proxies for openness.
Rodriguez and Rodrik nd fault with Dollar (1992), Edwards (1998), and
Sachs and Warner (1995) for using exchange rate distortions as measures of
trade policy, since exchange distortions reect macro-economic distortions,
not trade policies per se. They also critique Edwards (1998) for using aWorld
Bank classication of trade regimes which is subjective. While Dollars (1992)
openness measure seems ideal because it directly measures the deviation of
domestic from international prices, Rodriguez and Rodrik argue the measure
is primarily correlated with swings in the exchange rate. Dollar (1992) uses
the following denition of openness:
OPENNESSi = 100

Pi
EiPUSA

OPENNESS is the relative price level compared to the United States,
with all price levels converted to US dollars, using Summers-Heston country-
specic consumption price indices. A higher price level should indicate a
higher degree of distortions. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) argue that the
law of one price does not hold in general, and that domestic prices could be
high for reasons other than trade policy. These could include high transport
costs or monopolies in distribution channels. In practice, Rodriguez and
Rodrik show that there is no relationship between the openness measure
calculated by Dollar and actual tari¤s or non-tari¤ barriers. In fact, tari¤s
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and non-tari¤barriers enter with the wrong sign if this measure of openness is
regressed on tari¤s and non-tari¤barriers. They then show that this measure
is primarily capturing exchange rate movements.
Both Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) and Harrison and Hanson (1999) cri-
tique a heavily used measure of openness created by Sachs andWarner (1995).
The Sachs and Warner measure has been updated by Wacziarg and Welch
(2007), but the updated measure may su¤er from the same shortcomings as
the Sachs and Warner measure. Harrison and Hanson show that the Sachs
and Warner (1995) measure of OPENNESS does not pick up di¤erences in
trade policy but instead reects di¤erences across countries in exchange rate
policies and political regimes. One way to reinterpret the evidence presented
in Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995) is that real exchange rate over-
valuation is bad for growth, a theme recently emphasized by Rodrik (2007).
One obvious implication for researchers is that any study which measures
the impact of real price distortions on growth due to protection should also
control for exchange rate movements.
(2) Endogeneity problems. Endogeneity problems could arise for many
reasons. Policy makers may prefer not to open up to trade until rms are
capable of competing on world markets, suggesting that the causality runs
from incomes to openness. Even statutory measures of trade policy (tari¤s,
quotas) are endogenously determined. The pattern of protection is likely
to be skewed towards protecting weak sectors,promising infant industries,
special interests or vocal minorities.
While empirical work in the 1970s and 1980s largely ignored endogeneity
problems, newer studies give much greater weight to constructing plausible
identication strategies. This progress is evident in Table 2, which lists
prominent studies on the linkages between openness and growth from the
1980s onwards. Most of the early studies had no identication strategy at
all, as indicated in column (4). More recent work addresses this omission,
using one of two general approaches.
The rst approach is to use granger-causality tests that exploit lags in
studies that use time-series datasets. As indicated in Table 2, these studies of-
ten nd that causality runs in the reverse direction, from Y toOPENNESS:
more successful economies (or sectors) are more likely to open up to global
competition. Related to this approach is the use of lags as instruments, which
depends on some strong assumptions about the lack of correlation between
the instruments and the error term.
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The second general approach to identication has been to seek additional
instruments for OPENNESS. One path-breaking study along these lines is
Frankel and Romer (1999). Frankel and Romer use the insights from gravity
models to derive an instrument based on geographic proximity. Gravity
models predict that countries closer to each other trade more with each other.
This means that distance can be used as an instrument for bilateral trade.
In the rst stage regressions, Frankel and Romer regress the log of country
is trade with country j as a share of country is GDP on distance and other
variables:
ln ( ij=GDPi) = a
0Xij +  ij
The vectorX includes the log of distance between country i and j, the log
of population and area in both countries, and dummy variables indicating
whether the two countries share a common border and whether they are
landlocked. There are no subscripts for time in this specication: this is a
pure cross-section using data for 1985. Frankel and Romer show that greater
distance from a trading partner reduces bilateral trade, and they are able to
explain 36 percent of bilateral trade in the rst stage. Using the rst stage
estimates, Frankel and Romer then generate an OPENNESS variable by
aggregating predicted bilateral trade with all of country is trading partners.
In the second stage, Frankel and Romer regress log of income per capita in
1985 on the predicted trade share, log of population and log of area. They
show that OPENNESS positively a¤ects income per capita.
The beauty of this approach is that geographic proximity is without ques-
tion exogenous with respect to income. There are several problems, how-
ever. Since distance does not change over time, the authors cannot allow
for country-specic xed e¤ects i in equation (1) and are restricted to pure
cross-section estimation. While one solution in principle would be to con-
trol for factors that vary across countries but remain xed over time such
as cultural or institutional di¤erences it may be di¢ cult to control for all
these omitted determinants of income. Another concern is that Frankel and
Romers original results are not very robust: the statistical signicance on
predicted openness disappears once we add continent dummies, which is not
surprising since all the identication is from the cross-section. Frankel and
Romer also omit observations with zero bilateral trade in the rst stage,
which probably contributes to the poor rst stage R-square and the result-
ing weak instrument problem. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) are also critical
of Frankel and Romer because they argue that greater openness to trade gen-
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erated through geographic proximity may have di¤erent e¤ects from trade
generated through trade policy interventions. One further concern is that
the instrumental variable estimates magnify the impact of trade on incomes,
in contrast to what one would expect if trade is a positive function of income.
The explanation given by Frankel and Romer is that the bias goes in the op-
posite direction because of measurement error, but one is still left wondering
whether or not the authors have successfully addressed the endogeneity of
trade to income.
Alcala and Ciccone (2004) use the insights of Frankel and Romer to im-
prove on their initial specication. They use all bilateral trade data available
in the rst stage, including those bilateral trade pairs with zero trade, which
improves the rst stage F-statistic from 3.06 using Frankel and Romers bilat-
eral trade pairs to 11.66. This gives them two and a half times the number of
observations in the rst stage relative to Frankel and Romer. Consequently,
the second stage relationship between their chosen measure of openness and
their dependent variable Y (the log of PPP GDP per capita in 1985) is more
robust. They also add a measure of institutional quality to the Z vector,
which addresses the concern that trade is positively correlated with income
or growth because greater openness is correlated with better institutions.
They instrument institutional quality with language and settler mortality
data, drawn from Hall and Jones and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson.
Nevertheless, any analysis which uses geography as an instrument is still
restricted to a pure cross-section analysis, which requires the researcher to
nd all possible covariates which could induce a spurious correlation between
OPENNESS and Y .
There are other aspects to Alcala and Ciccone (2004) which suggest that
the relationship between openness and income in a pure cross-section is not
very robust. Trade openness is only signicantly correlated with Y if the
authors use a realmeasure of openness, dened as the ratio of PPP trade
to GDP. Nominal trade shares are not signicantly associated with GDP per
capita, which leads Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) to suggest that
Alcala and Ciccones results are driven by movements in the price level, not
by trade. It is di¢ cult to be sure, however, since Rodrik, Subramanian and
Trebbi do not use exactly the same specication as Alcala and Ciccone.
Romalis (2007) suggests another clever instrument for a countrysOPENNESS:
tari¤s imposed by a countrys trading partners. In particular, Romalis uses
US most-favored nation (MFN) tari¤s as an instrument for developing coun-
try trade shares. Using this instrument, he shows that the change in real
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per capita GDP is positively and signicantly a¤ected by trade, and that
the magnitude is economically important. Using MFN tari¤s is particularly
clever, since these are unlikely to be inuenced by developing country behav-
ior and are consequently exogenous. This is at the same time a limitation
of the approach: the instrument only varies over time, not across countries
since the US must apply the same MFN tari¤s to all its trading partners.
The results also could be interpreted to suggest that other country poli-
cies matter for developing country growth, but sheds less light on whether
own developing country policies to lower their trade barriers is benecial for
growth. What Romalis shows is that access for developing country exports is
benecial for growth, but his research does not indicate whether opening up
import-competing sectors to competition through reductions in protection
are also benecial for growth.
(3) Which variables to include in the set of controls Z : The third major
area of controversy in this literature is which variables to include in the set of
controls Z. There is a growing literature which claims that two key omitted
variables from the Z vector, leading to omitted variable bias in early stud-
ies, are institutions and geography. Indeed a recent literature has sought to
distinguish between institutions, economic geography, and trade as sources
of economic growth, including Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik, Subra-
manian, and Trebbi (2004), and Alcala and Ciccone (2004). Only Alacala
and Ciccone nd that openness matters; the other two studies nd that in-
stitutions rule. There are several reasons for why Alcala and Ciccone get
very di¤erent results from Rodrik et. al. (2004). First, Alcala and Ciccone
use real trade shares while Rodrik et. al. use nominal trade shares as their
measure of openness. Second, Alcala and Ciccone improve upon the Frankel
and Romer measure by expanding the rst-stage and using more countries,
improving the rst-stage F and reducing the fragility of the instrument.
None of these three studies, which have been extensively cited in the
empirical literature on the determinants of growth, uses trade policy as a
measure of openness. Easterly and Levine (2003) use the Sachs and Warner
(1995) and Dollar (1992) measures to proxy for openness; the aws of these
two measures are discussed above. Rodrik et. al. use the average of nominal
trade shares for 1950 through 1998 as their openness measure. All three
papers focus on a pure cross-section of countries. As pointed out by Harrison
(1996), trade policies and trade shares have changed too much over the last
forty years to make long run averages very meaningful.
Given the problems inherent in the openness measures, and the reliance on
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pure cross-sectional estimation, it is not surprising that openness is trumped
by institutions in two of these three studies. This research also highlights
the tremendous problems associated with measuring institutions in a way
which is distinct from trade policy. The correlation between the openness
and institutions measures in Easterly and Levine (2003) is .68, which suggests
that multicollinearity is likely to be a signicant problem. Both Rodrik et.
al. and Alcala and Ciccone use the Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton
measure of institutions, which is constructed fromWorld Bank surveys based
on responses for 1997-1998. Yet the dependent variables in these two studies
are PPP GDP per capita prior to that period: 1985 PPP GDP per worker
for Alcala and Ciccone and PPP GDP per capita in 1995 for Rodrik et. al.
It seems odd to try to understand growth in 1985 or 1995 using measures
of institutions based on data from the end of the 1990s, unless institutions
change very little. Yet if institutions are not time-varying, then they may
simply be capturing the country xed e¤ect i in equation (1).
While this survey has highlighted some of the shortcomings of cross-
country work on openness and growth, there are several promising new areas
of research which deserve mention. Most of the work surveyed so far uses
a measure of real GDP per capita or per capita growth as a measure of Y .
Yet a number of studies have suggested that openness is important because
it allows countries to invest more. Levine and Renelt (1992) show that there
is no robust relationship between di¤erent measures of openness and average
per capita GDP growth in their cross-country sample. Replacing Y with
investment shares in GDP, however, they nd that openness is robustly cor-
related with investment rates. They conclude that the relationship between
trade and growth may be based on enhanced resource accumulation and not
necessarily on the improved allocation of resources.
Levine and Renelt show that trade matters for growth because it increases
investment. One mechanism could be by reducing the price of investment
goods. Delong and Summers show that countries with lower investment
prices grow faster, and Lee (1995) shows that a higher share of imported
capital goods in total investment are associated with higher growth. More
recently, Hsieh and Klenow (2007) argue that on the contrary there is no link
between lower relative prices of investment goods and trade policy. They cite
as evidence the fact that the actual level of prices for investment goods in
poor countries are not higher than in the rest of the world. Instead, they
argue that investment rates are low in poor countries because the relative
price of investment is high relative to non-traded consumption goods, such
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as services.
The importance of barriers to investment in understanding linkages be-
tween trade and growth is taken up once more by Estevadeordal and Taylor
(2008). They estimate a version of equation (1) in di¤erences, but separate
their measure of openness into tari¤s on consumption goods, intermediates,
and capital goods. They also allow for a country xed e¤ect in di¤erences,
leading to a di¤erence-in-di¤erence specication for (1). They show that this
approach successfully addresses the problem of whether institutions or trade
policy is responsible for higher incomes, since in rst di¤erences there is no
clear correlation between the two. In addition, they address the potential
endogeneity of changes in openness by using as instruments for the change
the level of tari¤s in 1985 interacted with two measures of what they re-
fer to as GATT potential: GATT membership in 1975 and a measure of
diplomatic pressure constructed from number of diplomats. Estevadeordal
and Taylor show that tari¤ protection only negatively a¤ects growth if tari¤s
are on capital goods or intermediates, which is consistent with Levine and
Renelts 1992 hypothesis that openness matters because it a¤ects resource
accumulation.
A second promising area of research is related to an emerging consensus
on the need for openness to trade to be accompanied by key complementary
policies. Recent research emphasizing the importance of complementarities
between trade and other policies includes Chang, Kaltani, and Loayza (2005),
Bolaky and Freund (2006), and Ja¤ee and Sutherland (2003). One reason
why the relationship in (1) may be fragile could be because openness to trade
is most successful if implemented in conjunction with other policieswhich
make it possible for rms to e¤ectively compete on world markets. If such a
policy can be characterized as X (there could be overlap between X and Z),
then it would lead to a slightly di¤erent specication:
Yit = Constant+ OPENNESSit + Zit + Xit
+(OPENNESS X)it + i +  t + "it
Figure 4, taken from Bolaky and Freund (2006), makes this point graphi-
cally. Bolaky and Freund use three di¤erent measures of openness, including
real and nominal trade shares, and tari¤s. In countries with low barriers to
entry, there is a positive relationship between openness to trade and growth;
in regulated economies, there is a negative relationship. The importance of
other policies in this case, low entry barriers provides one explanation for
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Figure 4: Trade, Growth, and Regulation of Entry.
why it is so di¢ cult to nd a robust relationship between openness to trade
and good performance. There is simply too much heterogeneity in outcomes,
in large part because other types of policies are so di¤erent. The necessity for
openness to trade to be accompanied by low barriers to entry and exit can be
understood in light of new trade theories that emphasize rm heterogeneity,
as illustrated by Melitz (2003). In his model, gains from trade occur through
reallocation of market share from less productive to more productive rms.
If rms cannot easily expand or exit, this important source of productivity
gains through trade reforms is lost.
Two other studies also nd that gains from trade are contingent on other
policies. Chang, Kaltani, and Loayza (2005) use panel data instead of a
cross-section and trade shares corrected for country size are their measure of
openness. In their work, the key complementary policies for ensuring that
openness to trade is associated with growth include infrastructure develop-
ment, labor market exibility, and low barriers to entry. Given the cur-
rent levels of those variables, they conclude that there are many countries
that currently stand to lose from opening their markets. Chang, Kaltani
and Loayza argue that other types of reforms are not so critical for ensur-
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ing growth gains from openness, including educational attainment, nancial
depth, and good governance. DeJong and Ripoll (2006), using tari¤s as a
measure of openness, also nd that the e¤ect of openness on growth is con-
ditional on the level of income. In particular, using cross-country data for
1975-2000, they nd a positive relationship between tari¤s and growth rates
for the worldpoorest countries, but a negative relationship for rich countries.
These three papers have several implications for trade policy. When rst-
best outcomes (eliminating both trade and other distortions simultaneously)
are not possible, these papers suggest that the advisability of trade reform
depends on the existence and the degree of non-trade distortions and the
feasibility of removing them. Policy makers need to reject a one size ts
all approach to trade opening in favor of packages tailored to the specic
circumstances of each country. Another implication is that opening up to
trade is not enough; in particular, key complementary reforms include lower-
ing barriers to new rm entry, encouraging more exible labor markets, and
improving infrastructure.
4.3 What can the di¤erent e¤ects of trade volumes
versus trade policy tell us about the success of IP?
Our review of recent evidence on trade policies, trade volumes, and growth
suggests that researchers face several challenges. In particular, measuring
openness to trade, identifying the direction of causality between openness
and growth, and identifying additional controls to include in cross-country
estimation are ongoing concerns. Nevertheless, our review of the studies in
Table 2 suggests the following broad conclusions:
 Studies that use trade volumes as a measure of openness generally nd
a positive relationship between changes in openness and growth.
 Studies that use tari¤s as a measure of openness for the post World
War II period generally nd an insignicant e¤ect of average tari¤s on
growth. However, the pattern of protection matters. High tari¤s on
intermediates or investment goods may be negatively associated with
growth.
Existing studies suggest that in the post World War II period, tari¤s on
average have not been successful in generating higher growth. We conrm
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these general conclusions using a panel dataset on non-OECD countries, for
the 1960 through 2000 period. In particular, we contrast the results us-
ing trade shares (X+M/GDP) as our openness measure relative to using the
World Banks revenue tari¤s (tari¤ revenue divided by imports). The de-
pendent variable is log income per capita. The use of a panel of annual
observations allows us to control for country-specic xed e¤ects and also
for time e¤ects. Country xed e¤ects are one approach to controlling for
country characteristics that vary across countries (such as institutions) that
are not perfectly measured and do not vary systematically from one year to
the next. Time e¤ects allow us to control for world-wide shocks, such as an
oil price shock or a worldwide currency crisis.
The top two rows in Table 5 show that openness measured using trade
shares is positively and signicantly associated with growth. These results
are consistent with the majority of the studies listed in Table 2 that use trade
shares as a measure of openness and generally nd that changes in trade
shares are associated with higher growth. However, the bottom two rows
show that revenue tari¤s are not signicantly associated with growth. Even
skeptics, such as Rodriguez (2007), generally conclude that there is a strong
correlation between trade volumes and growth, while the association between
trade policyas measured by the World Banks revenue tari¤ measureand
growth is weak.
The positive correlation between trade shares and growth is very strong
and remains after we add other controls. The negative correlation between
tari¤s and growth is signicant in some specications but is not a robust
nding; even Estevadeordal and Taylor (2008) nd no correlation with growth
when using consumption goods tari¤s as a measure of openness. What should
we make of this? As we discussed in Section 3, tari¤s are imposed for
many reasons. Foremost among these reasons are the need to raise revenue,
political economy considerations, and infant industry concerns. Either IP
via protection has not worked, or protection on average has been imposed
for other reasons, leading to no net gains in output.
A promising area for new research is to move beyond reduced form evi-
dence on the linkages between openness and growth so that we can identify
how openness to trade a¤ects growth. This is particularly important from
a policy perspective. If openness yields benets because it allows rms to
import new technology embodied in capital goods, the policy implications
are quite di¤erent than if openness is benecial because it forces rms to
compete internationally or leads to market share reallocation towards more
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e¢ cient rms. Identifying the mechanisms leading from openness to growth
is precisely the focus of new micro-based studies of rms (see, for example,
Melitz (2003) or Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007)). These theoretical
advances have been accompanied by a growing empirical literature, to which
we now turn.
4.4 Identifying the mechanisms for gains from trade
Much of the new research evaluates the importance of international trade for
growth using micro models of consumer and rm behavior. This new research
focuses on the following mechanisms for understanding the linkages between
openness to trade and growth: (1) gains from consumption of increased va-
riety (2) gains from importing goods that embody new technology (3) gains
from increasing competition (4) gains from reaping economies of scale (5)
gains through reallocation of market shares to the most productive rms and
(6) learning by doing through exporting. We describe these in more detail
below.
Gains from consumption of increased variety Quantitative models are
useful for measuring gains from trade coming from increased variety, as in
Romer (1994). Romer (1994) and Feenstra (1994) showed that these gains
could be large, while Arkolakis et. al. (2008) show that Romers results
are sensitive to modeling assumptions. Under heterogeneity, gains could be
small, as the new varieties that are imported after liberalization are "mar-
ginal varieties," in the sense that total consumption of these goods is small.
Moreover, the benets from the increase in foreign varieties could be com-
pensated by the losses associated with the displacement of domestic varieties.
Another important paper in this literature is Broda and Weinstein (2006).
Broda and Weinstein show that an important part of growth comes from the
increase in imported variety over the last decades. While this may in part
result from a countrys own trade reforms, it is also driven by diversication
on the part of exporting countries like China.
Gains from importing goods that embody new technology Eaton and Ko-
rtum (1999) argue that tari¤s a¤ect the price of capital, and through this
they a¤ect the capital-labor ratio in steady state. Coe and Helpman (1995),
Keller (1998) and others reviewed in Keller (2004) study the role of trade as
a vehicle for "international R&D spillovers." The idea is that by importing
intermediate and capital goods, a country benets from the R&D done in the
exporting countries. This is a key feature of the model of R&D and trade
57
in Eaton and Kortum (2001). A di¤erent notion is that trade accelerates
the international ow of technical know-how (see Grossman and Helpman,
p. 165). Several papers have explored this empirically with mixed results
(see Rhee et. al., 1984, Aitken et. al., 1997, and Clerides et. al., 1998, and
Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
A number of theoretical papers have explored the role of intermediate
inputs in raising productivity growth (Ethier (1979,1982), Markusen (1989),
Romer (1987, 1990), and Grossman and Helpman (1991)). Some recent stud-
ies nd that increasing intermediate goods inputs or lowering input tari¤s are
associated with large productivity gains. This includes Goldberg, Khandel-
wal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2008), Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Amiti
and Konings (2007), Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2006) and Broda, Green-
eld and Weinstein (2008). Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova
(2008) use Indian data to show that accounting for new imported varieties
lowered the price index for intermediate goods by 4.7 percent per year rela-
tive to conventional gains from lower import prices. They also nd that lower
input tari¤s account for a third of the new products introduced by domestic
Indian rms, suggesting potentially large gains from trade.
Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2008) develop a model in which coun-
tries interact through trade and multinational production (MP). MP can be
seen as a particular way through which technology di¤uses across countries.
Trade and MP are substitutes in that they are alternative ways to serve a
market, but they are also complements because MP requires importing inputs
from the home country. The authors estimate the model and then conduct
counterfactual exercises to study the gains from trade and MP. In prelimi-
nary calculations they nd that trade and MP act more as substitutes than
complements. This would imply that the calculated gains from trade do not
increase when we take into account the indirect e¤ect of trade in facilitating
technology di¤usion through MP. Still, the joint gains from trade and MP
are very large, particularly for small countries.
Gains from increasing competition Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994),
and Muendler (2005) show that increasing competition due to lowering of
trade barriers reduced price-cost margins, using micro-level data for Turkey,
Cote dIvoire, and Brazil. Enhanced competition may encourage rms to
engage more in innovative activity, or may simply lead to lower prices for
consumers. One important implication is that studies which measure the
productivity gains from trade reforms without allowing mark-ups to fall post
reform are likely to mismeasure the productivity gains from trade, as pointed
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out by Harrison (1994). Harrison shows that the direction of the bias in
productivity measurement cannot be identied a priori. She also shows that
a simple way to address this problem is to allow measured factor shares to
vary with changes in trade policy when doing production function estimation.
Gains through reallocation of market shares to the most productive rms
New heterogeneous trade models suggest that trade enhances productivity by
reallocating output towards more e¢ cient rms. In the original framework
developed by Melitz (2003), rms are endowed with di¤erent productivity
draws, which are pre-determined and unchanging over time. When a country
opens up to international trade, only the more productive rms remain as
the less productive rms are forced to exit.
There are a number of implications of this framework which could be
tested using rm-level data. As we discussed earlier, these models which
emphasize reallocation of rm shares imply a critical role for other comple-
mentary policies that make it easy for rms to expand, contract, enter, or
exit the market. Another implication is that productivity gains from trade
reforms should operate through market share reallocation. An early study
for the United States by Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) did not focus
on trade policy per se but provided a framework for decomposing productiv-
ity growth into components due to within-rm changes versus reallocation
of output. They concluded that the bulk of growth in aggregate total factor
productivity (TFP) was accounted for by the reallocation of output shares.
For developing countries, this decomposition has been performed by Pavcnik
(2002) for Chile and by Van Biesebroeck (2003) for Colombia.
Since Pavcniks sample begins at the end of the Chilean trade reforms, she
cannot use changes in trade policy as her openness measure. Instead, she sep-
arates enterprises into import-competing, export-competing, and non-traded
sectors. She then examines whether import or export-competing rms had
higher productivity relative to other types of rms. Using the Olley-Pakes
(1993) approach to estimating productivity, Pavcnik nds that import com-
peting rms improved their productivity over time, while export competing
rms did not. This suggests that in Chile there was no learning among ex-
porters, but import-competing rms did exhibit productivity growth. Pavc-
nik calculates that two-thirds of productivity growth in Chile was due to
reallocation of market shares towards more e¢ cient producers, and the re-
maining one-third was due to improved productivity among surviving rms.
Van Biesebroeck (2003) uses a variety of methods to compute productivity
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growth and nds that for Colombia the majority of changes in productivity
occur within the same plant. Van Biesebroeck nds that between two thirds
and three quarters of the total change comes from within plant changes. The
second most important e¤ect is the entry of more productive plants into
the economy. While Pavcnik (2002) nds that two-thirds of the increases
in productivity growth are due to reallocation of market shares, Van Biese-
broeck nds the opposite: in Colombia, the bulk of aggregate increases in
productivity growth are driven by within-plant changes in productivity.
One possible explanation for these di¤erent results is that entry and exit
barriers (due to restrictions on hiring and ring) in Colombia were higher
than in Chile during this period. Barriers to entry or exit make it di¢ cult
for a reallocation of market share towards more e¢ cient producers to occur.
More case studies are needed before we can reach any denitive conclusions.
However, the limited evidence suggests that productivity growth stems from
both (1) a reshu­ ing of production towards more e¢ cient producers and
(2) increasing productivity within the rm. Consequently, Melitzs (2003)
simplifying assumption that rms receive an exogenous productivity draw
which is unchanging over time is not consistent with actual rm behavior.
The latest heterogeneous rm research modies Melitz (2003) to allow rm-
level productivity to evolve over time, instead of being xed at the initial
distribution. Atkeson and Burstein (2006), Costantini and Melitz (2007),
Lileeva and Treer (2007), and Ederington and McCalman (forthcoming) all
develop models with heterogeneous rms where productivity is allowed to
evolve within the rm. Lileeva and Treer (2007) allow reductions in foreign
tari¤s to induce lower-productivity rms to invest in raising labor produc-
tivity, engage in more product innovation, and increase their adoption of
advanced manufacturing technology, which in turn leads to within-rm pro-
ductivity gains. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006) have also developed a
model where rms produce multiple goods, and trade liberalization may lead
them to focus on the goods in which they are most productive. Empirically
this would be seen as an increase in productivity within rms, even though
the mechanism is essentially the same as in Melitz (2003).
Learning by doing through exporting One likely channel through which
international trade leads to productivity gains is through learning by doing
for exporters. Yet a rst round of empirical studies suggested that there
was very little, if any, learning from exporting. Instead, these rst gener-
ation studies found that the best rms select into exporting, leading to a
strong positive correlation between productivity levels and export status.
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This research included case studies of Colombia (Clerides, Lach, and Tybout
(1998)), Spain (Delgado, Farinas, and Ruano (2002)), Germany (Bernard and
Wagner (1997)),and the United States (Bernard and Jensen (1999)). Pavc-
nik (2002) also found a similar result: rms operating in export-competing
sectors are the most e¢ cient in manufacturing, but these rms do not show
productivity improvements over time.
This rst-generation evidence is drawn from primarily high and upper
middle income countries. A second wave of empirical studies casts doubt
on the hypothesis that there is no learning by doing for exporters. For
developing countries, this includes Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) for Korea,
Van Biesebroeck (2005) for 9 African countries, Lileeva (2004), Blalock and
Gertler (2004) for Indonesia, Hallward-Driemeir, Iarossi, and Sokolo¤ (2005)
for East Asian countries, Fernandes and Isgut (2006), Park, Yang, Shi and
Jiang (2006) for China, Aw, Roberts and Winston (2007), and De Loecker
(2007) for Slovenia.
All of these second generation studies nd evidence of learning through
exporting. Blalock and Gertler (2004), for example, test for whether ex-
porting confers productivity gains using a panel of Indonesian manufactur-
ing enterprises. They nd strong evidence that rms experience a jump in
productivity of 3 to 5 percent following the initiation of exporting. Van
Biesebroeck (2006) examines the evidence in favor of learning by exporting
in Africa and also nds a causal link from exporting to productivity.
Blalock and Gertler argue that previous tests of learning by exporting
were done on industrialized or middle income developing countries. They
point out that while rms in developed and middle income countries are
likely to be as e¢ cient as those in their trading partners countries, rms
in the poorest countries may have much more to gain from exposure to in-
ternational export markets. Lileeva and Treer (2007) propose a similar
explanation for these disparate ndings using Canadian data. They show
that lower productivity rms are more likely to invest and learn in order
to access foreign markets, in contrast to higher productivity rms that are
able to export without additional investment. De Loecker (2007) nds that
for Slovenian rms, there was evidence of a di¤erent kind of selection into
export markets: only the most productive rms began exporting. He then
uses nonlinear matching estimation to test whether there was learning by ex-
porting during the 1994-2000 period. He nds that while there was evidence
of selection into export markets, these same exporters increased productivity
as a result of exporting. The identication strategy uses both matching
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techniques and the di¤erence in productivity growth for those who began
exporting this period relative to a control group that did not. De Loecker
also nds that learning by exporting was higher for rms exporting to high
income destinations.
All of the identication problems present in (10) for the cross-country
literature are challenges for these micro studies as well. How can we distin-
guish between selection into exporting (i.e. the most productive rms choose
to become exporters) and the impact of exporting on learning and produc-
tivity? A number of studies exploit the panel nature of the data, testing
whether rms were more productive prior to becoming exporters. This in-
volves constructing an indicator for the period prior to when the rm becomes
an exporter and testing whether it is statistically signicant in a regression
of productivity on export status. Another approach has been to nd an in-
strument for export status. Van Biesebroeck (2005) uses as instruments for
lagged export status the location of the rm, ethnicity of the owner, foreign
ownership and state ownership, although the validity of these instruments is
not completely clear. Lileeva and Treer (2007) use US tari¤ cuts mandated
by the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement as an instrument for Canadian
export status.
Despite ongoing controversies regarding the importance of learning by
doing through exporting, it is probably safe to conclude the following:
1. The most productive rms are likely to become exporters.
2. While there is selection into exporting, there is also learning through
exporting.
3. Learning from exporting is most likely in technologically backward
countries and among less productive rms.
5 Foreign Direct Investment
Many countries encourage inward FDI because they expect that foreign rms
will enable domestic enterprises to become technologically more advanced.
This is nothing other than industrial policy, although it is rarely identied
as such. As pointed out in our introduction, attracting foreign funds typ-
ically means tilting incentives in favor of foreign investors. Hanson (2001)
reviews the many incentives o¤ered to foreign rms, which include income
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tax holidays, tari¤ exemptions, and subsidies for infrastructure. In 1998, 103
countries o¤ered tax concessions to foreign companies that set up production
or other facilities within their borders. Some of these concessions were enor-
mous: the Government of Alabama paid the equivalent of 150,000 dollars per
employee to Mercedes for locating its new plant there in 1994; the British
government provided between 30,000 and 50,000 dollars per employee to at-
tract Samsung and Siemens in the late 1990s; Ireland o¤ered until recently
a corporate tax rate of 10 percent to all foreign manufacturers who chose to
locate there (Gorg and Greenaway (2003)). Until 2008, China o¤ered sig-
nicantly lower corporate tax rates to foreign companies locating there, and
continues to subsidize infrastructure investments for multinationals locating
in foreign enterprise zones.
Most countries encourage FDI inows to specic sectors; typically these
are sectors which are technologically more advanced. Chandra and Kolavalli
(2006) document that "attracting FDI has been an important strategy in
technological adaptation" in a number of cases (p. 33) Table 6 from Alfaro
and Charlton (2008) identies the specic sectors targeted by 29 countries
for the 1985-2000 period. The most targeted sectors include machinery,
computers, telecommunications, and transport equipment.
Alfaro and Charlton nd that FDI inows are likely to be higher in tar-
getted sectors, and that FDI in these sectors generates higher growth. Their
study suggests some support for the argument that IP has been successful
for FDI, possibly because governments appear to target sectors with pos-
itive externalities. Nevertheless, it is di¢ cult to econometrically identify
whether targeting has worked, since FDI may be attracted to sectors with
high potential growth.
Aggregate cross-country studies on FDI and growth are reviewed in greater
detail in another chapter of this volume. Given the strong correlation be-
tween FDI inows as a share of GDP and openness to trade reported in
Tables 3 and 4, identifying a separate impact of FDI from trade on country
outcomes is likely to be challenging. All of the problems associated with
the cross-country evidence on trade and growth measuring policies, identi-
fying the direction of causality, and omitted variable biasare present in this
literature as well. Researchers typically use FDI ows, rather than policies
targeted at FDI, to measure its e¤ects, since panel data on FDI policies is
even more di¢ cult to obtain than data on tari¤s. Reverse causality is also
a problem, since extensive evidence suggests that FDI is attracted to large,
less risky, and growing local markets. Nevertheless, there is generally mixed
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evidence on the relationship between FDI and a countrys growth (Carkovic
and Levine (2002), Bosworth and Collins (1999), Borenzstein et al (1998)).
Recent work on FDI and growth suggests that other complementary policies
need to be in place to maximize the gains from inward foreign investment,
reinforcing the theme introduced in Section 4 on trade. Important policies
that need to be in place for a country to benet from FDI include a minimum
level of human capital (Borenzstein et al, 1998), developed nancial markets
(Alfaro et al, 2004) and openness to trade (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and
Dapsoford, 1996).
There is signicant research interest in FDI as a vehicle through which
developing country rms learn about new technology. While most of the
empirical literature focuses on productivity e¤ects of FDI, there is also a
growing literature that examines the impact of FDI on factor markets. We
review these two research areas below.
5.1 FDI and Productivity
To justify special treatment, foreign enterprises would need to confer some
type of positive externality which is not internalized by rms. A typical test
of whether foreign rms transfer technology to domestic enterprises would be
to estimate rm-level productivity, and measure whether a more extensive
foreign presence increases domestic rm productivity. As an illustration,
Aitken and Harrison (1999) estimate the following production function for
rm i in sector j at time t:
Yit = Constant+ 1DFI_Plantijt + 2DFI_Sectorjt
+3 (DFI_Plantijt  2DFI_Sectorjt) + 4Zijt + i +  t + "it
where
DFI_Sectorjt =
P
i2j DFI_Plantijt  EmploymentijtP
i2j Employmentijt
The dependent variable could be log of output, in which case the Z vector
would control for input use, leaving foreign investment to a¤ect the resid-
ual determinants of output, which is typically interpreted to be total factor
productivity (TFP) levels. Alternatively, the dependent variable Y could
be output per worker or TFP, and the vector Z could include a number of
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other controls, such as size, openness, or other determinants of productiv-
ity. DFI_Plant is typically measured as the share of the plant which is
foreign-owned. The coe¢ cient 1 then measures whether rms with foreign
investment are more productive than other plants. Most researchers nd
that the own-plant e¤ect is large and signicant. In other words, rms with
foreign equity participation typically have higher output, higher output per
worker, or higher levels of TFP.
This is an important point which has not been emphasized enough in
the literature on FDI. While many researchers are focused on identifying
some sort of externality or technology spillover, probably the most impor-
tant contribution that foreign rms make is the direct e¤ect captured by
the coe¢ cient 1 on DFI_Plant. Ramondo (2008) develops a model where
countries gain access to foreign technologies through the activities of multi-
nationals. In counterfactual exercises with her estimated model she nds
that for small countries the associated benets can be quite large.
If most benets from FDI are internalized by receiving plants, then pro-
moting joint ventures is important for policy. Promoting joint ventures has
been the core of Chinas policy to benet from inward foreign investment.
Foreign investors in key sectors (mobile phones, computers) were required to
enter into joint ventures with domestic rms (Rodrik, 2006). In electronics,
Huchet (1997) writes that Chinas technology strategy has been clear: allow
foreign rms access to the domestic market in exchange for technology trans-
fer through joint production or joint ventures.Wholly owned foreign rms
are a rarity in China; most rms are joint ventures between local (frequently
state-owned) and foreign enterprises.
China is a particularly interesting case to study in seeking to understand
the role played by technology transfer via FDI. Since opening its economy to
the outside world in late 1978, China has absorbed an increasing amount of
FDI and is now among the worlds largest hosts of FDI inows. A number
of recent papers use Chinese rm-level data to evaluate the the own-plant ef-
fect (the coe¢ cient 1 that measures whether rms with foreign investment
are more productive than other plants). All these studies, including Hu
and Je¤erson (2002), Du, Harrison, and Je¤erson (2008), and Lin, Liu, and
Zhang (2008) nd that joint ventures in China exhibit not only higher pro-
ductivity levels than other enterprises but also higher productivity growth.
Du, Harrison, and Je¤erson (2008) nd that these e¤ects are largest for state-
owned enterprises that form partnerships with foreign rms. The impact on
their productivity is 10 times that on privately-owned enterprises. Du, Har-
65
rison, and Je¤erson (2008) suggest that forming joint venture partnerships
for Chinese state-owned enterprises has provided an alternative approach to
privatization as a way of increasing public sector performance. Bartel and
Harrison (2004) also nd that public sector enterprises in Indonesia improved
performance after forming joint ventures with foreign enterprises.
Although there is a strong relationship between foreign ownership and
productivity levels, that e¤ect often cannot be separately identied from
a rm xed e¤ect. So if the equation above is estimated either in rst-
di¤erences or with rm specic e¤ects, then the coe¢ cient on DFI_Plant
may not be signicant. What this implies is that rms with foreign equity
participation are at a higher level of technology, but technological change is
not always higher for these enterprises. This should not be surprising, since
many of these rms are already at the technology frontier.
While evidence suggests that it might make sense to encourage less pro-
ductive state enterprises to make alliances with foreign rms, or to provide
incentives for rms to form partnerships with foreign rms, most research
has not used any sort of identication strategy to tease out the direction of
causality. One possibility is that foreign rms acquire the most productive do-
mestic enterprises, or form alliances with the most productive rms. Arnold
and Javorcik (2006) attack this problem by asking whether foreign rms are
simply acquiring the most productive domestic enterprises (in Indonesia) or
whether they cause these enterprises to become more productive. Combin-
ing di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation with nonlinear matching techniques,
they show that the acquired rms outperformed the control group in every ob-
servable dimension, including exhibiting higher productivity growth, higher
investment, and higher sales growth. They conclude that foreign equity in-
fusions do confer benets to domestic enterprises, and that the e¤ect is not
simply one of picking winners. However, more studies in this regard would
be useful.
The coe¢ cient 2 on DFI_Sector measures the extent to which foreign
ownership in the sector positively a¤ects the productivity of domestic enter-
prises. This e¤ect is sometimes referred to as a horizontal spillover, since it
measures the extent to which foreign investment in the same sector a¤ects
the productivity of domestic rms. Early studies, such as Blomstrom and
Wol¤ (1994) for Mexico, typically estimated a pure cross-section or failed to
include rm or industry-specic e¤ects. Consequently, the coe¢ cient 2 was
always positive and frequently signicant, indicating the presence of positive
horizontal spillovers. Aitken and Harrison (1999) showed that this positive
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coe¢ cient for Venezuelan manufacturing enterprises was spurious, indicating
that foreign rms were attracted to highly productive sectors. When they
include rm or sector e¤ects, the coe¢ cient on DFI_Sector switched from
positive to negative. Aitken and Harrison interpreted the negative coe¢ -
cient as indicative of market-stealing: foreign rms grab market share from
domestic rms, driving them up their cost curves in sectors with economies
of scale.
Other recent studies measuring the extent of horizontal spillovers are
listed in Table 7. In contrast to earlier studies which generally found sup-
port for positive (horizontal) spillovers, more recent studies that have at-
tempted to reproduce Aitken and Harrison (1999) for other countries have
typically found insignicant or negative horizontal externalities. This in-
cludes Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech Republic, Smarzynska
(2002) for Lithuania, Lopez-Cordova (2003) for Mexico, Damijan et al (2001)
for eight transition economies, Kathuria (2000) for India, Hu and Je¤erson
(2002) and Du, Harrison and Je¤erson (2008) for China, and others. Vir-
tually every study published since 1999 has found negative or insignicant
horizontal externalities.30
One explanation for the lack of positive horizontal spillovers is that for-
eign rms have no incentives to transfer knowledge or technology to competi-
tors within the same industry. They should, however, have an incentive to
help the productivity of their suppliers, by transferring knowledge to them
(see Kugler (2001)). More recent work has sought to identify what is now re-
ferred to as vertical spillovers, which are positive externalities stemming from
the relationships of foreign enterprises with domestic suppliers or customers.
Forward spillovers could occur if foreign rms that locate domestically sup-
ply inputs that embody new technologies or processes. Backward spillovers
could occur if domestic suppliers to downstream foreign rms benet from
contacts with the rms to increase productivity. Smarzynska (2004) denes
horizontal, forward, and backward FDI spillovers as follows:
HorizontalFDIjt =
P
i2j DFI_Plantijt OUTPUTijtP
i2j OUTPUTijt
30One interesting exeption in Poole (2008), who uses a matched establishment-worker
database from Brazil to present evidence consistent with the existence of positive multi-
national spillovers through worker mobility in Brazil.
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and
ForwardFDIjt =
X
m6=j
jm
P
i2mDFI_Plantijt  (Yijt  Xijt)P
i2m(Yijt  Xijt)
where jm is the share of inputs purchased by industry j from industry m in
total inputs sourced by sector j. Finally, if jkt is the proportion of sector
js output that is supplied to sector k (taken from the input-output matrix),
then backward FDI spillovers are dened as:
BackwardFDIjt =
X
k 6=j
jk HorizontalFDIkt
Smarzynska nds a zero or negative impact from forward linkages, and
a positive impact of backward linkages, indicating that technological gains
from FDI are primarily concentrated among domestic suppliers interacting
with downstream foreign rms. Recent studies on other countries (Table
7) also nd these positive backward FDI spillovers, including Blalock and
Gertler (2003) for Indonesia, Liu for China (2005), Gorodnichenko, Svejnar,
and Terrell (2006) for 15 transition economies, and Lopez-Cordova (2003) for
Mexico. The evidence in favor of backward spillovers may be one factor that
could explain Chinas emphasis on the use of domestic content requirements.
Sutton (2004) describes the use of domestic content requirements in both
India and China as follows:
"From the early 90s onwards, a wave of multinational rms
entered both markets. In both countries, these entrants were
required to achieve a high level of domestic content within a spec-
ied period (typically, 70 percent within 3 years). For at least
some of the new entrants, this was seen as an unreasonable tar-
get, as domestic suppliers could not meet the price and quality
requirements of the car makers. Achieving the 70 percent tar-
get required the car makers to switch rapidly from a reliance on
imported components to sourcing from local vendors; and this in
turn gave the car makers a strong incentive to work closely with
(rst-tier) suppliers, to ensure that quality standards were met,
within an acceptable price."
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These requirements illustrate how IP has been actively used to shape
China and Indias auto sector through the use of domestic content require-
ments. Even if there are backward spillovers, however, the optimal policy
would be to subsidize domestic input purchases by foreign rms instead of
imposing them through domestic content requirements. Domestic content
requirements could deter some investments that would have created back-
ward spillovers, and may lead to ine¢ cient outcomes by protecting domestic
suppliers from import competition.
Perhaps as a result of very demanding domestic content requirements,
recent e¤orts to identify backward FDI spillovers in Chinese manufactur-
ing have found none. These include studies by Du, Harrison, and Je¤erson
(2008), and Lin, Liu, and Zhang (2008). Both studies use rm-level manufac-
turing census data spanning 1998 through 2006. Lin, Liu, and Zhang (2008)
nd evidence of positive forward spillovers, while Du, Harrison, and Je¤erson
(2008) nd negative horizontal spillovers and positive forward spillovers. A
remaining question for researchers is why there are backward spillovers in
other countries but not in China.
A related approach is to think of the benets of FDI through their im-
pact on the variety of non-tradable inputs available in the host country.
Rodríguez-Clare (1996) presents a model to explore this idea. Under full em-
ployment, multinationals expand at the expense of domestic rms, so what
matters is the demand for domestic inputs per unit of labor hired, a term that
Rodríguez-Clare labels the linkage coe¢ cient.31 If multinationalslinkage co-
e¢ cient is higher than that of domestic rms, the multinationalsbackward
linkage e¤ect is positive and FDI would lead to an increase in input variety
and host-country productivity.32
Using rm-level data for several Latin American countries, Alfaro and
Rodríguez-Clare (2004) show that although multinationals source a lower
share of their inputs domestically than domestic rms, they nevertheless tend
to have a higher linkage coe¢ cient thanks to the fact that they use more
roundabout production methods, requiring more inputs per unit of labor.
Still, to date there is only anecdotal evidence that multinationals indeed lead
to an increase in the variety of inputs available in the host country. Moreover,
one concern is that if multinationals generate positive backward linkages then
31This is in contrast to most of the literature on multinationals and linkages, which
focused instead on the share of inputs that multinationals source domestically.
32The positive productivity e¤ect relies on the presence of love of variety for inputs, as
in Ethier (1982) and Romer (1990).
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this should benet domestic rms that use similar inputs as multinationals.
One would then expect to see positive horizontal externalities, but this is
generally not what the literature nds (at least in LDCs).
To summarize, the evidence seems to consistently indicate that:
1. Firms that receive FDI (joint ventures) or are acquired by multination-
als generally exhibit higher productivity levels.
2. There is evidence of positive vertical spillovers from foreign buyers to
domestic suppliers (backward linkages) and from foreign suppliers to
domestic buyers (forward linkages).
3. There are negative or insignicant horizontal spillovers to rms within
the same industry.
Anecdotal evidence and new research (Chandra and Kolavalli (2006), Al-
faro and Charlton (2008)) suggests that FDI has been particularly important
in cases where governments were actively engaged in strategies of technologi-
cal upgrading in certain sectors, and brought in foreign companies as part of
those strategies. Typically, these e¤orts were part of a set of complementary
policies that included increasing the supply of skilled workes in a targetted
industry, improving regulation and infrastructure, promoting new activities
and innovation, and increasing exports. In many of those cases, the govern-
ment probably encouraged joint ventures, but the direction of causality is
not so clear.
Given these results, are scal incentives for foreign enterprises warranted?
If the primary reason for giving these incentives is to encourage technology
transfer, then the answer should probably be no: if foreign rms are the only
ones that use the inputs that benet from backward spillovers and there are
no horizontal spillovers, then there is no need to subsidize FDI. Yet there is
clearly a further need to understand the mechanism through which foreign
rms generate vertical spillovers. Even if vertical spillovers do exist, Pack and
Saggi (2006) argue that "the magnitude of some of the incentives being used
seems di¢ cult to justify. (p. 281). They also point out that investment
incentives and tax breaks to multinational investors work against their local
competitors. Thus, if there are local rms that could potentially compete
with multinationals, the adverse e¤ect on such rms of tax incentives to
multinationals needs to be taken into account. The e¢ cacy of investment
incentives is also unclear such policies could easily end up transferring rents
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to foreign investors without a¤ecting their investment decisions.(Pack and
Saggi (2006), p. 281)
5.2 FDI and host country factor markets
One robust result in the literature on foreign ownership and productivity
is that rms with foreign equity have higher productivity levels. Foreign
rms are also typically more capital intensive, and spend more on worker
training. As long as rms do not face a perfectly at labor supply schedule,
it is likely that these di¤erent rm characteristics will translate into higher
wages. There could also be other imperfections in the labor market, such as
search costs for rms seeking skilled wages, or e¢ ciency wage setting, that
could result in foreign rms paying higher wages. To the extent that there is
worker mobility or productivity spillovers, these wage e¤ects for workers at
foreign enterprises could also spill over to other workers.
Almost all studies nd that workers in foreign rms are paid higher wages,
which may reect the fact that foreign rms or joint ventures have higher
productivity levels. In perfect markets more productive rms would not pay
higher wages, but market imperfections (such as search costs or informational
asymmetries) could generate such a link. Evidence showing higher wages paid
by multinationals includes Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996) for Mexico
and Venezuela, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) for Indonesia using a pure cross-
section, Harrison and Scorse (2004) for Indonesia using a panel, Velde and
Morrisey (2003) for a set of African economies, Martins and Esteves (2007)
for Brazil, and Earle and Telegdy (2007) for Hungary. Studies of industrial
countries also nd large wage gaps between domestic and foreign enterprise
wages when researchers do not condition for worker or rm characteristics.
This includes Almeida (2003) for Portugal, Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin
(2001) and Dri¢ eld and Girma (2003) for the United Kingdom, and Feliciano
and Lipsey (1999) for the United States. The unconditional wage gap, which
is the gap in wages paid by foreign versus domestically owned enterprises
without controlling for worker or rm characteristics, is typically large. It is
frequently as high as 40 percent (for Hungary) or 50 percent (for Brazil).
When researchers control for worker and rm characteristics, then the
wage premium paid by foreign rms declines dramatically, to around 10 per-
cent. Earle and Telegdy (2007) nd that the wage gap between workers
employed at foreign and domestic enterprises is not much a¤ected by condi-
tioning on worker characteristics, but that controlling for industry reduces
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the premia to 34 percent, and controlling for rm size further reduces it to 28
percent. (Robert Lipsey has questioned whether it makes sense to control for
characteristics such as rm size: if foreign rms are larger and consequently
pay higher wages than domestically owned enterprises, workers are neverthe-
less better o¤.) When Earle and Telegdy control for unobserved xed e¤ects
by exploiting changes in rm ownership to identify its e¤ect on wages, the
premium is further reduced to 7 percent. Harrison and Scorse (2004) also
nd that the premium falls to between 5 and 10 percent when worker and
rm characteristics are controlled for. Ibarraran, using data for Mexican
macquilas in 1992 and 1999, nds no premium in 1992 but a small premium
in 1999.
Martins and Esteves (2007) use matched worker and rm panel data for
1995 through 1999 to analyze the impact of foreign ownership on wags in
Brazil. Like Earle and Telegdy (2007) they use changes in rm ownership as
a way to control for unobserved rm-specic e¤ects that could be correlated
with wage premia. They also follow workers who move to or leave foreign
enterprises, to control for unobserved worker-specic e¤ects. They nd that
workers moving from foreign to domestic rms typically take wage cuts when
they move, while movers form domestic to foreign rms increase their pay.
However, compared to the unconditional wage gaps of 50 percent, the wage
premium associated with working for a foreign rm falls to between 3 and 7
percent once worker and rm characteristics are controlled for. The authors
conclude that their results support a positive view of the role of foreign rms
upon the Brazilian labor market.
To summarize, the evidence suggests that foreign rms pay a small wage
premium of between 5 and 10 percent. While the earlier literature found
larger wage premia of more like twenty percent, these earlier estimates failed
to adequately control for individual characteristics of workers, such as edu-
cation and experience. Consequently, part of the wage gap stems from the
fact that foreign rms tend to hire better educated and more skilled work-
ers. Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that foreign enterprises do not
unfairly "exploit" workers, paying them below what their domestic counter-
parts would pay. In fact, most of the evidence suggests that foreign rms tend
to pay higher wages than comparable foreign rms. There is also evidence
that foreign rms are more susceptible to pressure from labor groups, leading
them to be exhibit greater compliance with minimum wages and labor stan-
dards. Harrison and Scorse (2008) nd that foreign rms in Indonesia were
much more likely than domestic enterprises to raise wages and adhere to min-
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imum wages as a consequence of the anti-sweatshop campaigns there. They
also nd that the employment costs of the anti-sweatshop campaigns were
minimal, as garment and footwear subcontractors were able to reduce prots
to pay the additional wage costs without reducing the number of workers.
While most of the emphasis on the role of FDI in local factor markets
is on the relationship between FDI and host country wages, there is also an
emerging literature on FDIs e¤ect on local capital markets. One reason
policy makers give for promoting foreign investment in developing countries
is the scarcity of capital for new investment. This argument is based on the
assumption that incoming foreign investors provide additional capital when
they set up new enterprises in local markets. However, as exchange rate
volatility has continued to rise many foreign investors have found ways to
hedge by borrowing on local capital markets. This increase in local nancing
for incoming foreign investors may lead to crowding out of domestic rms.
Harrison and McMillan (2003) and Love, Harrison, and McMillan (2004)
test whether or not borrowing by local multinationals is crowding out do-
mestic enterprises. The framework in both papers uses an Euler equation
approach combined with Generalized Method of Moment estimation. While
Harrison and McMillan (2003) is a country case study which analyzes the
behavior of mostly French multinationals operating in Cote dIvoire, Love,
Harrison and McMillan (2004) use company level data across a panel of
countries. The results suggest that in a country such as the Cote dIvoire,
which was riddled with market imperfections and where access to credit was
rationed due to interest rate ceilings, foreign investors did indeed crowd do-
mestic enterprises out of local credit markets. However, Love, Harrison, and
McMillan (2004) found that foreign investors tended to crowd indomes-
tic enterprises i.e., as foreign investment increased, the amount of credit
available to domestically-owned rms actually rose. The contrasting results
again point to the important role of policy complementarities: in a country
with credit market imperfections such as the Cote dIvoire, FDI exacerbated
these problems. These studies using micro-data are consistent with macro-
level evidence on the importance of complementarities with nancial market
development for ensuring the gains from FDI (Alfaro et al, 2004).
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6 Concluding Comments
Given the varied experiences across countries and time periods, the di¤erent
interpretations possible, and the di¢ culties in conducting clean empirical
analyses, it is not easy to arrive at strong conclusions regarding the role of
industrial, trade and FDI policy in development. Our survey of the theory
and the evidence nevertheless suggests some tentative conclusions.
We do not endorse infant-industry protection in this chapter; yet we do
not claim that a somewhat uniform and moderate tari¤ is a disaster for devel-
opment. There are instances where infant-industry protection was successful
particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuriesand could
work today in developing countries. Still, the conditions needed for infant
industry protection to succeed are generally not satised. The framework
in Section 2 shows that the theoretical justication for intervention requires
at a minimum either industry-level rents or a latent comparative advantage,
as well as large Marshallian externalities from production. These necessary
conditions are not easy to identify for policy makers ex ante. Nor is there
evidence suggesting that developing countries have generally protected sec-
tors with latent comparative advantage and Marshallian externalities. Most
developing countries have the highest tari¤s in consumer goods sectors, such
as textiles and apparel. We suspect that the types of sectors where there are
important Marshallian externalities are not those where developing countries
have a latent comparative advantage (i.e., sectors that are intensive in knowl-
edge and human capital). It is also likely that protection has been used as
a tool to protect sunset industries instead of sunrise industries; hence, there
is an inherent bias against promoting sectors with a latent comparative ad-
vantage.
For infant industry protection to improve welfare it must pass both the
Mill and Bastable tests. The Mill test requires that the protected sector
can eventually survive international competition without protection, whereas
the Bastable test requires that the discounted future benets compensate
the present costs of protection. This means that the dynamic forces which
increase industry productivity must operate quickly. In practice, most re-
search assessing the success of IP has ignored these tests. There are other
problems as well. In all the models presented in this review, protection is
never the rst-best policy. In addition, the infant-industry framework typi-
cally assumes that the mere expansion of a sector will generate all sorts of
positive e¤ects that will increase industry-wide productivity. But this may
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not happen, and the economy may simply end up with a larger version of
the ine¢ cient sector it began with. We argue that it may be better to im-
plement policies designed directly to elicit the investments that will increase
productivity. Such investments may not occur without public intervention
because of coordination failures.
While a number of market failures could justify government interven-
tion in theory, the key question is whether IP has worked in practice. One
challenge that we face in evaluating the empirical literature is the large gap
between the theoretical justication for IP and the quantitative work that
has been done to evaluate its "success". As we pointed out above,few studies
of IP have examined whether industries pass either the Mill or the Bastable
test. Even if studies could show that protected sectors grew faster, this would
not be su¢ cient evidence to claim that IP is justied from a welfare stand-
point. Nevertheless, we conclude that protection in the last several decades
of the twentieth century generally failed to generate higher growth. The
hundreds of studies on trade policies, trade shares, productivity and growth
show a strong correlation between increasing trade shares and country per-
formance, and no signicant correlation between tari¤s on nal goods and
country outcomes. The only exception is for intermediate or capital goods,
where a higher tari¤ is associated with lower growth. Putting aside the se-
rious problems of reverse causality identied in our review, we interpret this
evidence as suggesting that trade and FDI policies are most successful when
they are associated with increasing exposure to trade. One implication is
that interventions that increase exposure to trade (such as export promo-
tion) are likely to be more successful than other types of interventions (such
as tari¤s or domestic content requirements).
We remain skeptical that protection or subsidies to FDI are needed. Nev-
ertheless, new evidence suggests that IP through FDI promotion may be more
successful than intervention in trade, in part because FDI promotion poli-
cies focus on new activities rather than on protecting (possibly unsuccessful)
incumbents. We are condent that if such measures are part of a broader
e¤ort to achieve technological upgrading then they may be helpful, whereas
if they are implemented in isolation they are likely to fail. This is consistent
with Chandra and Kolavalli (2006), who conclude their overview of ten cases
of successful technology upgrading by stating that "the role of government
was most e¤ective when its support for specic industries was embedded in
institutions and policies that were internally consistent, had an explicit pur-
pose, and were blessed with political commitment" (p. 39). Rodrik refers to
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this characteristic as "embeddedness". Chandra and Kolavalli conclude that
"in every case, getting it right depended upon the degree of synchronization
between institutions and government policies to motivate learning among ex-
porters. The hallmark of these policies was industry specicity, which o¤ers
some useful lessons for other developing countries" (p. 41).
The long-running discussion about "picking winners" can be sidestepped
by focusing on e¤orts of "discovery" (as argued by Hausmann and Rodrik,
2003), or by simply working with existing industries and clusters to deal
directly with the coordination failures that limit their productivity and ex-
pansion. For example, instead of blanket subsidies for exports and FDI, we
think of attracting multinationals to produce key inputs or to bring specic
knowledge needed by clusters with the ability to absorb them. As Chandra
and Kolavalli (2006) have put it, "without host-country policies to develop
local capabilities, MNC-led exports are likely to remain technologically stag-
nant, leaving developing countries unable to progress beyond the assembly
of imported components" (p. 19).
We envision an important role for what we refer to as "soft" industrial
policy, whose goal is to develop a process whereby government, industry and
cluster-level private organizations can collaborate on interventions that can
directly increase productivity. The idea is to shift the attention from inter-
ventions that distort prices to interventions that deal directly with the coor-
dination problems that keep productivity low in existing or raising sectors.
Thus, instead of tari¤s, export subsidies, and tax-breaks for foreign corpo-
rations, we think of programs and grants to, for example, help particular
clusters by increasing the supply of skilled workers, encouraging technology
adoption, and improving regulation and infrastructure. While "hard" IP is
easier to implement than "soft" IP measures, tari¤s and subsidies become
entrenched and are more easily subject to manipulation by interest groups.
The specic policies that should be pursued as part of this type of IP
depend, of course, on the particular coordination failures that a¤ect a clus-
ter. Given the variety of coordination failures that exist, there is a need for
a wide set of instruments or policies. An exhaustive list is therefore impos-
sible. Some examples are: regulation to enforce higher quality standards in
cases of imperfect information or externalities; public investment in specic
infrastructure projects when there are strong investment complementarities
(e.g., a regional airport geared to exploit tourism opportunities, or an irri-
gation project for modern agriculture); attraction of FDI to bring in foreign
technologies; scholarships for studies abroad in areas deemed important for
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growth and diversication of a cluster in cases where thin markets prevent
individuals from making such investments; grants for innovative projects pro-
posed by single rms or entrepreneurs, prizes to innovative rms, grants for
research projects proposed by organized producers and performed by local
research centers, and technical assistance to allow long-term collaborative
strategies for education and research between business associations and uni-
versities.
It is clearly unreasonable to expect governments to be able to identify
the coordination failures a¤ecting di¤erent sectors or clusters. A more real-
istic approach is to invite sector and cluster organizations to come forward
with well-justied proposals for government support. It is instructive here
to reproduce the practical advice of Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999):
"To meet the demands of globalized competition, intra-rm e¤orts are not
su¢ cient. The business sector has to be able to organize collective action
for self-help, and it must be able to articulate its demands vis-à-vis political
actors. This places great demands on business associations, both in terms of
service provision and lobbying. It implies a fundamental upgrading process
and the creation of a learning organization. Key features are a profession-
alization of business associations (e.g., employing more and better qualied
professionals) and the implementation of mechanisms to ensure ongoing or-
ganizational development." Perhaps the government should provide support
to di¤erent sectors that want to start or improve their level of organization.
This would be the rst line of action in countries where the private sector or-
ganizations are weak or are designed for rent seeking or confrontation rather
than constructive work.33
In comparison with the more traditional approach to IP, the soft IP that
we propose here has two the additional advantages. First, although this
requires more research, we conjecture that a soft IP reduces the scope for
corruption and rent-seeking associated with hard IP such as protection or se-
lective production subsidies. Second, soft IP is much more compatible with
the multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements that many
LDCs have implemented over the last decades. It is true that if an LDC
wants to protect an industry for a period of time, it can always negotiate
33An example of such a process is the Macedonia Competitiveness Activity, a USAID-
funded program that rst motivated groups throughout the country to organize and pro-
pose cluster initiatives and then selected ve such initiatives for support (see Ketels, 2006).
Similar initiatives are currently being followed in other countries including Colombia,
Chile, and the Dominican Republic.
77
"space" for that policy when it joins the WTO. This is warranted under the
WTOs rules for Special and Di¤erential Treatment (SDT), which call for
"preferential market access for developing countries, limits reciprocity in ne-
gotiating rounds to levels consistent with development needsand provides
developing countries with greater freedom to use trade policies than would
otherwise be permitted by GATT rules" (Hoekman, 2004, p.1). But if the
country has already joined the WTO then this is not possible. Moreover,
export subsidies are supposed to be eliminated by all but the poorest coun-
tries by 2015 (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), local
content requirements on multinationals are now WTO-illegal (Agreement on
Trade Related Investment Measures, TRIMS), and patent laws are supposed
to be set according to international standards (Agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property, TRIPS). Such restrictions make it impossible for LDCs
to follow some of the policies implemented by South Korea and Taiwan, for
example (Rodrik, 2004). Of course, as emphasized by Rodrik (2004), some
policies associated with hard IP remain feasible: countries can provide scal
incentives to particular sectors or to new activities. But clearly the policy
space for hard IP has shrunk over the last decades, while that for soft IP
remains basically unrestricted.
One area where additional research is urgently needed is on the human
cost of adjustment to trade and FDI reforms. Although this was not the
focus of our chapter, we note that there is limited research addressing how
poor and unskilled workers are a¤ected by trade reform and incoming FDI
ows. Some preliminary evidence suggests that trade reforms may push
workers towards the informal sectors (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007),Muendler
(2008)). To the extent that countries lack social safety nets, they may choose
to delay liberalizing their trade or FDI policies. Harrison (2007) suggests that
globalization is not inherently pro-poor, and that complementary measures
are needed to cushion the impact and ensure that the gains from globalization
are realized for everyone.
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Appendix
We rst show how size vm matters for wages. We assume that x1 = x2 =
x. Also, to simplify, we assume that Tj = Lj = 1 all j. In this case
m 
X
j
x^jmw
 
j (11)
We also have x^11 = x^22 = x, while v1 > v2 and x^j1 = x^j2 = zj for any
j = 3; :::N . Then it is clear that 1 > 2 () w1 < w2. Assuming to
simplify notation that Y = 1 then
w1+j =
X
m
x^jm
vm=m (12)
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where A =
P
j=3 z

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j . If v1 = v2 then the solution of the system entails
1 = 2. Also, if 1 = 2 then necessarily v1 = v2. Now we show that
when v1 > v2 the solution of the system is such that 1 < 2: We consider
(1   2)0v1 at the point v1 = v2 and 1 = 2. At the point v1 = v2 and
1 = 2 we have
(1   2)0v1 =
 
1 + 
 X
m=3
vm
m
+
v1
1
x +
v1
1
! =(1+) 1
1
1
 
x2 + 1  2x < 0
This establishes that a small increase in v1 implies that 1 < 2. Now
suppose there exist v1 > v2 such that 1 > 2. Due to continuity there
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would exist v1 > v2 such that 1 = 2. But this contradicts v1 = v2 ()
1  2 = 0. Thus, the solution of the system above implies that if v1 > v2,
then 1 < 2: Thus, we have that 1 < 2 in equilibrium, and this implies
w1 > w2.
Now consider two countries such that country 1 has HP in the rst indus-
try and country 2 has HP in the second industry. We assume that v1 = v2 = v
and (as above) that x^j1 = x^j2 = zj for any j = 3; ::; N . We will show
that x1 > x2 implies w1 > w2. From 12 we see that w1 > w2 is equiv-
alent to
 
x1   1

2 >
 
x2   1

1. Obviously, x1 = x2 () 1 = 2.
We can write 1 = f(x1; x2) and 2 = g(x1; x2). Moreover, f(x1; x2) =
g(x2; x1):This implies that
 
x1   1

2  
 
x2   1

1 =
 
x1   1

g(x1; x2)   
x2   1

f(x1; x2) = 0 if and only if x1 = x2: We have that
 
x1   1

2   
x2   1

1 is equal to
NX
j=3
zjw
 =1+
j
 
x1   x2

+
 
x1   1
 X
j=1;2
x^j2w
 =1+
j  
 
x2   1
 X
j=1;2
x^j1w
 =1+
j
Notice that
PN
j=3 z

jw
 =1+
j
 
x1   x2

> 0, as x1 > x2: Consider then
A   x1   1 X
j=1;2
x^j2w
 =1+
j  
 
x2   1
 X
j=1;2
x^j1w
 =1+
j
Using x^11 = x1, x^

21 = 1, x^

12 = 1, x^

22 = x2, and 12, and simplifying, we get
A =
 X
m=3::N
vm
m
+
vx1
1
+
v
2
! =1+  
2x1   1  x1x2

 
 X
m=3::N
vm
m
+
vx2
2
+
v
1
! =1+   x2x1   1 + 2x2
Di¤erentiating A w.r.t. x1 and evaluating at x1 = x2 = x and 1 = 2 = 
yields
A0x1 =
 X
m=3::N
vm
m
+
vx1
1
+
v
2
! =1+
x 11
0@2  x + x   1+  2x   1  x2 vx 11P
m=3::N
vm
m
+
vx1
1
+ v
2
1A
=
 X
m=3::N
vm
m
+
vx1
1
+
v
2
! =1+
x 11
0@2 + 1+   2x + 1 + x2 vx 11P
m=3::N
vm
m
+
vx1
1
+ v
2
1A > 0
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This implies that if x1 > x2, then A > 0 and, thereby,
x1 1
1
>
x2 1
2
: This
implies that w1 > w2:
Now consider two industries with the same size. The only di¤erence is the
number of countries that have HP of size x in these two industries. Assume
that a set Ji of countries have HP in industry i = 1; 2, with J2  J1. We
have
1 = x
w 1 + w
 
2 + x

X
j2J2
w j + x

X
j2J1=J2
w j +
X
j 62J1
w j
= x
 
xv
1
+
v
2
+
X
m3
vm
m
! =(1+)
+
 
v
1
+
xv
2
+
X
m3
vm
m
! =(1+)
+x
X
j2J2
w j + x

X
j2J1=J2
w j +
X
j 62J1
w j
and
2 = w
 
1 + x
w 2 + x

X
j2J2
w j +
X
j2J1=J2
w j +
X
j 62J1
w j
=
 
xv
1
+
v
2
+
X
m3
vm
m
! =(1+)
+ x
 
v
1
+
xv
2
+
X
m3
vm
m
! =(1+)
+x
X
j2J2
w j +
X
j2J1=J2
w j +
X
j 62J1
w j
If J2=J1 = ; (which implies that J1 = J2) then 1 = 2. As J2=J1 becomes
non-empty, then 1 > 2. But recall that since x1 = x2 = x and v1 = v2 = v
then
w1 =
 X
m
xv
1
+
v
2
+
X
m3
vm
m
!1=1+
and
w2 =
 X
m
v
1
+
xv
2
+
X
m3
vm
m
!1=1+
This implies that w2 > w1.
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TABLE 1 
Country Tariff  Revenues Tariffs Changes 1985-2004 
 1980 1985 1990 2000 2004 1980 1985 1990 2000 2004 Change 
Rev 
Change 
Tariff 
Change 
STD 
India 15.5 24.2 21.1 8.4 5.7 74.3 98.8 79.2 32.5 28.1 -18.5 -70.7 -32.8 
Bangladesh 13.4 17.9 12.1 7 8.2 99.9 86 102.2 21.6 16.4 -9.7 -69.6 -36.8 
Paraguay 6 2.2 3.3 3.4 2.2 71 71.7 16 10.9 8.5 0 -63.2 -6.5 
Pakistan 15.3 14.7 15.2 5.6 3.9 77.6 78 58.8 46.6 16.1 -10.8 -61.9 -14.8 
Peru 10.6 8.3 3.9 4.5 3.4 57 64 36 13.4 9.6 -4.9 -54.4 -22.1 
Nicaragua 8.7 7.4 4.3 1.8 1.3 54 54 24.8 3.2 4.9 -6.1 -49.1 . 
Costa Rica 5.3 6.9 7 1.1 1.1 55 53 16.4 5.4 5.7 -5.8 -47.3 -5.4 
Guatemala 4.8 7.5 3.6 2.5 2.7 50 50 23 7.2 5.1 -4.8 -44.9 -19 
Brazil 10 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.2 . 55.6 30 14.4 13.1 1.0 -42.5 -10.3 
Madagascar 8.5 . 14 10.2 10.3 31.5 46 36 . 5.2 . -40.8 . 
China 5.7 10 3.7 1.5 1.8 49.5 39.5 40.3 16.3 9.8 -8.2 -29.7 -22.1 
Ecuador 7.2 6.2 4 5.2 5.2 . 37.7 37.1 12.9 11.5 -1 -26.2 -20.7 
Senegal 11.4 8.3 11.8 8.3 9.3 . 39 35 12 13.4 1 -25.6 . 
Chile 2.8 5.7 3.7 2.3 .7 10 30 15 9 4.9 -5 -25.1 0 
Turkey 6.3 3 2.8 .7 .4 44 26.6 22.7 7.1 2.6 -2.6 -24 -21 
Egypt 13.1 12.1 5.9 7 6 47.4 42.8 33.5 20.5 18.9 -6.1 -23.9 -386.3 
Benin 10.6 . . . . . 37.4 . 12 14 . -23.4 . 
Uganda 3.1 11.6 10.8 11.4 9.8 . 30 30.1 8.3 6.7 -1.8 -23.3 . 
Philippines 6.8 6.2 6.6 2.7 2.5 38 27.6 24.3 7.6 4.4 -3.7 -23.2 -1.9 
Kenya 6.1 7.4 6.3 7.5 7.5 40.3 39.2 43.7 19.3 16.2 .09 -23 -8 
Colombia 7.8 7.5 6 2.5 2.3 33.5 33.6 30.4 11.7 11.3 -5.2 -22.3 -2.1 
Mali 3.8 5 4.6 . . 35 35 25 12 12.8 . -22.2 . 
Zambia 2.4 6.4 4.8 7.3 7.3 . 34.8 25.6 14.7 13.2 .9 -21.6 . 
Venezuela 3 9.1 2.2 3.1 1.8 . 32.9 30.6 13.5 12.2 -7.3 -20.7 -18.5 
Uruguay 8.9 5.8 5.6 2 1.9 . 31 30.5 11.1 10.8 -3.9 -20.2 2.1 
Sri Lanka 11.7 10.6 8.8 2.1 2.5 41.3 29 26.9 9.9 9.8 -8.1 -19.2 -16.2 
Thailand 6.9 6.5 5.4 1.4 1.3 32.3 31.2 40.8 17 13.3 -5.2 -17.9 -7.2 
Burundi 18.1 17 22.9 13.3 13.3 . 37.9 37 . 20 -3.7 -17.9 . 
Tanzania 7.7 6.3 7.5 11.9 11.9 . 32 29.7 19.1 14.1 5.5 -17.9 . 
Ghana 17.3 21.7 11.6 4.6 4.6 . 30 17.5 15.2 13.1 -17.1 -16.9 . 
Argentina 9.5 12.7 9.9 3.1 7.4 27.8 27 20.5 12.6 11.4 -5.3 -15.6 -17.1 
Mexico 17.6 2.6 2 1 1 30.9 30 11.1 16.2 14.6 -1.6 -15.4 2.3 
South Korea 4.1 3.6 3.4 1.3 1.3 20.4 23 13.3 8.7 9.3 -2.3 -13.7 -.7 
Central African 
Rep. 
10.6 . 11.5 8.6 8.6 . 32 32 18.6 18.9 . -13.1 . 
Congo, Rep. of 3.8 . 8.2 1.1 1.6 . 32 . 17.6 19.6 . -12.4 . 
Syria 7.1 5.6 2.9 3.7 3.7 37.3 27 20.4 . 14.6 -1.9 -12.4 . 
New Zealand 2.5 2 1.7 .8 1.6 13 16 14.5 3.4 3.7 -.4 -12.3 -11.3 
Bolivia 7.8 7 2.3 2.4 2 . 19.8 16.7 9.5 7.5 -5 -12.3 . 
Nigeria 8.5 5.1 4 . . 32.6 37 34.3 . 24.8 . -12.2 -15.2 
Indonesia 2.9 1.6 2.4 .5 1 29 18.1 20.3 8.4 6.4 -.6 -11.7 -5.9 
Mauritius 9.6 9.6 7.6 4.6 3.6 34.9 34.9 27.6 31 23.5 -6 -11.4 -63.7 
Gabon 7.3 6.4 4.8 . . 43.3 29.6 . 20.4 18.6 . -11 . 
Cote d'Ivoire 12.8 11.8 10.9 9.3 9.9 27.5 23.3 33 12 12.7 -1.9 -10.6 . 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
10.3 8.4 9.1 6.4 5.5 23.6 22.4 20.7 . 13 -2.9 -9.4 . 
Poland . 8.6 6 1.2 1 . 13.6 11.7 10 4.3 -7.6 -9.3 .90 
Australia 3.6 3.2 3.1 1.3 1.6 14.5 13.3 14.2 5.8 5.1 -1.6 -8.2 -7.8 
Austria .7 .6 .7 .3 .2 11.6 10 8.7 2.4 1.8 -.4 -8.2 -5.2 
Nepal 8.6 7.7 8.8 5.1 6.9 22.1 22.6 22.6 14.7 14.8 -.79 -7.8 . 
Jamaica .9 1.7 . 2.2 3 16.5 17 17 10.6 9.4 1.3 -7.6 . 
Trinidad & 3.2 5.7 2.7 10.2 10.2 . 17 18.6 18.4 9.7 4.5 -7.3  4.7 
Tobago 
Canada 2.4 1.7 1.2 .3 .3 11.2 10.5 9.4 3.9 3.7 -1.4 -6.8 -2.1 
Malaysia 7.7 5.7 3.2 1.6 .6 10.6 13.6 13 9.2 7.4 -5.1 -6.2 20.8 
Italy .4 .3 .3 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -.1 -5.7 -2.3 
Denmark .5 .4 .3 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -.2 -5.7 -2.3 
Belgium .3 .3 .4 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -.1 -5.7 -2.3 
Luxembourg .1 .1 .1 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 .1 -5.7 -2.3 
Netherlands .4 .4 .5 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -.2 -5.7 -2.3 
Germany .5 .5 .5 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -.3 -5.7 -2.3 
Ireland 3.5 3 3 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -2.8 -5.7 -2.3 
Spain 2.7 3 1.5 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -2.8 -5.7 -2.3 
France .5 .4 .4 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -.2 -5.7 -2.3 
Greece 3.2 .7 .6 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -.5 -5.7 -2.3 
United Kingdom .7 .6 .6 .3 .2 8.8 7.5 7.4 2.4 1.8 -.4 -5.7 -2.3 
Finland .8 .4 .6 .3 .2 10.4 7 7.7 2.4 1.8 -.2 -5.2 -5.2 
Norway .3 .3 .3 .3 .2 6.2 5.7 5.7 2.9 .5 -.1 -5.2 7.1 
Guyana 1.8 3.9 . . . . 17 . 17 12 . -5 . 
Belize 8.7 10.9 10.8 6.6 6.6 . 17 . . 12.9 -4.3 -4.1 . 
Malawi 6.6 8.8 5.7 8.1 8.1 . 16.7 15.2 19.6 12.9 -.6 -3.8 . 
Japan .9 .8 .9 1.5 1.5 9.5 6.7 6.9 4.5 2.9 .7 -3.8 -.8 
United States 1.1 1.7 1.5 .8 .9 7.3 6.6 6.2 4 3.2 -.8 -3.4 3.4 
Algeria . . . 5.5 7.6 11.7 21.7 24.6 24.6 18.4 . -3.3 . 
Iran 17 14.2 5.4 3.1 4.9 20.7 20.7 20.7 4.9 17.5 -9.2 -3.2 . 
Sweden .7 .3 .4 .3 .2 7.5 4.1 4.7 2.4 1.8 -.1 -2.3 .09 
Haiti 9.9 8 6.7 . . 27.7 11.6 . 10 10 . -1.6 . 
Iceland 6.5 4.6 4 .5 .4 9.6 6.7 3.8 1.9 5.1 -4.2 -1.6 .6 
Namibia . . 7.3 12.5 8.5 9.4 6 11 7.2 4.5 . -1.5 -1.3 
Cyprus 4 4.4 4.2 1.3 1.3 17.1 17.6 16.5 16.4 16.4 -3.1 -1.2 . 
Switzerland 2.4 2 1.9 .3 .3 4.6 4.4 4.4 0 3.2 -1.7 -1.2 0 
Botswana 12.8 7.1 6.6 6.1 6.1 9.4 6 11 7.2 5 -1 -1 -1.3 
Papua New 
Guinea 
3.3 5.9 7.1 7.3 6.1 . 7 7 21.1 6.4 .1 -.5 . 
Kuwait . . 1.2 1.1 1.3 . 4 . . 3.5 . -.5 . 
Singapore .4 .3 .1 .1 0 .3 .3 .4 .4 0 -.3 -.3 -1.8 
Hong Kong .5 .6 .4 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 -.6 0 0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0 0 0 0 0 . 4 . 4 4 0 0 . 
Jordan 7.1 6.1 5 4.6 3.1 . 13.8 . 24 14.4 -3 .5 -2.9 
Tunisia 9 13.3 9.5 3.6 2.4 26.4 24 27.5 30.6 25.3 -10.9 1.2 2.5 
Barbados 3.7 3.4 3.6 . 3.1 . 17 . 19 19 -.3 2 . 
South Africa 1.2 1.4 2.2 1.5 1.6 9.4 6 11 8.5 8.5 .2 2.5 .3 
Bahamas 8.1 9.3 9.6 11 11 29.8 32.3 . 35 35 1.7 2.7 . 
Morocco 10.7 6.4 8.6 7.4 7.4 54 23.5 23.5 33.6 28.3 1 4.7 . 
Oman . 1.4 1 .9 .8 . 3 . 4.7 8 -.6 5 . 
Zimbabwe 1.7 8 9.2 7.3 7.3 10 8.7 10.1 21.4 15.9 -.6 7.2 6.8 
Romania . . .4 1.6 .9 . . . 15.2 13.3 . . . 
Guinea-Bissau . 7.7 . . . . . . 12 13.9 . . . 
Ukraine . . . 1 1.7 . . . 10.5 7.9 . . . 
Sierra Leone 13.3 11.9 4 10 10 25.8 25.8 . . . -1.9 . . 
Myanmar 14.2 17.6 19.4 19.8 15.2 . . . . 4.4 -2.4 . . 
Rwanda 13.3 . 14.2 . . . . . . 8.3 . . . 
Russia . . . 4.6 9.8 . . . 12.6 10.3 . . . 
Czech Rep. . . . .5 .1 . . . 6.5 5.1 . . . 
Niger 8.4 9.5 9.8 . . . . . 12 12.8 . . . 
Albania . . . 7.3 3.4 . . . 17 8.3 . . . 
Togo 12.4 8.6 9.2 . . . . . 12 14.4 . . . 
Fiji 5.8 7.9 6.4 4.5 4.5 . . . 12.4 12.4 -3.4 . . 
El Salvador 6.2 7.1 4.1 1.5 1.6 48 . 21.1 7.4 5.4 -5.5 . . 
Croatia . . . 2.6 .7 . . . 6.7 4.1 . . . 
Portugal 2.1 1.2 1.3 .3 .2 . . 7.4 2.4 1.8 -1 . -2.3 
Vietnam . . . . 2.8 . . . . 13.6 . . . 
Honduras 6.7 . . 2.9 2.9 41 . 20 7.9 5.2 . . . 
Lithuania . . . .3 .1 . . . 5.4 1.2 . . . 
Dominican 
Republic 
9.8 6.5 6.3 7.2 6.5 . . 28 19.5 10.3 0 . . 
Hungary 5 3.7 5.1 .8 .6 . . . 8.2 8.9 -3.1 . 3.7 
Bahrain .9 .7 1.1 1.3 .9 . 6 . . . .2 . . 
Panama 3.1 4.1 1.8 4 1.6 . . 40 9.5 7.9 -2.5 . . 
Israel 5.1 2.9 .9 .3 .4 . . . 2 4.5 -2.5 . . 
Latvia . . . .3 .2 . . . 5.6 3.2 . . . 
Taiwan 3.6 2.8 2.1 1.5 .8 . . 9.7 8.8 6.9 -2 . . 
Slovenia . . . .8 .3 . . . 11.8 3.9 . . . 
Slovak Rep. . . . 1 .2 . . . 6 22.1 . . . 
Cameroon 11 6.1 5.4 9.2 9.2 . . . 18.4 18.1 3.1 . . 
Malta 4.9 4.5 4.9 .6 .7 . . . 8.8 8.8 -3.8 . . 
Bulgaria . 5.4 1.3 .7 .7 . . 11.4 13.7 10.2 -4.7 . . 
TABLE 2 
 CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES ON OPENNESS AND GROWTH 
Study Author and Date Measure of Openness Data Description Identification Strategy Does Openness increase Growth? 
1. Tyler (1981) 1) Annual average real growth rate of total 
exports; 2) Manufacturing sector export 
earnings  
Cross-sectional data for 55 middle-
income developing countries from 
1960-1977 
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of exports on economic growth. 
 
 
2. Feder (1982) 1) Export growth* export/GDP ratio; 2) 
Growth rate of exports (in specific inter-
sectoral externalities regression) 
Pooled data from 31 semi-
industrialized countries and 17 
developed countries between 1964 and 
1973 
No identification strategy Significant positive impacts of exports on economic growth 
(exported-oriented policies) bring the economy closer to an 
optimal allocation of resources. 
3. Salvatore (1983) Growth of percentage of exports in GDP Pooling of cross-section and time-
series data for 52 developing countries
from 1961-1978 
Full information maximum likelihood; uses 
consumer price index and index of real GDP 
of all market economics as instruments for 
exports  
No significant positive impact of exports on economic 
growth. Trade is very important to the development 
process, but more in the nature of a handmaiden than as an 
engine of growth. The policy implication is that 
excessively pursuing a policy of industrialization through 
import substitution can retard growth. 
4. Balassa (1985) 1) Export growth* share of exports in GDP; 
2)  Trade orientation (the deviation of actual 
from hypothetical value of per capita 
exports) 
Pooled data for 43 semi-industrialized 
countries from 1973-1979 
No identification strategy The results show that the growth rate of GNP is higher with 
a greater extent of outward orientation at the beginning of 
the study period and the greater the extent of reliance on 
export promotion in response to the external shocks of the 
period. 
5. Gupta (1985) Growth rate of exports Time series data for 1) South Korea 
from the first quarter of 1960 to the 
last quarter of 1979 and 2) Israel from 
1967-1981. 
Sims causality test Bidirectional causality between exports and economic 
growth for both countries. 
6. Jung & Marshall (1985) Growth rate of real value of exports Time series, annual data for 37 
developing countries from 1951-1981
Granger causality test Export led growth in only 5 countries while no causality in 
20 countries. 
7. Kavoussi (1985) 1) RX: growth of a specific country's total 
export earnings; 2) RW: growth of a 
country's export earnings due to expansion 
of world demand for its traditional 
commodities; 3) RC: a rise in the share of 
world markets for a country's traditional 
commodities; 4) RD: an increase in the share 
of nontraditional commodities in a country's 
total exports; 5) RCD: an indicator of the 
effect of trade policy (where 
RCD=(1+RC)*(1+RD)-1; values greater 
Cross-sectional data for 52 low- and 
middle-income developing countries 
from 1967-1977.  
No identification strategy Firstly, the study shows that a rapid expansion of export 
earnings requires both favorable external markets and 
outward-oriented commercial policies. Secondly, the 
results suggest that free trade appears to enhance growth 
only when external demand is favorable. 
than or equal to 0 imply an outward trade 
orientation, while values less than 0 imply 
an inward trade orientation. 
8. Chow (1987) Export growth in manufactured goods  Time series, annual data for 8 newly 
industrializing countries (NICs) from 
the 1960's and 1970's 
Sims causality test Export led growth in only Mexico, strong bidirectional 
causality between export growth and industrial 
development in other 7 countries. 
9. Darrat (1987) Growth rate of real value of exports Time series, annual data for Hong 
Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
from 1955-1982 
White's causality test Exports and economic growth are significantly and 
positively correlated. Causality runs from exports to 
economic growth only in Korea. For the remaining three 
countries, the export-led growth hypothesis is rejected. 
10. Goncalves & 
Richtering (1987) 
1) Annual average growth rate of total 
export volume in 1975 prices; 2) Average 
share of exports in GDP; 3) Change in share 
of exports in GDP in each period.  
Pooled data for 70 developing 
countries from 1960-81 
No identification strategy No significant positive impact of exports on GDP net of 
exports. 
11. Hsiao (1987) Exports Time series, annual data for Hong 
Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
during the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's 
Granger & Sims causality tests The Sims' test indicates a feedback relationship while the 
Granger test indicates no causal relation between the 
exports and GDP, except for Hong Kong where both tests 
indicate a unidirectional causality from GDP to exports. 
12. Ram (1987) 1) Export growth rates; 2) Export growth 
rates* export GDP shares 
Time series & cross sectional data  for 
88 countries from 1960-72 & 1973-82
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of exports on economic growth. 
13. Grabowski (1988) 1) Growth of exports; 2) Share of exports in 
GDP  
Time series, annual data for Japan 
from the 1880's to the 1940's  
Single and simultaneous equations; uses the 
volume of world trade and the time period as 
instruments for the growth of exports 
The results show that growth in Japan was not export led, 
in the sense that external demand stimulated rapid export 
growth resulting in substantial economic growth. Using a 
simulation analysis, it was found that policies aimed at 
export promotion had a positive impact on economic 
growth. 
14. Rana (1988) 1) Export growth rate; 2) Export growth 
rate* share of exports in GDP 
Pooled data for 43 developing 
countries 
No identification strategy Supports the view that exports would have less effect on 
growth when the world environment is unfavorable 
15. Singer & Gray (1988) 1) Growth of country's total export earnings; 
2) Trade policy factor RCD = (1+RC)* 
(1+RD), where RC is the competitiveness 
factor and RD is the diversification factor. 
Positive values of RCD represent outward 
trade orientation. 
Pooled data for52 developing 
countries from 1967-1973 & 1977-
1983 
No identification strategy Positive impact of exports on economic growth under 
favorable world market conditions; however, this positive 
impact is weaker for low-income countries.  
16. Kohli & Singh (1989) 1) Growth of exports; 2) Export share in 
GDP; 3) Growth of exports*share of exports 
in GDP 
Pooled data for 30 countries from 
1960-70 & 1970-81 
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of exports on economic growth 
in export-oriented nations.  The impact is subject to 
diminishing returns. 
17. Kunst & Marin (1989) Manufacturing sector exports Time series, annual data for Australia Granger causality test Positive causality from productivity to exports 
18. Mbaku (1989) Growth rate of exports  Pooled data for 37 African countries 
from 1970-81 
No identification strategy The results show that export expansion significantly 
enhances economic growth in Africa. 
19. Koschos (1989) Growth rate of real exports Cross-sectional data for 71 developing 
countries from 1970-80 
No identification strategy The evidence contradicts the view that among "more 
advanced" developing economies the effect of export 
expansion on growth is stronger than among "less 
advanced" ones. In fact, among "less developed" countries 
output growth is mainly influenced by export expansion 
and capital formation, its response to labor growth being 
highly significant. 
20. Fosu (1990) Annual export growth  Cross sectional data for 28 Least-
Developed Countries (LDCs) in 
Africa from 1960-70 & 1970-80 
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of exports on economic growth, 
but this positive relationship is smaller compared to other 
LDCs. 
21. Grabowski, Sharma & 
Dhakal (1990) 
Growth of exports  Time Series, annual data for Japan 
from 1885-1939 & 1952-1980 
Granger causality test No export led growth in pre World War II period but 
export led growth in post World War II. 
22. Sheehey (1990) Export growth* share of exports in GDP  Pooled data for 36 countries from 
1960-1970 
No identification strategy This is a critique of Balassa and Feder's work particularly. 
The author argues that, since the link between sectoral 
growth and growth of GDP is common to all sectors, the 
growth clearly cannot be due to relative productivity 
differences and externality effects. By showing the same 
tests that support the ‘promotion’ of all major components 
of GDP, the author argues that the previous tests have no 
bearing at all on the export-promotion/import-substitution 
controversy.   
23. Afxentiou & Serletis 
(1991) 
Growth rate of real value of exports Time series, annual data for 16 
developed countries 
Granger causality test Growth led exports in 3 nations and was bidirectional in 
the US. In general, there is no significant causality between 
export growth and GNP growth in these 16 countries.  
24. Ahmad & Kwan (1991) 1) Total real value of exports; 2) Total real 
value of manufactured exports; 3) Share of 
manufactured exports in total exports  
Pooled time-series and cross-sectional 
data for 47 developing African 
countries from 1981-1987 
Granger causality test No support for export led growth or growth led exports. 
25. Alam (1991) 1) Export growth; 2) Qualitative evaluation 
of trade orientation (World Bank 
Development Report 1987), including 
effective rates of protection, export 
incentives, exchange rate alignments and 
direct controls 
Pooled data for 41 developing 
countries  from 1965-73 & 1973-84 
No identification strategy Significant positive relationship between outward 
orientation and exports and output growth rates for both 
time periods. Moreover, the impact of trade policies on 
growth rates acted more strongly through increases in 
productivity rather than increases in investment rates. 
26. Dodaro (1991) 1) Manufactured exports as a percentage of 
total merchandise exports; 2) dummy 
variable equal to one if over 50% of a 
country's exports are make up of fuels, 
minerals and metals, 0 otherwise. 
Pooled data for 41 developing 
countries  
Instrumental variable technique; uses 
nominal per capita GNP and population size 
as instruments for manufactured exports 
The level of development is an important determinant of 
the degree of manufacturing and processing in a country's 
export basket. Moreover, the results show that the 
composition of exports affects economic growth. 
Concentration of exports in manufactures and greater levels 
of processing allow for greater diversification and a 
reduction in concentration both with respect to 
commodities and market areas. This reduction in 
concentration may reduce export earnings instability, 
fostering further economic growth. 
27. Esfahani (1991) 1) Share of imports in GDP* growth rate of 
imports; 2) Share of exports in GDP * 
growth rate of exports 
Cross-sectional data for 31 semi-
industrialized countries from 1960-73, 
1973-81 & 1980-86 
Simultaneous equations; uses log GDP per 
capital and log labor as instruments for 
export and import variables 
Export promotion is particularly important for countries 
that cannot obtain sufficient foreign aid or capital. 
28. Kwan & Cotsomotis 
(1990) 
Ratio of exports to national income (the 
growth rate of exports to national income is 
used as a robustness check) 
Time series, annual data for China 
from 1952-85 
Granger causality test Bidirectional causality between exports and economic 
growth for the post-reform period (since 1978), but no 
causality for the pre-reform period. 
29. Oskooee, Mohtadi & 
Shabsigh (1991) 
Export growth Time series, annual data for 20 least-
developed countries (LDCs) from the 
1950's to the 1980's 
Granger causality test with Akaike's optimal 
lag criterion 
The study indicates positive causality from economic 
growth to export growth in 4 out of 20 countries (Korea, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Thailand) and negative causality 
in Indonesia. Korea and Thailand exhibit positive causality 
in both directions.  
30. Salvatore & Hatcher 
(1991) 
Growth rate of real value of exports Time series & pooled, annual data for 
26 developing countries from 1963-73 
& 1973-85 
No identification strategy The econometric results only partially support the 
hypothesis that international trade benefits most developing 
countries and that an outward orientation leads to a more 
efficient use of resources and growth.  
31. Sharma, Norris & 
Cheung (1991) 
Export growth Time series, quarterly data for  5 
industrialized countries from 1960-
1987 
Granger causality test Export led growth for Germany and Japan, while growth 
led exports for the US and the UK.  There was no causality 
in either direction for Italy. 
32. Dollar (1992) 1) Dollar measure of outward orientation: 
RPLi= 100*ePi/Pu.s.,where RPLi is the 
index of country i's relative price level, e is 
the exchange rate, and Pi is the consumption 
price index for country i;  2) Variability of 
the real exchange rate 
Cross-sectional data for 95 countries 
from 1976-85 
No identification strategy Significant negative relationship between distortion in the 
real exchange rate and growth of per capita GDP after 
controlling for the effects of real exchange rate variability 
and investment level. Trade liberalization, devaluation of 
the real exchange rate and maintenance of a stable real 
exchange rate could improve growth performance in poor 
countries. 
33. Edwards (1992) 1) Index of trade intervention; 2) INVERV1, 
overall intervention index obtained when a 
homoskedastic (unscaled) model is used to 
predict trade flows for the 183 commodities 
in the sample; 3) INVERV2, overall 
intervention index obtained when a  
heteroskedastic (scaled) model with 
residuals proportional to GNP is used; 4) 
OPEN1, overall openness index obtained 
from the unscaled trade model; 5) OPEN2, 
overall openness index obtained from the 
residuals of the scaled trade model; 6) 
OPENM1, manufacturing sector openness 
index obtained from the unscaled trade 
model; 7)OPENM2, manufacturing sector 
openness index obtained from the scaled 
heteroskedastic trade model 
Cross-sectional data for 30 developing 
countries from 1970-82 
Instrumental variable technique; uses the 
average and coefficient of variation of the 
black market premium to identify the level 
of trade restrictions 
A strong positive relationship exists between trade 
orientation and economic performance. The relationship is 
robust to the method of estimation, to correction for errors 
in variables and to the deletion of outliers. 
34. Egwaikhide (1992) 1) Natural log of real value of oil exports; 2) 
Natural log of real value of oil imports 
Time series, annual data for Nigeria 
from 1973-78  
Instrumental variable technique; uses the 
natural logs of the lags of real imports and 
the price for crude oil as instruments for real 
exports  
Crude oil exports have only marginally stimulated the 
growth of output in Nigeria. 
35. Giles, Giles & McCann 
(1992) 
Real value of exports Time series, annual data for New 
Zealand from 1963-1991 
Granger causality test The study finds mixed evidence for the export-led growth 
hypothesis when they use growth rates of exports and 
output. While they reject the hypothesis at the aggregate 
level, there is some support for the ELG of certain 
exporting sectors (such as minerals, chemicals, plastics, 
metal, metal products, live animals, and meat).  However, 
replacing levels of exports and output with growth rates, 
there is causality from real exports of manufactured goods, 
meat, and live animals to real GDP. 
36. Hutchison & Singh 
(1992) 
Growth rate of real value of exports Time series, annual data for 34 
developing countries from the 1950's 
to the 1980's 
Granger causality test 11 countries showed evidence of significantly positive 
export externality effects contributing to non-export sector 
domestic growth. Three countries showed evidence of 
externalities in the non-export sector contributing to export 
growth and three countries showed evidence of negative 
externalities. 
37. Levine & Renelt 
(1992)  
1) Exports as a percentage of GDP; 2) 
Imports as a percentage of GDP; 3) Leamer's
(1988) openness measure based on factor-
adjusted trade; 4) Leamer's(1988) trade-
distortion measure based on H-O deviations; 
5) Black-market exchange-rate premium; 6) 
Dollar's (1992) real exchange-rate distortion 
for SH benchmark countries. 
Pooled data for 119 countries from 
1960-1989 
No identification strategy Significant positive correlation between share of 
investment in GDP and share of trade in GDP. None of the 
measures of openness are robustly correlated with growth 
when other explanatory variables are introduced. 
38. Marin (1992) Log of exports of manufacturing goods 
(quarterly observations) 
Time series data for the US, UK, 
Japan and Germany 
Granger causality test Exports cause labor productivity in all the countries 
studied.  The hypothesis of export-led growth cannot be 
rejected. 
39. Serletis (1992) 1) Log of exports; 2) Log of imports Time series, annual data for Canada 
from 1870-1985 
Granger causality test Causality from exports to growth but no causality from 
imports to growth. 
40. Sheehey (1992) 1) Share of exports in GDP; 2) Growth rate 
of share of exports in GDP; 3) Average 
annual growth rate of exports. 
Pooled data for 53 non oil exporting 
and 6 developed countries from 1960-
81 
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of exports only during 
favorable world demand & in industrialized countries. 
41. Wilbur & Haque 
(1992) 
Natural log of exports  Time series, annual data for 11 
developing and 6 developed countries 
from 1960-72 & 1973-87 
No identification strategy Supports the "export expansion" hypothesis, emphasizing 
the significant importance of exports in the formation of 
savings for both highly developed and less developed 
countries.  
42. Alege (1993) 1) Real value of total exports; 2) Real value 
of oil exports 
Time series, annual data for Nigeria 
from covering the period of 1960-85  
Granger causality test The results show the existence of strict econometric 
exogeneity between exports and GDP and a unidirectional 
causality from GDP to oil exports. No causality from total 
export growth (or oil export growth) to GDP growth. 
43. Dodaro (1993) Manufactured exports as a percentage of 
total merchandise exports 
Time series, annual data for a wide 
range of least-developed countries 
(LDCs) 
Granger causality test The causality test shows very little support for the basic 
export promotion contention. There are two main results of 
this study: first, the level of development is an important 
determinant of the degree of manufacturing and processing 
in a country's export basket; second, the efficiency of 
export-led growth depends on the composition of exports 
and the stage of development. 
44. Ghartey(1993) Log of exports Time series, seasonally adjusted 
quarterly data for Taiwan, Japan and 
the US 
Stepwise Granger causality test (Hsiao's 
version of Granger causality test) 
Exports cause economic growth in Taiwan; economic 
growth causes exports in the US; and there is bidirectional 
causality in Japan. 
45. Gordon & Sakyi-Bekoe 
(1993) 
Real value of exports  Time series, annual data for Ghana 
from 1955-87 
Granger causality test, Sims model, 
modified Sims model, Akaike final 
prediction (error model) and the non-
parametric multiple rank F-test model 
Causality results vary depending upon the model used for 
testing and the lag specification defined. The violation of 
the normality assumption leads the Granger model to the 
apparently incorrect conclusion that GDP causes exports. 
46. Khan & Saqib (1993) Natural log of real value of total exports, 
manufactured exports and primary exports 
Time series, annual data for Pakistan 
from 1972-1988 
Simultaneous equations; uses foreign 
income and the index of domestic export 
prices to world export prices to identify the 
export demand function, and uses the 
effective exchange rate index and the 
relative price index to identify the export 
supply function 
A strong positive association between export performance 
and economic growth is found, but more than 90 percent of 
the contribution of exports to economic growth is indirect 
in nature. 
47. Oskooee & Asle (1993) Real value of exports Time series, quarterly data for 9 LCDs Granger causality tests with the new 
techniques of cointegration and error-
correction models 
The results indicate bidirectional causality for all countries 
(except for Malaysia for which there is no cointegration) 
between export growth and economic growth when the 
cointegrating properties of the time series are incorporated 
into the analysis. 
48. Oxley (1993) Natural log of real value of exports Time series, annual data for Portugal 
from 1833-1985 
Granger causality test  The export-led growth hypothesis is rejected in favor of 
reverse causality. 
49. Sengupta (1993) 1) Export growth; 2) Export growth*share of 
exports in GDP 
Time series, annual data, mainly 
focused on newly-industrialized 
countries (NICs) in Asia including 
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, from the 1960s to the 
1980s 
No identification strategy The empirical evidence supports the basic premises of the 
new growth theory in the case of the successful NICs in 
Asia and for Korea, in particular. 
50. Atesoglu (1994) Growth rate of real value of exports Time series, annual data for the US 
from the 1960's to the 1980's  
Instrumental variables technique; uses the 
rate of growth of external prices and the rate 
of growth of the world's real income to 
instrument for exports 
The export-led Kaldor growth model interprets and predicts 
the short-run fluctuation in the growth rate of the US 
economy. Moreover, the dynamic Harrod foreign trade 
multiplier rule of Thirlwall is not preferable to the 
Kaldorian model for explaining annual changes in the US 
rate of growth. 
51. Coppin (1994) 1) Real exports; 2) Growth rate of real 
exports; 3) Share of manufactured exports in 
total exports; 4) Share of the growth rate of 
manufactured exports in total exports  
Pooled data for 59 low- and middle-
income countries during the 1980's 
No identification strategy Positive impact of exports (but not manufactured exports) 
on economic growth. The results also show that the growth 
in the labor force was an important factor in explaining 
growth. 
52. Dutt & Ghosh (1994) Real value of exports Time series, annual data for 26 low-, 
middle- and high-income countries 
from 1953-91 
No identification strategy For the majority of the countries in the sample, export 
growth and economic growth have moved together. 
53. Greenaway & Sapsford 
(1994a) 
Growth rate of share of exports in GDP Cross-sectional data for 104 countries 
from 1960-88 
No identification strategy The results support the hypothesis that exports and growth 
are positively correlated. This relationship is robust to 
variations in the composition of the country samples. 
Moreover, the strength of the association varies from sub-
period to sub-period, but the positive association becomes 
stronger over time.  Export growth does not always follow 
reform. 
54. Greenaway & Sapsford 
(1994b) 
Growth rate of share of exports in GDP Time series, annual data for 5 
developing countries from 1956-88 
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of exports on economic growth 
for Sri Lanka, but negative for Turkey. 
55. Hansen (1994) 1) Growth rate of exports * percentage of 
exports in GDP; 2) Growth rate of exports of 
manufactured goods and services* 
percentage of manufacturing and service 
exports in GDP; 3) Growth rate of 'other' 
commodity exports * percentage of 'other' 
commodity exports in GDP 
Time series, annual data for New 
Zealand from 1968-1991 
Engle-Granger cointegration test Exports of manufactures and services have had a greater 
effect on the economy's recent growth experience than 
exports of primary products and raw materials. 
56. Hotchkiss, Moore & 
Rockel (1994) 
1) Annualized growth rate of exports 
weighted by the proportion of exports in 
GNP; 2) Annualized growth rate of exports 
(unweighted) 
Annual data for 85 countries from 
1960-1986  
No identification strategy The results indicate that exports contribute to growth 
through both a sector-externality effect and a factor-
productivity effect for middle income countries, but only 
through a factor-productivity effect for low income 
countries.  
57. Love (1994) Export growth  Time series, annual data for 20 
developing countries from the 1960's 
to the 1990's 
Granger causality test Substantial support for the hypothesis that exports cause 
growth. In 14 out of  20 countries there is evidence of 
causality from export growth to GDP growth, with 
causality being positive for 10 countries and negative for 
4.The export-led results are highly sensitive to the 
definition of economic growth. 
58. Sengupta & Espana 
(1994) 
1) Time derivative of exports; 2) Average 
share of exports in GDP; 3) Real export 
growth 
Time series, annual data for Japan, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and 
South Korea from the 1960's to the 
1980's  
Engle-Granger cointegration test The externality effect of exports and their productivity 
growth played the role of a catalyst for other sectors' 
growth. Exports and output are cointegrated and there is 
evidence of a significant positive impact of exports on 
economic growth, particularly in South Korea. 
59. Sharma & Dhakal 
(1994) 
Growth rate of real value of exports Time series, annual data for 30 
developing countries from 1960-88 
Granger causality test Causal relationship between export growth and output 
growth is found in five countries; export-led growth is 
found in six; output growth causes export growth in eight; 
no causal relationship for remaining countries. No causal 
relationship between export and output growth for South 
Korea. 
60. Ukpolo (1994) Annual percentage growth rates of exports 
of fuel products 
Time series, annual data for 8 low-
income African countries from 1969-
88 
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of non-fuel primary exports on 
economy. 
61. Yaghmaian (1994) 1) Exports in constant prices; 2) Average 
annual growth rate of exports 
Pooled and time series data for  66 
developing countries from 1971-1980 
& 1981-1990 
No identification strategy A positive and statistically significant association was 
obtained between export growth and the growth of output 
when population statistics were used for the labor variable 
in the neoclassical growth model. However, when 
substituting employment for population, there was no 
statistical support for export-led growth. 
62. Ahmad & Harnhirun 
(1995) 
Real exports evaluated in per capita terms in 
1980 prices 
Time series, annual data for 5 Asian 
countries from 1966-90 
Granger causality test with error correction 
model 
Causality between exports and economic growth in both 
directions for Singapore. 
63. Amirkhalkhaili & Dar 
(1995) 
Growth rate of real value of exports Time series, annual data for 23 
developing countries from the 1960's 
to the 1990's  
No identification strategy There is evidence of export-led growth for all except the 
strongly inward-oriented group of countries. No major 
difference between moderately inward-oriented countries 
and moderately- and strongly outward-oriented countries in 
terms of the impact of export expansion on economic 
growth. 
64. Clark (1995) 1) Qualitative evaluation of trade orientation 
(World Bank Development Report 1987), 
including effective rates of protection, 
export incentives, exchange rate alignments 
and direct controls; 2) Real export growth 
Time series and pooled, annual data 
for 35 developing countries from 
1973-1985  
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of exports and outwardly-
oriented trade policy on industrial diffusion rather on 
output growth. 
65. Coe & Helpman (1995) (Ratio of imports of goods and services to 
GDP) * (Natural log of foreign R & D 
capital stock) 
Pooled data for 21 OECD countries 
and Israel from 1971-1990 
No identification strategy  Demonstrates the extent to which a country's total factor 
productivity depends not only on domestic R&D capital 
but also on foreign R & D. Foreign R & D has beneficial 
effects on domestic productivity and the result is stronger 
when the country is more open to foreign trade. 
66. Holman & Graves 
(1995) 
First difference of log of exports  Time series, annual data for South 
Korea from 1953-1990 
Granger and Sims causality tests The Sims results found consistent two-way exogeneity 
between exports and GNP growth. The Granger causality 
results indicate that there is bidirectional causality between 
exports and economic growth. 
67. Jin (1995) 1) Natural log of real value of goods 
exported; 2) Natural log of world 
commodity price level for all exports (used 
as a proxy for foreign price shocks); 3) 
Natural log of industrial production index 
for all industrial countries (used as a proxy 
for foreign output shocks)  
Time series, seasonally adjusted 
quarterly data for Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan 
from 1973-1993  
Granger causality tests The results from the variance decompositions indicate 
significant feedback relations between exports and output 
for Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, which can be 
interpreted to suggest that in the short-run, economic 
growth and export growth reinforce each other. However, 
the Granger cointegration test suggests that no long-run 
equilibrium exists between exports and the level of output. 
68. Jin & Yu (1995) Exports of goods and services Time series, seasonally adjusted 
quarterly data for Korea, Japan, 
Canada and the US 
Granger causality test The results do not support the causal implication of the 
export-led growth hypothesis. For Korea and Japan, there 
is bidirectional causality between export growth and GNP 
growth; for Canada and US, growth led exports. 
69. Kwan & Kwok (1995) Export growth Time series, annual data  for China 
from 1952-1985 
Granger causality test Exports led growth including instantaneous causality. 
70. Lee (1995) 1) Ratio of imported to domestic capital 
goods; 2) Ratio of imports to investment; 3) 
Share of imports in GDP 
Cross-sectional data for 79 countries  
from 1960-85  
Instrumental variable technique; uses land 
size, distance from trade distortion as 
instruments for openness measures 
The ratio of imported to domestically produced capital 
goods in the composition of investment has a significant 
positive impact on per capita income growth rates across 
countries, and for developing countries in particular. 
Moreover, the ratio of foreign to domestic components of 
investment is an important factor in economic growth. The 
policy implication is that any trade distortions that restrict 
the importance of capital goods hurt the economy in the 
long run. 
71. McCarville & 
Nnadozie (1995) 
Real value of exports  Time series, annual data for Mexico 
from 1926-88 
Granger causality test Supports the export-led growth argument. 
72. Paul & Chowdhury 
(1995) 
Natural log of growth rate of real exports Time series, annual data for Australia 
from 1949-91 
Granger causality test There is evidence of Granger causality running from 
exports to GDP growth, implying that expansion of exports 
promotes economic growth in Australia. 
73. Rashid (1995) Growth of the real value of exports Time series, annual data for India 
from 1960-1989 
2SLS, 4 equation multivariate simultaneous 
model; uses RER and LW to instrument for 
the growth rate of exports. Note: RER is the 
nominal exchange rate times producer prices 
in the US divided by India's consumer price 
index (CPI) as a percentage change; LW is 
world income. 
The results support that idea that trade is the handmaiden of 
growth and suggest that domestic factors play a more 
important role in increasing growth rates. Furthermore, the 
study shows that liberalization has not had a significant 
effect on industrialization and investment in the study 
period. 
74. Abhayaratne (1996) Logs of real exports and imports (measured 
in 1985 prices) 
Time series, annual data for Sri Lanka 
from 1960-92 
Granger causality test The results reject the notion that foreign trade stimulates 
economic growth. 
75. Amoateng & Amoako-
Adu (1996) 
Growth rate of real value of exports Pooled (including time series and 
cross-sectional data) data for 35 
African countries from 1970-90 
Granger causality test (trivariate model, 
introducing external debt servicing as a third 
variable)  
Both the export-driven GDP growth and GDP growth-led 
export promotion hypotheses are supported. During the 
1983-90 sub-period, the structural adjustment programs 
that removed some of the economic distortions and 
encouraged regular repayment of the external debt also 
improved economic outcomes in the countries studied. 
76. Bodman (1996) Logs of manufacturing goods exports  Time series, seasonally adjusted 
quarterly data for Australia and 
Canada from 1960-95  
No identification strategy Export-led growth hypothesis holds for both economies. 
The reverse causality is rejected for both countries, except 
for the Canadian manufacturing sector, for which there is a 
small, significant positive effect of labor productivity on 
manufactured exports. 
77. Boltho (1996) Export growth  Time series, annual data for Japan 
from 1913-1937, 1952-1973, & 1973-
90 
Granger causality test (in both directions) For the period 1952-73, not one of the five tests supports 
the idea of export-led growth. For the remaining two 
periods, the export-led growth hypothesis seems to be 
rejected.  
78. Burney (1996) Export growth Cross–sectional data from 1965-80 & 
1980-90, which consists of 89 and 95 
countries respectively.   
No identification strategy The study confirms that there is a positive relationship 
between exports and economic growth. However, the 
relationship is significant only for the period 1980-90. 
Moreover, the level of significance of the impact of exports 
on economic growth is relatively higher for high income 
economies. 
79. Cheng & Chu (1996) Natural log of exports in constant dollars Time series, annual data for the US 
from 1940-90 
Granger causality test The results show bidirectional causality between exports 
and economic growth. 
80. Doraisami (1996) Growth rate of real values of exports Time series, annual data for Malaysia 
from 1963-1993  
Engle-Granger causality test The study provides strong empirical support for 
bidirectional causality between exports and output and a 
positive long-run relationship between exports and growth. 
81. Dutt & Ghosh (1996) Real value of exports Time series, annual data for 26 
developed and developing countries 
Engle-Granger cointegration & causality 
tests with error-correction model 
The study provides evidence of cointegration in only 14 
countries.  It shows that export causes growth in five 
countries, while growth causes exports in two countries.  
Bidirectional causality is found in three countries, and no 
causality is found in four countries. 
82. Fosu (1996) 1) Growth rate of real exports; 2) Mean 
annual growth rate of non-fuel primary 
exports; 3) Average annual non-fuel primary 
exports as a percentage of total exports  
Pooled, time series and cross-sectional
data for 76 less developed countries 
from 1967-1986  
No identification strategy The study shows that exports have a positive effect on 
GDP growth. Moreover, this positive impact generally 
remains positive when non-export GDP is the dependent 
variable. Lastly, the growth of non-fuel primary exports 
exhibits little or no external impact on the non-export 
sector (casting some doubt on the sustainability of primary 
product export-led growth). 
83. Harrison (1996) 1) Trade reform (1960-84); 2) Trade reform 
(1979-88); 3) Black market premium; 4) 
Price distortion; 5) Trade shares; 6) 
Unprotected agriculture; 7) Movement 
towards international prices 
Pooled, time series and cross-sectional 
data for developing countries 
Granger causality test Significant positive impact of openness on economic 
growth. The Granger causality test shows that causality 
between exports and growth runs in both directions. 
However, the choice of time period for analysis is critical.  
84. Henriques & Sadorsky 
(1996) 
Natural log of real value of exports Time series, annual data for Canada  
from 1870-1991  
Granger causality test The results tend to favor the one-way Granger causal 
relationship that the growth rate of GDP influences export 
growth. 
85. Jin & Yu (1996) Real value of exports Time series, quarterly data for the US 
from 1959-1992 
No identification strategy Based on the VAR techniques, no significant causal 
impacts are found between exports and output. This 
suggests that export expansion is neutral with respect to the 
growth of the US economy. 
86. Karunaratne (1996) Growth rate of value of exports Time series, seasonally adjusted 
quarterly data from Australia from 
1979-1994 
Granger causality test with error correction  Trade operated as an engine of growth in Australia during 
the study period. 
87. Kwan, Cosotmitis & 
Kwok (1996) 
Growth rate of real value of exports  Time series, annual data for Taiwan  
from 1953-1988 
No identification strategy The result shows that while the weak exogeneity 
assumption appears to be valid, the super exogeneity 
assumption is rejected. Thus, the results cast doubt on 
policy recommendations based on the export-led growth 
hypothesis. 
88. Mallick (1996) Growth rate of real value of exports Time series, annual data for India 
from 1950-1992  
Engle-Granger causality tests with error 
correction model 
Cointegration and causality test results indicate the 
existence of strong cointegration and Granger causality 
between income and exports growth. Causality runs from 
income to export growth. 
89. Mollik (1996) Growth rate of real value of exports Time Series, annual data for 
Bangladesh from 1972-1992  
Granger & Sims causality tests Exports cause economic growth but not the opposite. 
90. Mulaga & Weiss 
(1996) 
Growth rate of effective protection (ERP): 
ERPi=(ti-aij*tj)/(1-aij) where ti and tj are the 
the tariffs or tariff-equivalents for goods i 
and j, respectively, and aij is the share of 
input j in the value of output i at world 
prices. 
Firm level data for Malawi from 1970-
1991  
No identification strategy The impact of a decline in protection on total factor 
productivity depends upon the way productivity growth is 
measured. The study finds a positive relationship for the 
simple TFP estimates. However, the growth seems 
unassociated with changes in protection when capital input 
is measured by capital services rather than capital stock. 
91. Piazolo (1996) 1) Real value of exports of goods and 
services; 2) Real value of imports of goods 
and services; 3) Trade orientation dummy 
variable (import substitution dummy 
variable is 0 from 1965-82; export 
diversification dummy variable is 1 from 
1983-92) 
Time series, annual data for Indonesia  
from 1965-1992  
Engle-Granger causality test Indonesian long-run economic growth is more investment–
driven than trade- or export driven. However, the short-run 
terms effects of exports are strongly positive. 
92. Pomponio (1996) Manufactured goods exports   Time series, annual data for 66 
developing and OECD countries from 
1960-1988  
Granger causality test The bivariate causality tests show weak evidence 
supporting the idea that manufactured exports lead to 
output growth. However, when the investment factor is 
included in the trivariate causality test, there is mixed 
evidence in support of the trivariate causal relationships. 
93. Riezman, Whiteman & 
Summers (1996) 
1) Growth rate of exports; 2) Growth rate of 
imports; 3) Share of exports + imports in 
GDP  
Time series, annual data for 126 
countries from 1960-85  
Granger causality test 30 out of 126 countries support the export-led growth 
hypothesis; 25 out of 126 countries support the growth-led 
exports hypothesis. Using a weaker notion of "support", 65 
out of 126 countries support the export-led growth 
hypothesis. For the "Asian Tiger" countries, the 
relationship between export growth and output growth 
becomes clearer when conditioned on human capital and 
investment growth as well as import growth. 
94. Thornton (1996) Natural log of real value of exports Time series, annual data for Mexico 
from 1895-1992 
Granger causality test Positive Granger causal relationship running from exports 
to economic growth. 
95. Al-Youslf (1997) 1) Growth rate of value of exports; 2) 
Growth rate of exports*share of exports in 
GDP 
Time series, annual data for Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Oman from 
1973-1993 
No identification strategy Significant positive impact of exports on economic growth. 
However, economic growth is highly affected by oil. 
96. Berg (1997) 1) Growth rate of real value of exports (in 
Granger causality test); 2) Growth rates of 
real values of exports and imports (in 
simultaneous equations)  
Time series data for Mexico from 
1960-1991 
Granger causality test; Simultaneous 
equations;  uses the real exchange rate and 
the growth rate of real GDP of the US to 
instrument for exports; uses the real 
exchange rate and a measure of foreign 
capital inflows to instrument for imports 
 
During the period 1960-1991, trade and real output growth 
were positively related in Mexico. Simultaneous equation 
regressions suggest that both exports and imports 
significantly explain the growth of total factor productivity 
in Mexico. However, this study also points out the 
limitations of empirical exercises due to the changing 
composition of exports and shifting policy regimes, and 
emphasizes the importance of theoretical work. 
97. Coe, Helpman & 
Hoffmaister (1997) 
1) Change of the share of machinery and 
equipment imports from industrial countries 
in GDP in each developing country (denoted 
by M); 2) M* log of foreign R&D capital 
stock  
Pooled data for 77 developing 
countries and 22 industrialized 
countries from 1971-1990 
No identification strategy The results imply that a developing country's total factor 
productivity is larger the larger is its foreign R&D capital 
stock, the more open it is to machinery and equipment 
imports from industrial countries and the more educated is 
its labor force. 
98. Gani (1997) Growth rate of the (real) share of exports in 
GDP  
Time series, annual data for Papua 
New Guinea from 1970-1992  
No identification strategy Exports and stable exchange rates have positively 
contributed to economic growth. 
99. Ghatak, Milner & 
Utkulu (1997) 
1) Natural log of the real value of exports (in 
Granger causality test); 2) Real value of 
exports of manufactured goods, fuel and 
non-fuel primary products (in Johansen 
maximum likelihood procedure) 
Time series, annual data for Malaysia 
from 1955-1990 
Granger causality test The results provide support for the export-led growth 
hypothesis; aggregate exports Granger-cause real GDP and 
non-export GDP. This relationship is found to be driven by 
manufactured exports rather than by traditional exports. 
100. Gokkceus (1997) Natural log of the industry-specific annual 
total protection rate, including all charges on 
imports such as customs duty, municipality 
tax, stamps, funds, etc. 
Panel data with annual observations 
for 29 four-digit rubber industry plants 
in Turkey from 1983-1986 
No identification strategy This study reveals that trade liberalization or declining 
protection have a significant positive effect on productivity 
growth. 
101. Greenaway, Morgan 
& Wright (1997) 
1) Growth in real value of merchandise 
exports; 2) Percentage change in exports 
Pooled data for 74 developing 
countries from the 1980's to the 1990's
No identification strategy In general, liberalization seems to have been associated 
with deterioration in growth for this sample; the result was 
robust for both the full and the restricted samples. 
102. Liu, Song & Romilly 
(1997) 
Natural logs of exports and imports Time series, quarterly data for China 
from 1983-1995 
Granger causality test Bidirectional causality between economic growth and 
exports plus imports, which is consistent with China's 
development strategy of protected export-promotion. 
103. Park & Prime (1997) 1) Growth rate of exports; 2) Share of 
exports in GDP; 3) Growth rate of exports * 
share of exports in GDP  
Pooled and cross-sectional data for 26 
inland provinces and 11 coastal 
provinces in China 
No identification strategy The results support the hypothesis that exports have 
contributed to the growth of provincial incomes in China 
for the period examined with both the cross-sectional and 
pooled analyses, with the results being primarily driven by 
the comparison between the coastal provinces and the  
inland areas. 
104. Pineres & Ferrantino 
(1997) 
1) GEXP, the growth rate of the real value of 
exports; 2) RXR, the real exchange rate; 3) 
TRAD7 is the variance of the traditional 
index calculated across industries; 4) Specl, 
a static measure of specialization; 5) CSX, a 
measure of the change in export composition
Time series, annual data for Chile 
from 1962-1992 
Granger causality test  In general, growth periods in Chile have been associated 
with stability in the composition of exports and an 
acceleration of export diversification. There is a positive 
relationship between export diversification and economic 
growth. 
105. Begum & 
Shamsuddin (1998) 
1) Level of exports; 2) Share of exports in 
GDP; 3) Growth rate of exports; 4) Export 
growth rate weighted by the share of exports 
in GDP.  Note: OLS results use the last 
measure as the exports variable 
Time series, annual data for 
Bangladesh from 1961-1992 
Instrumental variable technique; uses the 
annual growth rate of world income and the 
difference between foreign and domestic 
inflation rates to instrument for exports 
Export growth has significantly increased economic growth 
through its positive impact on total factor productivity in 
the economy. The contribution of exports to economic 
growth was more pronounced during 1982-90, when the 
government pursued a policy of trade liberalization and 
structural reform and political turmoil was not persistent. 
106. Biswal and Dhawan 
(1998) 
Natural log of total real value of exports and 
total real value of manufactured goods 
exports 
Time series, annual data for Taiwan 
from 1960-1990  
Granger causality test with error correction 
model 
The study finds evidence of bidirectional causality between 
exports and growth. 
107. Clerides, Lach & 
Tybout (1998) 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the plant 
exports, 0 otherwise. 
Plant-level, panel data for Columbia 
(1981-1991), Morocco (1984-1990) 
and Mexico (1984-1990) 
1) Full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML); simultaneously estimates export 
market participation patterns and marginal 
cost realizations; 2) GMM; used to test the 
robustness of the marginal cost estimate 
The study addresses the question of whether the association 
between exporting and efficiency reflects causation flowing 
from exporting experience to improvements in 
performance. The actual data suggest an inconsistent 
causality pattern (no-learning-by-exporting scenario). The 
FIML and GMM tests confirm that the association between 
exporting and efficiency is most plausibly explained as 
low-cost producers choosing to become exporters. 
108. Doyle (1998) Natural log of the real value of exports  Time series, annual data for Ireland 
from 1953-1993 
Granger causality test with error correction Exports and GDP are cointegrated. Evidence of short-run 
and long-run causality runs from exports to growth. 
109. Iscan (1998) Share of exports in GDP  Panel, sector-level data for Mexico 
from 1970-1990 
Granger causality test with VAR model The study found no evidence that exports lead to capital 
accumulation or vice versa. However, there is evidence that 
common determinants, such as the real exchange rate, may 
be the driving force for the capital accumulation.  
110. Islam (1998) Value of exports  Time series data for 15 Asian 
countries from 1967-1991 
Multivariate error-correction model to test 
the Granger causality between exports and 
growth 
Causality test results indicate that export expansion causes 
growth in two-third of these countries, corrected for 
simultaneity between the causal factors. A country with a 
large public sector, higher level of economic development, 
and lower vulnerability to external economic shocks, is 
more likely to reap the benefits of export promotion 
strategies. 
111. Keller (1998) A foreign knowledge stock variable which is 
a weighted sum of the cumulative R&D 
expenditures of a country’s trading partners 
(the weights are given by the bilateral import 
shares)  
Panel data for 21 OECD countries 
from 1971-1990 
Monte-Carlo based robustness test; R&D 
spillovers among randomly matched trade 
partners investigated 
Randomly matched trade patterns give rise to greater 
positive R&D spillovers than do true bilateral trade 
patterns, suggesting that the Coe and Helpman (1995) 
model of trade-related international R & D spillovers is not 
robust. 
112. McNab & Moore 
(1998) 
Dummy variables for inwardly-oriented 
trade policy and outwardly-oriented trade 
policy 
Pooled data for 41 countries Simultaneous estimations; openness 
measures are used as instruments  
Outward trade policy increased annual GDP, and trade 
policy is a robust determinant of growth. 
113. Onafowora & Owoye 
(1998) 
Real value of exports and trade policy 
dummies 
Data from 12 sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries from 1963-1993 
Johansen's conintegration tests and VECM  Changes in trade policies and exports have positive effects 
on growth for 10 out of 12 SSA countries. 
114. Shan & Sun (1998a) Growth rate of real value of exports Quarterly, seasonally adjusted data for 
Australia from 1978-1996  
Granger causality test using Toda and 
Yamamoto method 
Results indicate one-way causality from industrial growth 
to export growth with a one-year lag. 
115. Shan and Sun (1998b) Natural log of exports  Monthly, seasonally adjusted data for 
China from 1978-1996  
Granger causality test using Toda and 
Yamamoto method 
Results indicate bidirectional causality between exports and 
real industrial output in China. 
116. Shan & Sun (1998c) 1) Natural log of the growth rate of exports; 
2) Natural log of the growth rate of imports.
Quarterly,  seasonally adjusted data 
for Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Taiwan from 1978-1996  
Granger causality test using Toda and 
Yamamoto method, followed by sensitivity 
analysis 
Principal results from the paper cannot offer support for the 
export-led growth hypothesis.  Hong Kong and Korea show 
bidirectional Granger causality between exports and 
growth. 
117. Pineres & Ferrantino 
(1999) 
1) Natural log of real value of exports; 2) the 
mean of a cumulative export experience 
function for each commodity (traditionality 
scores); 3) a static measure of specialization 
which approaches 1 implying a high degree 
of specialization and nears 0 suggesting a 
degree of export diversification.  
Annual data for Columbia from 1962-
1993 
1) Cointegration and error-correction 
modeling used to test relationship between 
GDP and exports; 2) simultaneous equation 
system: using the price of coffee, oil, lagged 
log of real exports, world interest rates as 
instruments for openness measures.  
Traditional Granger causality tests reveal little evidence of 
export-led growth. However, analysis of structural export 
change and export diversification sheds significant light on 
the trade–growth linkages.  Results reveal a positive 
interaction between structural changes in the export sector 
and Colombian GDP growth .Results indicate that 
increased export diversification leads to more rapid growth 
in real exports; and that more rapid structural change in 
exports is associated with accelerated growth in Colombian 
GDP. 
118. Clark, Sawyer & 
Sprinkle (1999) 
Trade policy orientation, measured using 
Dollar's index of real exchange rate 
distortion 
Pooled data for 94 developing 
countries  
No identification strategy Outward-oriented trade strategies are found to have an 
important effect on industrialization.  
119. Dhawan & Biswal 
(1999) 
1) Natural log of real value of exports; 2) 
Terms of trade 
Annual data for India from 1961-1993 VAR model; Johansen test for cointegration; 
Engle and Granger's error correction 
approach (to determine the direction of 
causal flow in the short-run as well as in the 
long-run) 
The results suggest that there is one long-run equilibrium 
relationship among real GDP, real exports and terms of 
trade, and the causal relationship flows from GDP growth 
and terms of trade to export growth. The causality from 
exports to GDP appears to be a short-run phenomenon. 
120. Frankel & Romer 
(1999) 
Trade is measured using instrumental 
variables that take account of countries' 
geographic locations 
Cross-sectional data for 150 countries OLS and instrumental variables techniques Trade has a positive effect on income growth. 
121. Greenaway, Morgan 
& Wright (1999) 
1) Real value of exports; 2) Eecomposition 
of exports into different categories 
Panel data for 69 countries from 1975-
1993 
No identification strategy Results report a strong positive relationship between real 
export growth and real output growth.  The study also finds 
that export composition does matter. 
122.  Moosa (1999) Sum of exports of goods and services Annual data for Australia from 1900-
1993 
Cointegration and causality tests   Results fail to detect either a long-run or short-run 
relationship between exports and growth. 
123. Vamvakidis (1999) 1) Share of exports plus imports in GDP; 2) 
Economy judged "open" if it meets five 
conditions from Sachs and Warner: a) 
average tariff less than 40 percent; b) 
average nontariff barriers less than 40 
percent; c) black market premium less than 
20 percent of official exchange rate; d) 
government is not communist; f) no state 
monopoly on major exports. 
Data covers the period from 1950 to 
1992. Data for real GDP per capita, 
investment share, and population 
growth are from the Penn World 
Table; trade shares come from the 
World Table (World Bank, 1994), and 
school enrollment ratio are from Barro 
and Lee (1994). The analysis focuses 
on 109 countries engaged in regional 
trade agreements (RTA) and 51 
countries engaged in broad 
liberalization between1958-1989.  
No identification strategy Economies grow faster after broad liberalization, in both 
the short-run and the long–run; however, they grow more 
slowly after an RTA. 
124. Weinhold & Rauch 
(1999) 
Share of exports plus imports in GDP Data from 39 countries 1960-1990 No identification strategy Increased trade may lead to growth. 
125. Xu & Wang (1999) Foreign R&D spillovers weighted by total 
imports, capital goods imports, and non-
capital goods imports 
Data from 21 OECD countries from 
1983-1990  
No identification strategy Trade in capital goods was found to be a significant 
channel of R&D spillovers. 
126. Anoruo & Ahmad 
(1999) 
Growth rate of the share exports plus 
imports in GDP 
Time series, annual data for Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand from 1960-1997 
Granger causality test The results show bidirectional causality between economic 
growth and openness. 
127. Al-Marhubi (2000) 1) Average share of exports in GDP from 
1961-88; 2) Export structure, measured as 
the ratio of manufactured good exports to 
total exports from the World Development 
Indicators 1997 
Cross-sectional data for 91 countries 
from 1961-1988 
No identification strategy The results show that export diversification is associated 
with faster growth. This relationship is economically large 
and is robust to different model specifications and different 
measures of export diversification. Moreover, distortions to 
international trade and market-oriented resource allocation 
that run counter to a country's comparative advantage can 
have adverse effects on economic efficiency and growth 
performance. 
128. Anwer & Sampath 
(2000) 
Natural logs of goods and non-factor service 
exports 
Time series, annual data for 97 
countries from 1960-1992 
Granger causality test In 97 countries, GDP and exports are integrated of different 
orders for 36 countries. Among the other 61 countries, 17 
countries exhibit no long-run relationship between the two 
variables; 35 countries show causality in at least one 
direction (10 countries show unidirectional causality from 
GDP to exports, 5 show unidirectional causality from 
exports to GDP, and 20 show bidirectional causality), and 9 
countries do not show any causality. 
129. Choudhri & Hakura 
(2000) 
Sector openness index, which depends on 
how international trade affects the 
technology transfer process 
Panel data for 44 countries (including 
33 developing countries) from 1970-
1993 
No identification strategy The effect of increased openness on productivity growth 
differs across sectors. In traditional (low-growth) 
manufacturing sectors, no effect or little effect exists; for 
medium-growth sectors, import competition has a 
significant growth-enhancing effect; and there is some 
evidence to show that export expansion in high-growth 
sectors leads to an increase in productivity growth. 
130. Darrat, Hsu & Zhong 
(2000) 
Real value of exports Data for Taiwan from 1953-1988 VECM model after Johansen cointegration 
tests, instead of simple Engel-Granger 
procedure 
The exports are both weakly and super-exogenous to 
output. 
131. Erlat (2000) Export and import flows, divide into three 
categories: net exporting, import competing, 
non-competing 
Annual data for Turkey from 1963-
1994, divided into four sub-periods 
No identification strategy First, trade plays a more significant role in employment 
changes during the post-1980 periods; this is observed 
more in the net exporting and non-competing categories 
rather than the import competing category.  Second, the 
switch to export-oriented growth in 1980 did not lead 
export-based employment to be dominant in employment 
changes, but has acted as a buffer in the sense that 
employment may either have grown much less or declined 
more severely if the post-1980 expansion of exports had 
not occurred. 
132. Jin (2000) Share of imports in GDP Annual data for Japan, South Korea, 
Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore from 1955 to 
1995 
VAR model  The results do not strongly support the idea that openness 
leads to growth. 
133. Kim (2000) Direct policy measures such as legal rates of 
tariff, quota ratios, and nominal rates of 
protection 
Panel data for 36 Korean 
manufacturing industries over nine 
sub-periods from 1966-1988 
No identification strategy Total factor productivity estimates based on the standard 
assumption of perfect competition and constant returns are 
biased and show a spurious relationship with changes in 
trade regimes. When both imperfect competition and non-
constant returns are taken into account, the growth 
accounting approach yields estimates of total factor 
productivity growth that are quite low. 
134. Morley & Perdikis 
(2000) 
Growth rate of exports Annual data for Egypt from 1955-
1996 
VECM and Granger causality tests There appears no evidence of either direction of causality 
between exports and growth. 
135. Moreira & Najberg 
(2000) 
Value of exports and imports National accounts series for Brazil 
from 1990-1997 
No identification strategy Trade liberalization has a negative short-run impact on 
employment , in long run, overweighed by a more labor-
intensive output mix 
136. Pereira & Xu (2000) Growth rate of exports Data for 39 countries from 1960–92 Multivariate VAR approach test to Granger 
relations 
Results strongly support the theory of export-led growth. 
137. Francisco & Ramos 
(2001) 
Real value of exports and imports Annual data for Portugal from 1865-
1998  
Granger causality in the ECM-VAR The empirical results reject unidirectional causality 
between exports, imports, and economic growth. However, 
there are feedback effects between exports, output growth 
and import growth.  
138. Ghirmay, Grabowski 
& Sharma (2001) 
Real value of exports  Time series data for 19 least 
developed countries (each with at least 
30 annual observations) 
Granger causality tests based on error-
correction modeling 
Export expansion leads to economic growth in 15 out of 19 
countries by either increasing the volume of investment, 
improving efficiency, or both.  
139. Khalafalla & Webb 
(2001) 
Real value of exports and imports (export 
data are broken down into two additional 
series: total value of primary commodity 
exports, and total value manufacturing 
exports). 
Quarterly data for Malaysia from 
1965-1996 
VAR model, VECM, Granger causality test Statistical tests confirm export-led growth for the full 
period and for the period to 1980, but tests on the 1981- 
1996 period show growth causing exports. Primary exports 
have a stronger direct impact on economic growth than 
manufactures.   
140. Madden, Savage & 
Bloxham (2001) 
Share of imports in GDP* foreign R&D 
capital stock 
Panel data for 15 OECD countries and 
6 Asian countries from 1980-1995 
No identification strategy Total factor productivity and domestic R&D are positively 
related.  Domestic R&D has relatively large impact on total 
factor productivity. 
141. Abdulnasser (2002) Value of exports Quarterly data for Japan from 1966-
1999 
Granger causality test in VAR model, LR 
test for causality and bootstrap simulation 
technique    
     
There is bidirectional causality between export and output 
growth in Japan. 
142. Chuang (2002) A set of trade-induced learning variables that 
take into account trade partners and learning 
characteristics. 
Cross-country panel data for 78 
countries from 1960-1985  
Panel regression. The general problem of 
causality is relatively minor in this study as 
only traded goods in a subset are taken. 
Holding other variables constant, trade-induced learning 
has a positive and significant effect on growth. 
143. Greenaway, Morgan 
& Wright (2002)  
1) A dummy variable, equal to 1 if it is 
activated at the time of a country’s first 
World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans 
(SALs)  2) a dummy variable based on 
tariffs, quotas, export impediments and 
Panel data for 73 countries from 1975-
1993 
No identification strategy Liberalization may favorably impact growth of real GDP 
per capita. However, the effect would appear to be lagged 
and relatively modest. 
promoters and exchange rate misalignment; 
3) a dummy variable for whether an 
economy is open or closed based on five 
criteria from Sachs and Warner: non-tariff 
barrier coverage; average tariffs; the black-
market exchange rate premium; whether the 
economy is socialist or not; whether a state 
monopoly exists over major exports. 
144. Jin (2002) Real value of exports Monthly data for Korea's four largest 
provinces (Seoul, Kyunggee, 
Kyungnam, and Pusan) from 1987-
1996  
Engle and Granger tests for cointegration, 
Granger causality tests, four-variable VAR 
model, variance decompositions and impulse 
responses 
Export growth has a significant impact on output growth 
for all provinces, although a feedback effect from output to 
export growth appears in Seoul and the Kyungnam 
province. 
145. Ahmed (2003) 1) Share of exports in GDP; 2) Average 
tariff collection rate  
Times series data for Bangladesh from
1974-1996 
VECM model after cointegration tests Exports and average tariff collection rates are significant in 
explaining GDP growth. 
146. Connolly (2003) Sum of high technology imports and non-
high technology imports, which are 
measured as total imports from the world, 
excluding high technology goods imported 
from developed countries. 
Annual panel data for 86 countries 
from 1965 to 1995 (data are not 
available for all countries in all years)
No identification strategy High technology imports positively affect domestic 
imitation and innovation. Moreover, their role is greater in 
developing nations. Finally, foreign technology embodied 
in imports plays a greater role in growth than domestic 
technology. 
147. Dar & Amirahalkhali 
(2003) 
1) Real value of exports; 2) Share of exports 
plus imports in GDP 
Data for 19 countries from 1971–1999 No identification strategy Results generally indicate that trade openness is important 
for economic growth, but the magnitude of the relationship 
varies significantly across countries. 
148. Ferreira & Rossi 
(2003) 
1) Effective rate of protection; 2) Nominal 
tariff  
Annual data for 16 industrial sectors 
in Brazil from 1985-1997  
Panel regression includes IV (the 
measurement of effective rate of protection 
and mess nominal tariff), 2SLS FE, and FE, 
no causality tests used. 
There is significant evidence that reducing trade barriers 
improves total factor productivity and labor productivity. 
149. Singh (2003) Share of real exports in real GDP for each 
industry 
Panel data for ten manufacturing 
industries in India from 1973/74-
1993/94.  
No identification strategy Exports do not induce convergence, but instead seem to 
accentuate the process of divergence among industries. The 
study provides some evidence for the significant effects of 
exports on the level of output per capita and total factor 
productivity in the manufacturing sector. The effects of 
exports on total factor productivity are significant in half of 
the sample industries, but are statistically insignificant in 
the remaining half. 
150. Yanikkaya (2003) 1) Trade volumes (import penetration; 
export share in GDP; trade with OECD 
countries; trade with non-OECD countries; 
US bilateral exports; US bilateral imports 
and population density), 2) Trade restrictions 
(import duties, export duties, taxes on 
international trade, bilateral payment 
arrangements and other measures of trade 
barriers). 
Panel data for over 100 developed and 
developing countries from 1970-1997
Cross-country regression, including OLS, 
SUR, 3SLS; instrumental variables 
technique, using log of average GDP per 
capita for the previous 5 years, 5-year lagged 
value of life expectancy, actual value of 
telephone mainlines, the access to 
international water, war deaths, tropical 
climate and political regime as instruments 
for trade measures 
The regression results for trade volumes provide substantial 
support for the hypothesis that trade promotes growth 
through a number of channels such as technology transfer, 
scale economies, and comparative advantage. Interestingly, 
all measures of trade barriers used in the study are 
significantly and positively correlated with growth except 
for restrictions on current account payments, which are 
negatively but insignificantly correlated with growth. Thus, 
the results provide considerable evidence for the hypothesis 
that restrictions on trade can promote growth, particularly 
for developing countries and under certain conditions. 
151. An & Iyigun (2004) Skill-intensive exports  Panel data for 86 countries from 1970-
1990 
Panel regression, followed by robustness 
tests including dropping outliers, causality 
test for direction of relationship between rate 
of per-capita GDP growth and subsequent 
skill content of exports 
After controlling for GDP per capita, education, openness 
to foreign trade, and political and macroeconomic stability, 
a higher export content of skill-intensive goods generates 
higher per-capita GDP growth rates, but the reverse does 
not hold. 
152. Balaguer & 
Cantavella, Jorda (2004) 
1) Real value of exports; 2) Export 
composition (in relative terms), calculated as 
share of consumption goods, semi-
manufactured and capital goods in total 
exports. 
Annual data for Spain from 1961-
2000 
Johansen's cointegration test followed by 
Granger causality tests   
Exports and growth are cointegrated, and there is 
bidirectional causality between exports and growth.   
153. Bugsten et al. (2004) A dummy variable, equal to 1 if a firm 
exports more than a certain amount 
(depending on company size, labor 
productivity, capital productivity, etc.), 0 
otherwise. 
Firm–level, panel data for the 
manufacturing sectors of four African 
countries: Kenya (1992-1994); Ghana 
(1991-1993); Zimbabwe (1992-1994); 
Cameroon (1992/93-1994/95). 
Simultaneous estimation of a dynamic 
production function and a dynamic discrete 
choice model for the decision to export  
The study finds that exporting increases productivity. 
154. Chuang & Hsu (2004) 1) Natural log of share of exports to OECD 
in total industry sales; 2) Natural log of 
share of imports in total industry sales  
Firm-level data for China from 1995  No identification strategy The presence of foreign ownership has a positive and 
significant effect on the productivity of domestic firms. 
Moreover, trading with more advanced countries helps 
China gain access to new technology and information, 
which improves China's productivity and enables it to 
compete in international markets. 
155. Dawson & Hubbard 
(2004) 
1) Growth rate of exports; 2) growth rate of 
exports times the share of exports in GDP 
Annual panel data for 14 Central and 
East European countries CEEC's from 
1994-1999 
First stage, aggregate production into export 
production and non-export production; in the 
second stage, random effects and fixed 
effects model applied to test relationship 
between GDP growth and export production 
variants. 
Export growth is a significant determinant of GDP growth. 
156. Dritsakis (2004) 1) Investment, measured as gross fixed 
capital adjusted by the GDP deflator; 2) Real 
export revenue  
Quarterly data for Bulgaria and 
Romania from 1991–2001 
Johansen cointegration test and Granger 
causality test based on a vector error 
correction model 
There is significant evidence to show cointegration 
between exports and growth, as well as investment and 
growth. Exports promote growth in both countries; , 
growth also promotes exports in both countries. Investment 
leads to growth in both countries. 
157.  Dutta & Ahmed 
(2004) 
1) Real value of exports; 2)  Import tariff 
collection rate 
Time series data for Pakistan from 
1973-1995 
VAR model to test long run effects, VECM 
model to test short run effects, both with 
human capital included in the model 
framework 
There is a unique long-run relationship between industrial 
growth and its major determinants including real exports. 
The short-run relationship between industrial growth and 
real exports is also significant. 
158. Dodzin &Vamvakidis 
(2004) 
Share of exports plus imports in GDP Panel data for 92 developing countries 
from 1960–2000 
Granger causality test  The impact of trade liberalization on different sectors of 
production in developing economies shows increases in the 
production share of the industrial sector, at the expense of 
agricultural production. 
159. Falvey, Foster & 
Greenway (2004) 
Trade-mediated knowledge spillovers 
(export spillovers and import spillovers) 
Data for 21 OECD countries from 
1975–1990 
Griliches' (1979) perpetual inventory 
method, weighted by imports or exports 
Results support the existence of spillovers through imports, 
but the evidence of spillovers through exports is less 
compelling.  
160. Lee, Ricci, & 
Rigobon (2004) 
1) The share of trade in GDP; 2) tariff; 3) 
import duties; and 4) black market 
premium.. 
A panel data of eight periods of 5 
years each, is spanning from 1961-
1965 and 1996-2000, including 100 
countries.  
“Identification through Heteroskedasticity” 
(IH): exploit plausible differences in 
variances of structural innovations (error 
terms) across subsamples of the data 
The results suggest that openness has a small positive 
effect on growth, which is not particularly robust. 
161. Thangavelu & 
Rajaguru (2004) 
Value of exports and imports Time series data for Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand from 1960-1996  
VECM approach   The long-run result shows that there is no causal effect of 
exports on labor productivity growth for Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan and Thailand, thereby suggesting 
that there is no export-led productivity growth in these 
countries. However, significant causal effects were found 
from imports to productivity growth, suggesting import-led 
productivity growth in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. In addition, the results 
indicate that imports tend to have greater positive impacts 
on productivity growth in the long run. 
162.  Awokuse (2005a) Real value of exports Quarterly time series data from 1963-
2001 for Korea 
VECM approach and augmented levels 
VAR modeling with integrated and 
cointegrated processes (of arbitrary orders) 
used to test Granger causality 
There is bidirectional causality between exports and GDP 
growth. 
163. Awokuse (2005b) Real value of exports  Quarterly time series data from 1960-
1991 for Japan 
Augmented VAR methodology used to test 
Granger causality; Direct acyclic graphs 
(DAG) used to further restrict VAR 
The causal path between exports and GDP growth in Japan 
is bidirectional; other variables such as capital and foreign 
output are also significant determinants of productivity 
growth in Japan. 
164. Biesbroeck (2005) Value of exports  Panel survey data for approximately 
200 manufacturing firms in  each of 
nine African countries from 1992-
1996  
1) GMM; uses lagged exports to test 
unidirectional causality from exports to 
productivity improvement; 2) Instrument 
variables technique; uses ethnicity of the 
owner and the state ownership 
  
165. Fu (2005) Value of exports 1) Panel data of 26 manufacturing 
industries for the period 1990–1997 
for China; 2) Pooled data for 358 sub-
industries, including 179 state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) industries and 179 
comparable township and village 
enterprises (TVE) industries from 
1995 
Uses a two stage process.  First stage uses a 
non-parametric Malmquist TFP approach to 
decompose TFP growth 
into technical change and efficiency 
improvements.  Second stage uses 
regressions to test the impact of exports on 
TFP growth. 
No significant evidence was found in favor of significant 
productivity gains caused by exports at the industry level. 
166. Dollar &  Kraay 
(2002) 
1) Trade volumes; 2) Tariffs; 3) Membership
in the World Bank; 4) Presence of capital 
controls 
Cross-sectional data for 92 countries 
and spanning the 1960's to the 1990's 
No identification strategy The study tests whether openness has systematic effects on 
the share of income accruing to the poorest in society. It 
finds little evidence to support such systematic effects, 
even when allowing the effects of openness to depend on 
the level of development and differences in factor 
endowments. 
167. Dollar & Kraay 
(2004) 
1) Decade-over-decade changes in the 
volume of trade; 2) Reductions in average 
tariff rates; 3) Share of trade in GDP 
Cross-sectional data for 101 countries 
and covering periods from the 1970s 
to the 1990s  
Instrumental variables technique; uses  
lagged trade volumes as instruments for 
current trade volumes  
Changes in growth rates are highly correlated with changes 
in trade volumes, controlling for lagged growth and 
addressing a variety of econometric difficulties. However, 
there is no significant correlation between changes in 
inequality and changes in trade volumes, controlling for 
changes in average incomes.  
168. Wacziarg & Welch 
(2003) 
Composite measure of openness including 
exchange rate reforms. 
  Positive relationship between a composite measure of 
economic reforms and economic growth, but not 
significant for the 1990's.  
 
169. Alcala & Ciccone 
(2004) 
The natural log of the share of the sum of 
imports and exports in purchasing power 
parity GDP (real openness) 
Cross-sectional data from Penn World 
Tables for 1985 
IV using a geography-based instrument for 
trade (obtained from aggregating bilateral 
trade shares predicted by the gravity 
Trade is a significant and robust determinant of aggregate 
productivity when real openness is used. 
equation). This method was first used by 
Frankel and Romer (1999).  
170. Rigobon & Rodrik 
(2004) 
Log of the share of trade in GDP Cross-sectional dataset from Penn 
World Tables and World 
Development Indicator, including 86 
countries  
“Identification through Heteroskedasticity” 
(IH): exploit plausible differences in 
variances of structural innovations (error 
terms) across subsamples of the data 
The share of trade in GDP has a negative impact on income 
levels and democracy, but a positive impact on the rule of 
law.  
172. Chang, Kaltani, & 
Loayza (2005) 
Share of real exports plus real imports in real 
GDP 
Pooled cross-country and time-series 
data for 82 countries from 1960-2000 
Non-linear growth regression specification 
that interacts a proxy of trade openness with 
proxies of educational investment, financial 
depth, inflation stabilization, public 
infrastructure, governance, labor-market 
flexibility, ease of firm entry, and ease of 
firm exit.   
The growth effects of openness are positive and 
economically significant if certain complementary reforms 
are undertaken.  
173. Hausmann, Hwang, 
and Rodrik (2005)  
A measure of the income level of a country’s 
exports, which also captures the level of 
sophistication of those exports. 
There are two sources of data. 1) The 
first is the United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE) covering over 5,000 
products at the Harmonized System 6-
digit level for the years 1992-2003 
(available for 124 countries over 
1999-2001); 2) the real per capita 
GDP data from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI), which 
is available for 113 countries. 
Instrumental variables technique; uses log 
population and log land area as instruments 
for the export sophistication measure 
Export sophistication positively affects growth. 
174. Freund and Bolaky 
(2008) 
The log of the share of the sum of imports 
and exports in GDP. 
Cross-country data from 126 countries 
covering periods from 2000 to 2004 
IV using a geography-based instrument 
(followed by Frankel and Romer (1999)) and 
also using remoteness from other markets as 
an additional instrument for trade, 
Openness interacts with regulation and only positively 
affects growth in unregulated economies with minimal 
restrictions on entry. 
175. Romalis (2007) Share of trade (evaluated at either current or 
constant price) in GDP  
Data for developing countries from 
1961-2000 
Instrumental variables technique; uses US 
MFN tariffs as instruments for developing 
country trade shares 
Openness positively affects per-capita GDP growth. 
176. Estevadeordal and 
Taylor (2008) 
tariffs on consumption, capital, and 
intermediate goods from primary sources  
Data on growth rate comes from the 
Penn World Table database (version 
6.2); data on average tariff comes 
from the Economic Freedom in the 
World 2005 database, which are 
available every 5 years from 1970 to 
2000, plus annually for 2001, 2002, 
and 2003, and the sample size grows 
from 77 countries in 1970 to 122 in 
the year 2000. 
IV using two “GATT Potential” instruments 
(the interaction of an indicator of GATT 
membership in 1975 with the pre-Uruguay 
Round tariff level and the interaction of 
Great Depression intensity with the initial 
period tariff level) to identify for trade 
liberalization (reflected by tariff policy)  
The results show that liberalizing tariffs on imported 
capital and intermediate goods did lead to faster GDP 
growth, but that there is no relationship between 
consumption goods tariffs on growth..    
 
  
Table 3: All Countries 
Correlation between Different Openness Measures 
    Exchange Rate Trade Taxes/ Tariffs  Openness Real DFI/GDP 
   Trade Volumes   (X + M/GDP) Openness        
   (PWT 6.1) 
              
Trade 0.0452     1.0000  
Taxes/   283   919 
Trade 
             
Tariffs -0.0314    0.6271*  1.0000  
              274        666        716 
             
Openness-0.0172   -0.2459*  -0.2470* 1.0000  
              291        561        464  607 
              
Real   -0.0662   -0.2200*  -0.2970*   0.8921*   1.0000  
Open      293        579        461        566        630 
              
DFI/ -0.0066  -0.2501* -0.3016* 0.3708*   0.4129* 1.0000  
GDP       281        559        445        567        576       607 
             
 
 Notes: Data from World Bank.  Time period includes 1970 through 2004. A”*” indicates significant 
 at the 5 percent level.  Number of observations are underneath correlation coefficient. 
 
 
Table 4: Developing Countries Only 
 
Correlation between Different Openness Measures 
      Exchange Rate Trade Taxes/ Tariffs  Openness Real DFI/GDP 
     Trade Volumes   (X + M/GDP) Openness      
     (PWT 6.1) 
 
              
    Trade taxes/   -0.0194    1.0000  
    Trade       188        435 
              
    Tariffs -0.1051    0.5863*   1.0000  
                    180        301        323 
              
    Openness    0.0153    -0.3594*  -0.3556*   1.0000  
    (X+M)/GDP    196        392        313        432 
              
     Real    -0.0625   -0.2370*  -0.3473*   0.8379*   1.0000  
     Openness       200        423        315        419        470 
              
     DFI/GDP    0.0377    -0.2465*  -0.3291*   0.4568*   0.3685* 1.0000  
             |       196        406        311        415        439       450  
 
Notes: Data from World Bank.  Time period includes 1970 through 2004. A”*” indicates significant 
  at the 5 percent level.  Number of observations are underneath correlation coefficient. 
Table 5: Incomes, trade shares, and import tariffs in a panel of non-OECD countries  
 
Using Trade Shares as a Measure of Openness, 1960-2000 
 
Dependent variable: ln income per capita, in PPP $1993 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS 
No 
controls 
 
OLS 
No 
controls 
OLS 
Includes 
controls 
OLS 
Includes 
controls 
IV 
No 
controls 
IV 
No 
controls 
IV 
Includes 
controls 
IV 
Includes 
controls 
3-year lag trade share 0.907 0.514 0.214 0.203     
 [0.036]*** [0.037]*** [0.038]*** [0.035]***     
Trade share     0.978 0.857 0.426 0.402 
     [0.037]*** [0.057]*** [0.067]*** [0.064]*** 
Country fixed effects? NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Observations 3294 3294 1996 2657 3288 3288 1996 2657 
 
Using Import Tariffs as a Measure of Openness, 1970-2000 
 
3-year lag Import tariff -3.586 -0.721 -0.298 -0.137     
 [0.377]*** [0.142]*** [0.117]** [0.119]     
Average import tariff     -4.830 -4.830 -0.635 -0.338 
     [0.441]*** [0.441]*** [0.328]* [0.379] 
Country fixed effects? NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Time fixed effects NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1617 1617 1261 1485 1415 1415 1125 1306 
 
Notes: Source is Aisbett, Harrison, and Zwane (2005), as reported in Harrison (2007).  Huber robust standard errors in parenthesis.  Data are annual data, with 
one observation for each country and year. The dependent variable is the log of income per capita, in PPP $1993.  Trade share is the share of exports plus imports 
in GDP.  Import tariffs are import revenues divided by the value of imports.  Both are taken from the World Bank’s indicators.  OLS indicates ordinary least 
squares and IV indicates instrumental variables.  All regressions exclude OECD high-income countries.   Columns (3) and (7) include controls for inflation, 
government expenditure in GDP, currency crises, investment in GDP, and the fraction of the population that is literate.  Columns (4) and (8) include controls for 
inflation, government expenditure, and currency crises.  In instrumental variable regressions, trade share is instrumented using three-year lagged value, and 
import tariff is instrumented using three-year lagged value. 
 
    Table 6 (from Alfaro and Charlton (2008)) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7: Foreign Investment and Technology Spillovers 
  Country Years Data Technology Spillovers? Details 
1.Globerman, Steven 
(1979) 
Canada 1972 Industry level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers. 
2.Blomstrom, Magnus & 
Persson Hakan (1983) 
Mexico 1970 Industry level (the Mexican 
manufacturing industry 1970) 
Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers (the existence of spillovers 
efficiency benefits from the foreign-owned plants to the 
domestically-owned ones). 
3.Blomstrom, Magnus 
(1986) 
Mexico Mexican census of 
manufactures 1970 
&1975 
Industry level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers (a result of the fact that input 
market start to operate better because of foreign entry rather 
than technology transfer). 
4.Haddad, Mona  & 
Harrison, Ann (1993) 
Morocco 1985-1989 Firm level No No evidence of spillovers (The results reject the hypothesis 
that foreign presence accelerated productivity growth in 
domestic firms). 
5.Blomstrom, Magnus & 
Edward N.Wolff (1994) 
Mexico 1970/1975 Industry level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers (suggested by the fact that 
productivity levels of locally-owned firms in Mexico have 
converged on those of foreign-owned firms). 
6.Caves, Richard E. 
(1994) 
Australia and 
Canada 
Canada (1965-67) & 
Australia (1963-63, 
1966-67) 
Industry level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers for both Canada and Australia 
(foreign investment impels higher technical efficiency in 
competing domestic firms and speeds the transfer of new 
technology of them). However, this result is not that 
significant for Canada probably because of the existence of 
tariffs.  
7.Kokko, Ari (1994) Mexico 1970 Industry level (the Mexican 
manufacturing industry 1970) 
Large technology and high 
foreign shares are harmful for 
spillovers. 
The results suggest that advanced MNC technologies or 
large technology gaps alone do not constitute 
unsurmountable obstacles to spillovers, but that spillovers 
are less likely in industries when large technology gaps and 
high foreign shares coincide. 
8.Kokko, Ari (1996) Mexico 1970 Industry level (the Mexican 
manufacturing industry 1970) 
This paper examines the signs 
of productivity spillovers 
This paper examines if there are signs of productivity 
spillovers from competition between local firms and foreign 
affiliates. The results indicate that spillovers from 
competition are not determined by foreign presence alone, 
but rather by the simultaneous interactions between foreign 
and local firms. 
9.Kokko, Ari; Ruben 
Tansini & Mario C. 
Zejan (1996) 
Uruguay 1988-1990 Firm level No No spillovers in a general sense. But there is a positive 
horizontal spillovers in the sub-sample of plants with 
moderate technology gaps vis-à-vis foreign firms. 
10.Borensztein, E., J. De 
Gregorio, & J-W Lee 
(1998) 
69 LDC 1970-89 Industry level (cross section) Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers from FDI only when a 
sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced technologies 
is available in the host economy. 
11.Aitken, Brian J. & 
Ann E. Harrison (1999) 
Venezuela 1976-1989 Firm level (panel) No No evidence supports the existence of technology 
"spillovers" from foreign firms to domestically owned firms. 
12.Blomstrom, Magnus 
& Fredrik Sjoholm 
(1999) 
Indonesia 1991 Plant level (Indonesian 
Central Bureau of Statistics) 
Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers (Labor productivity is higher 
in establishments with foreign equity than in purely 
domestically owned firms and the latter benefit from 
spillovers from FDI). But this spillovers were restricted to 
non-exporting local firms.  
13.Chuang, Yih-Chyi & 
Chi-Mei Lin (1999) 
Taiwan 1991 Firm level (Taiwan's 
manufacturing census data) 
Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers effect on firm's productivity. 
14.Sjoholm Fredrik 
(1999) 
Indonesia 1980 & 1991 Plant level  Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers (suggested by the fact that 
high competition to increase the degree of spillovers from 
FDI) & high technology gaps give rise to large spillovers. 
15.Sjoholm Fredrik 
(1999) 
Indonesia 1980 & 1991 Plant level Yes (both postitive horizontal 
and vertical) 
Both inter-industry and intra-industry spillovers are found, 
which indicates an evidence of positive horizontal as well as 
vertical spillovers. 
16.Djankov, Simeon & 
Bernard Hoekman 
(2000) 
Czech Republic 1992-1996 Firm level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers (foreign investment has the 
predicted positive impact on TFP growth of recipient firms. 
FDI appears to have a greater impact on TFP growth than do 
joint ventures, suggesting that parent firms are transferring 
more knowledge to affiliates than joint venture firms obtain 
from their partners). 
17.Kathuria, Vinish 
(2000) 
India 1976-1989 Firm level No (negative horizontal 
spillovers) 
There is an efficiency gain for foreign-owned in 13 out of 26 
sectors. For these 13 sectors, there is a negative horizontal 
spillover from the presence of foreign firms in the sector, 
but foreign technical capital stock has a positive impact. 
18.Liu Xiaming; Panela 
Siler, Chengqi Wang & 
Yingqi Wei (2000) 
UK 1991-1995 Industry level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers. The study also shows that the 
extent to which local firms benefit from the introduction of 
advanced technology depends largely on their own 
technological capabilities. 
19.Bosco, Maria 
Giovanna (2001) 
Hungary 1993-1997 Firm level Insufficient evidence The evidence for technological spillovers is weak and does 
not allow clear-cut conclusions. Foreign presence in high-
tech industries does seems to have a positive effect on both 
local and foreign firms. 
20.Damijan, Joze P.; 
Boris Majcen, Mark 
Knell & Matija Rojec 
(2001) 
Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia 
Republic, 
Slovenia 
1994-1998 Firm level No There are no significant positive horizontal spillovers for 
domestic firms from FDI. (Note: trade is an important 
alternative source of international R&D spillovers to firms 
without foreign participation in the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania and Slovenia). 
21.Driffield, Nigel 
(2001) 
UK  1989-1992 Industry level (Report on the 
census of production) 
No No evidence of investment or output spillovers occurring as 
a result of inward investment. However, catching up does 
occur in foreign-owned sector. 
22.Girma, Sourafel; 
David Greeway & 
Katharine Wakelin 
(2001) 
UK 1991-1996 Firm level No No aggregate evidence of horizontal (intra-industry) 
spillovers. Specifically, no wage and productivity spillovers 
to domestic firms as a result of foreign presence. 
23.Kinoshita, Yuko 
(2001) 
Czech Republic 1995-1998 Firm level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
First, technology spillovers from FDI occur for firms that 
are more R&D intensive; second, spillovers from foreign 
joint ventures are insignificant for Czech manufacturing 
firms; lastly, the extent of technology spillovers is greater in 
oligopolistic sectors than in non-oligopolistic sectors. 
24.Kokko, Ari; Mario C. 
Zejan & Ruben Tansini 
(2001) 
Uruguay 1988 Firm level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers from FDI to a sub-sample of 
locally-owned manufacturing plants with moderate 
technology gaps vis-à-vis foreign firms 
25.Konings, Jozef 
(2001) 
Bulgaria, 
Romania and 
Poland 
1993-1997 Firm level Yes (negative horizontal 
spillovers) for Gulgaria and 
Romaina, No for Poland 
On average, there are negative horizontal spillovers to 
domestic firms in Bulgaria and Romania and there is no 
evidence of spillovers in Poland (a negative competition 
effect that dominates a positive technology effect).  
26.Kugler, Maurice 
(2001) 
Colombia 1974-1998 Industry level Yes (positive vertical 
spillovers) 
This study distinguishes intra- and inter-industry spillovers. 
He finds widespread evidence for positive vertical (inter-
industry) spillovers, while horizontal spillovers appear only 
to be important in machinery equipment sector. 
27.Li, Xiaoying, 
Xiaming Liu and David 
Parker (2001) 
China 1995 (1995 industrial  
census) 
Industry level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers for state-owned enterprises. 
Collective-and-private-owned enterprises benefit from 
demonstration and contagion effects form foreign presence.  
28.Barrios, Salvador & 
Eric Strobl (2002) 
Spain 1990-1998 Firm level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers only when domestic firms had 
the appropriate "absorptive capacity". 
29.Castellani, Davide & 
Antonello Zanfei (2002) 
France, Italy, 
Spain 
1992-1997 Firm level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive and significant horizontal productivity spillovers for 
Italian firms, negative spillovers on Spanish firms and non-
significant effects on French firms. 
30.Carkovic, M. & Ross 
Levine (2002)  
72 countries 1960-1995 Industry level (cross section) No No evidence of spillovers.  
31.Dimelis, Sophia & 
Helen Louri (2002) 
Greece 1997 Firm level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers. Moreover, the spillovers 
stemming form minority-owned foreign establishments are 
larger than those from majority-owned ones. 
32.Haskel, Jonathan E., 
Sonia C. Pereira & 
Matthew J. Slaughter 
(2002) 
UK 1973-1992 Plant level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers from inward FDI to domestic 
plants. 
33. Girma, Sourafel 
(2002) 
UK 1989-1999 Firm level No No evidence of productivity spillovers 
34.Girma, Sourafel & 
Holger Gorg (2002) 
UK 1980-1992 Firm level This paper focuses on the role 
of absorptive capacity in 
benefiting from spillovers 
from FDI. 
This paper focuses on the role of absorptive capacity in 
determining whether or not domestic firms benefit from 
productivity spillovers from FDI. The results show that there 
is an evidence for a u-shaped relationship between 
productivity growth and FDI interacted with absorptive 
capacity, which suggests that improvements in absorptive 
capacity of firms may enhance their ability to benefit from 
spillovers from FDI. 
35.Girma, Sourafel & 
Katharine Wakelin 
(2002) 
UK 1988-1996 Firm level (OneSource 
Database) 
Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers occur in the domestic firms 
(with the presence of multinational firms in the same sector 
and region).  
36.Grog, Holger & Eric 
Strobl (2002) 
Ghana 1991-1997 Firm level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers from labor mobility. 
37.Gorg, Holger & Eric 
Strobl (2002) 
Ireland 1973-1996 Plant level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers for indigenous plants in high-
tech industries. 
38.Ruane, Frances & Ali 
Ugur (2002) 
Ireland 1991-1998 Plant level No No evidence of productivity spillovers (when the 
measurement of foreign presence is the MNC employment 
as a percentage of total employment). However, a weak 
evidence of productivity spillovers is found when foreign 
presence measures as the level of employment in foreign 
companies in the relevant sector.  
39.Smarzynska, Beata K. 
(2002) 
Lithuania 1996-2000 Firm level Yes (positive vertical 
spillovers) 
Positive vertical spillovers (the study shows that the 
existence of productivity spillovers from FDI taking place 
through contacts between foreign affiliates and their local 
suppliers in upstream sectors but there is no indication of 
spillovers occurring within the same industry). 
40.Zukowska-
Gagelmann, Katarzyna 
(2002) 
Poland 1993-1997 Firm level No (negative horizontal 
spillovers) 
Negative horizontal spillovers for the most productive local 
firms in high competition industries & positive horizontal 
spillovers for the least productive local firms in low 
competition industries.   
41.Blalock, Garrick & 
Paul Gertler (2003) 
Indonesia 1988-1996 Firm level (panel) Yes (positive vertical 
spillovers) 
Strongly positive vertical spillovers from FDI. 
42.Javorcik, B. S., B. 
(2003) 
Lithuania 1996-2000 Firm level  Yes (positive vertical 
spillovers) 
Positive vertical productivity spillovers. Morevoer, the 
results indicate that spillovers are associated with projects 
with shared domestic and foreign ownership but not with 
fully owned foreign investment. 
43.Keller, Wolfgang & 
Stephen, Yeaple (2003) 
US 1987-1996 Firm level Yes (positive horizontal 
spillovers) 
Positive horizontal spillovers form FDI (accouts for 14% of 
productivity growth of U.S. firm, FDI leads to significant 
productivity gains for domestic firms), also a evidence of 
imports-related spillovers.  
      
44. Liu, Zhiqiang (2005) China 1995-1999 Firm level Yes (no horizontal but 
positive vertical spillovers) 
No positive horizontal spillovers (negative short-run effects) 
but strong positive backward linkages. 
45. Hu and Jefferson 
(2002) 
China 1995-1999 Firm level No (Negative horizontal 
spillovers) 
Sample restricted to China’s electronic and textile industries, 
drawn from the survey of large and medium enterprises 
conducted by the Chinese National Statistical Bureau.  The 
authors find negative horizontal spillovers, although the 
impact is positive for firms receiving foreign investment. 
46. Lin, Lui, and Zhang 
(2008) 
China 1998-2005 Firm level Yes (Positive forward 
spillovers, net zero horizontal 
spillovers) 
They find that Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT) 
invested firms generate negative horizontal spillovers, while 
Non-HMT foreign firms tend to bring positive horizontal 
spillovers. These two opposing horizontal effects seem to 
cancel out at the aggregate level. They also find forward 
spillover effects from all types of FDI.  
 
47. Du, Harrison, and 
Jefferson (2008) 
China 1998-2006 Firm level Negative horizontal and weak 
forward spillovers 
They find evidence of negative and significant horizontal 
spillovers and weak forward spillovers. They also find no 
evidence of positive backward spillovers.  Firms with 
foreign investment exhibit higher productivity growth, 
particularly state-owned enterprises.   
 
